中国劳动力规模尚有增长空间

China’s working age population will fall by more than 10 per cent, a loss of 90m people, by 2040, as much of east Asia “gets old before it gets rich”, the World Bank said last week.

世界银行(World Bank)上周表示，到2040年中国的适龄劳动人口将减少逾10%，相当于减少9000万劳动力，而东亚大部分地区都面临“未富先老”的风险。

The findings conjure up a scenario of a shrinking workforce, sluggish economic growth, rising labour costs as workers become more scarce and increased government spending on pensions, sapping the vitality of one of the world’s key growth engines.

世行的报告让人们脑海中浮现出一幅劳动力萎缩、经济增长乏力、劳动力成本不断攀升的画面，因为劳动力变得越来越稀缺而且政府不得不增加养老金支出，这将削弱中国作为全球主要增长引擎的活力。

This scenario is widely accepted by economic and financial commentators. It is supposedly one of the great truisms of our time.

此种前景已经被经济、财经评论员广泛接受，并被视为我们时代的一条大道理。

Except it is not true. None of these things need happen. The truth is that China and the rest of emerging Asia could actually see their workforces expand over the next 25 years if they fell in line with norms in much of the western world.

但这个画面并不是真实的。所有这些都可以避免。事实是，未来25年，中国及其他亚洲新兴市场国家有可能看到本国劳动力壮大，如果他们实行与西方大部分国家相似的标准的话。

To be clear, the decline in the working-age population in China and several of its neighbours is, barring some highly unlikely turn of events, certain to happen.

需要澄清的是，中国与其多个邻国肯定会出现适龄劳动人口减少的情况（除非发生一些极不可能的事件）。

As the first chart shows, the World Bank foresees a 10 per cent decline in those aged between 15 and 64 in China by 2040, with larger falls still expected in Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, although most of Southeast Asia is likely to see an increase.

如下面的图一所示，世行预计，到2040年中国年龄介于15岁至64岁之间的人口将减少10%，而日本、泰国、新加坡、韩国及香港地区的适龄劳动人口预计将出现更大降幅，但多数东南亚国家的适龄劳动人口可能出现增长。

But the size of the working-age population should not be mistaken for the size of the labour force — many of the former are neither working nor looking for a job.

但“适龄劳动人口”的规模不应被误认为是“劳动力”规模——前者中的许多人既不工作也不找工作。

Take reasonable measures to address this, and the data show that the resultant increase in the participation rate should be larger than the decline in the working-age population, meaning more workers, not fewer.

如果采取合理措施应对，数据显示，由此带来的劳动参与率的提高幅度应会大于适龄劳动人口的降幅，这意味着劳动力增多，而非减少。

China’s low retirement age, for urban workers at least, is a case in point. Official pension ages in urban areas are 50 for blue-collar women, 55 for white-collar women and 60 for men, significantly lower than in most western countries.

中国较低的退休年龄（至少对城镇职工而言）就是一个恰当的例子。在城市地区，蓝领女性开始领取退休金的法定年龄为50岁，白领女性为55岁，男性为60岁，显著低于大多数西方国家。

One might assume this is a natural result of China having a lower life expectancy than the west. There is a grain of truth to this: China’s life expectancy of 76 (74.8 for men, 77.3 for women) is about three years lower than the western average.

人们可能会认为这是中国预期寿命低于西方的自然结果。有一点道理：中国人的预期寿命为76岁（男性74.8岁、女性77.3岁），约比西方平均水平低三岁。

But, firstly, the typical Chinese urban worker will almost certainly live longer than 76, with the average being dragged down by poorer rural dwellers.

但是，首先，典型的中国城市劳动者的寿命几乎肯定会超过76岁，因为较贫困的农村居民拉低了平均值。

Secondly, and more importantly, China’s pension age looks unsustainably low even when correcting for the life expectancy gap. Data collated by the World Bank in its document Live Long and Prosper: Ageing in East Asia and Pacific illustrate this clearly.

