美国须检讨 亚投行教训

This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system. True, there have been any number of periods of frustration for the US before, and times when American behaviour was hardly multilateralist, such as the 1971 Nixon shock, ending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. But I can think of no event since Bretton Woods comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out of it.

刚刚过去的这个月可能会作为一个历史性时刻载入史册，它标志着美国失去了全球经济体系担保人的角色。诚然，美国以前经历过数段挫折期，很多时候它的行为也算不上多边主义，比如1971年结束了美元兑换黄金的尼克松冲击(Nixon shock)。但除布雷顿森林体系(Bretton Woods)以外，我想不到有任何事件可与以下两件事的结合相提并论：中国力求建立一个重要的新机构；而从英国开始，美国未能说服几十个传统盟友不要参与该机构。

This failure of strategy and tactics was a long time coming, and it should lead to a comprehensive review of the US approach to global economics. With China’s economic size rivalling America’s and emerging markets accounting for at least half of world output, the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment. Political pressures from all sides in the US have rendered it increasingly dysfunctional.

这是一场早有预兆的战略和战术上的失败，它应该引来一场有关美国对全球经济采取什么姿态的全面检讨。随着中国的经济规模赶上美国，以及新兴市场在全球产出总量中至少占一半份额，全球经济架构需作出大幅调整。而国内各方的政治压力使美国的行为变得越来越不正常。

Largely because of resistance from the right, the US stands alone in the world in failing to approve the International Monetary Fund governance reforms that Washington itself pushed for in 2009. By supplementing IMF resources, this change would have bolstered confidence in the global economy. More important, it would come closer to giving countries such as China and India a share of IMF votes commensurate with their new economic heft.

美国政府在2009年推动国际货币基金组织(IMF)进行治理改革，但主要由于右翼的阻挠，美国未能批准改革方案，令其在国际社会陷入孤立。该改革方案本可以通过补充IMF的资源，提振全球经济信心。更重要的是，它可以赋予中国和印度等国与其新的经济份量更加相称的投票权份额。

Meanwhile, pressures from the left have led to pervasive restrictions on infrastructure projects financed through existing development banks, which consequently have receded as funders, even as many developing countries now see infrastructure finance as their principal external funding need.

与此同时，美国国内左翼的压力导致基础设施项目在通过现有开发银行融资时处处受限，这些开发银行作为出资者已逐渐退缩，尽管许多发展中国家现在将基础设施融资视为它们主要的外部融资需求。

With US commitments unhonoured and US-backed policies blocking the kinds of finance other countries want to provide or receive through the existing institutions, the way was clear for China to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. There is room for argument about the tactical approach that should have been taken once the initiative was put forward. But the larger question now is one of strategy. Here are three precepts that US leaders should keep in mind.

鉴于美国不能兑现承诺，而且美国支持的政策阻止其他国家通过现有机构提供或接受资助，中国建立亚洲基础设施投资银行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，简称亚投行）的道路是畅通的。在这个倡议提出后，对于在战术上应该采取什么样的姿态是存在争论空间的。但现在更大的问题是战略问题。美国领导人应牢记以下三条准则。

First, American leadership must have a bipartisan foundation at home, be free from gross hypocrisy and be restrained in the pursuit of self-interest. As long as one of our major parties is opposed to essentially all trade agreements, and the other is resistant to funding international organisations, the US will not be in a position to shape the global economic system.

首先，美国的领导力必须在国内有两党的基础，摒弃严重虚伪，并收敛对自身利益的追求。只要我们的两个主要政党仍然一个基本上反对所有贸易协定，另一个不愿资助国际组织，美国就无法影响全球经济体系的格局。

Other countries are legitimately frustrated when US officials ask them to adjust their policies — then insist that American state regulators, independent agencies and far-reaching judicial actions are beyond their control. This is especially true when many foreign businesses assert that US actions raise real rule of law problems.

每当美国官员要求其他国家调整政策，然后坚称自己无法控制美国各州监管机构、独立机构以及影响深远的司法行动时，其他国家有充分理由感到郁闷，尤其是在许多外国企业宣称美国的举动引发实质性法治问题的情况下。

The legitimacy of US leadership depends on our resisting the temptation to abuse it in pursuit of parochial interest, even when that interest appears compelling. We cannot expect to maintain the dollar’s primary role in the international system if we are too aggressive about limiting its use in pursuit of particular security objectives.

美国领导力的合法性取决于我们能否抵挡住诱惑，不利用它追求美国一国之利，即便这种利益看上去非常具有吸引力。如果我们将美元的使用局限于追求某些