其次（更重要的是），即使就预期寿命差做了调整，中国的退休年龄看起来也是低得不可持续。世行在《长寿与繁荣：东亚与太平洋地区的老龄化》(Live Long and Prosper: Ageing in East Asia and Pacific)报告中收集的数据清楚地阐明了这一点。

Chinese women can typically expect to live for virtually 30 years in retirement, with women in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia also enjoying long retirements, on average.

中国女性通常可以预期退休后再活差不多30年，平均而言，越南、泰国以及马来西亚的女性也可以享受较长的退休时间。

In contrast, women in richer countries such as Sweden, Germany and the US can realistically expect 20 years or less of retirement, as the second chart shows.

相比之下，如下面的图二所示，瑞典、德国以及美国等较富裕国家的女性实际上只能盼得20年或者更短的退休时间。

For men, the gap is not so extreme but the average retirement span in China, at 18 years, is still longer than in Sweden, Germany or the US. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia would appear to have more scope still to raise retirement ages.

对男性而言，差距不是那么大，但中国男性的平均退休期为18年，仍然比瑞典、德国及美国的男性要长。泰国、马来西亚以及印度尼西亚似乎有更大的空间来延长退休年龄。

Not everyone, of course, retires at the official retirement age, particularly if their pension is inadequate, but a closer look at the ages Chinese people actually do retire at vividly illustrates the scope for change.

当然，并非所有人都在法定退休年龄退休，尤其是如果他们的养老金不充裕的话，但仔细观察中国人的实际退休年龄能够很清晰地展现出改革空间。

As the third chart shows, by the age of 60, just one in three urban women and 55 per cent of urban men are still in the labour force. In contrast, two-thirds of rural women and 80 per cent of rural men are still in the labour force at this age.

如图三所示，到60岁时，只有三分之一的城市女性与55%的城市男性仍坚持工作。相比之下，三分之二的农村女性以及80%的农村男性60岁时仍在劳动。

This divergence is likely to be driven by the financial pressure on the poorer, rural population to continue working for longer.

这种差异很可能是经济压力造成的，迫使较贫困的农村人口继续劳动更长时间。

But given that most rural labourers are engaged in physically tough, back-breaking agricultural work, it certainly suggests most urban workers should be perfectly capable of continuing in their generally less physically demanding jobs for longer, although there will clearly be some exceptions to this, such as the construction industry.

但是，鉴于大多数农村劳动力从事的都是繁重劳累的农活，这恰恰反衬出，大多数城市劳动者应该完全有能力继续再干一段时间他们通常不需太多体力的工作，虽然有一些明显的例外，比如建筑业。

Overall, though, the World Bank says that average retirement ages in China (as well as Vietnam) among urban workers in formal jobs are three to four years below the already low official retirement ages.

不过，总体而言，世行表示，中国（以及越南）拥有正式工作的城市劳动力的平均退休年龄比本已较低的官方退休年龄还要低3至4年。

Across east and Southeast Asia as a whole, the Bank argues this trend is driven by government policy.

世行认为，在整个东亚以及东南亚地区，这种趋势是由政府政策造成的。

Indonesians and Vietnamese are not allowed to continue working beyond the normal retirement age (55 in the formal sector in Indonesia, 60 for men and 55 for women in Vietnam).

印度尼西亚和越南不允许超过退休年龄者继续工作（印尼正规部门退休年龄为55岁，越南男性为60、女性55岁）。

In China, meanwhile, late retirement is “effectively penalised”, with the additional year of pension contributions not increasing the individual’s pension.

而在中国，晚退休“实际上是不利的”，养老金缴费年头延长了，但个人养老金数额并未增加。

Early retirement is incentivised in many countries. In Vietnam, early retirement “actually increases pension wealth because the penalty is too low to offset the extra benefits received”, the World Bank says, adding that “the Philippines rewards early retirement with a large increase in pension wealth and penalises late retirement at a rate of 17 per cent a year”.

许多国家都采取激励措施鼓励提前退休。世行表示，在越南提前退休“实际上增加了养老金财富，因为惩罚太少，不会抵消额外收益。菲律宾对提前退休者的奖励是大幅增加养老金财富，对延迟退休者则课以一年17%的处罚”。

Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the reforms the World Bank is calling for in east and Southeast Asia is for governments to provide actuarially fair incentives for both early and late retirement.

这或许可以解释为什么世行会呼吁东亚及东南亚国家的政府进行改革，为提前退休和延迟退休者提供真正公平的激励。

The Bank is also recommending that countries equalise retirement ages for men and women, correcting a glaring anomaly whereby women can often retire at a younger age despite enjoying greater life expectancy in every country in the region, as well as linking retirement ages to changes in life expectancy.

世行还建议各国把男性及女性退休年龄拉平，以纠正一个明显的反常现象，即该地区所有国家的女性预期寿命都要更长些，却往往更早退休。世行还建议各国将退休年龄与预期寿命变化挂钩。

Its concern is not just that de facto retirement ages may fail to rise in line with life expectancy, but that they may fall still further.

世行担心的不仅是实际退休年龄可能无法与预期寿命保持同步增长，而且还可能会进一步下降。

“As East Asia and Pacific continues its rapid urbanisation, coverage of pension systems grows, and rising incomes provide new opportunities for people to retire before they are no longer physically capable of work, thereby creating a significant risk that average lengths of working lives will fall,” it says.

世行表示：“随着东亚与太平洋地区继续快速城市化，养老金制度覆盖范围也随之扩大。收入的增加为人们提供了新的机会，他们可以不用等到体力无法负荷工作时再退休，这便产生了一个显著的风险，即人们的平均劳动寿命将缩短。”

Moreover, bringing retirement systems more into line with western norms is not the only measure that would increase the workforce in ageing Asian nations.

此外，让退休制度更加符合西方标准并不是亚洲老龄化国家增加劳动力的唯一措施。

The World Bank also argues that many Asian countries have scope to significantly increase female labour force participation, which typically lags behind that of men, for instance by improving public childcare provision. They could also expand their labour force via immigration, although this is obviously a zero-sum game.

世行还指出，许多亚洲国家具备空间大幅提高女性劳动力参与率，这一指标通常落后于男性，可采取措施包括改善公共幼儿托管服务的提供。它们还可以通过增加移民来扩充自己的劳动力，不过这显然是一个零和游戏。

The Bank provides a vivid demonstration of how these effects could play out in China.

世行生动地展示了这些措施将会在中国产生什么样的影响。

As widely reported, the baseline, business-as-usual scenario, does indeed show the labour force declining 10 per cent or so between now and 2040.

就像媒体广泛报道的一样，如果一切照旧，正如基准线所示，从现在起到2040年中国的劳动力会下降10%左右。

But, as the final chart shows, if China adopted measures to retain older workers in the labour force, its working population would barely fall at all until at least the mid-2030s.

但正如最后一张图所示，如果中国采取措施延长退休年龄，至少到2030年代中期，其劳动人口基本不会下降。

Alternatively, if China succeeded in achieving a degree of convergence between male and female employment rates, the labour force would be just as large in 2040 as it is today. (This calculation is based on female labour force participation rising at an annual rate of 1/40th of the 2010 gap between men and women, thereby eliminating three-quarters of the gap by 2040.)

另外，如果中国能成功地缩小男女就业率的差距，至2040年其劳动力将与现在一样多。（该计算是基于女性劳动力参与率将以2010年男女就业率差距四十分之一的年增长率持续上升，这样至2040年中国就能消除四分之三的男女就业率差距）。

It is important to note that the “elderly” and “female” lines in the chart are mutually exclusive. If both of these issues were addressed, China’s labour force would actually rise by about 10 per cent by 2040, rather than falling by this amount.

需要注意的是在该图中，“老年人”和“女性”两条曲线是相互独立的。如果这两个问题都能得到解决，2040年中国的劳动人口不但不会下降10%，反而能增长10%左右。

“In the most optimistic scenario, you can actually increase the labour force from the current levels,” says Nithin Umaphathi, co-author of the report. “There is underutilised potential out there.”

该报告的合著者尼辛乌玛哈蒂(Nithin Umaphathi)表示：“在最乐观的情况下，中国的劳动力规模甚至会高于当前水平。中国还未充分利用其劳动力潜力。”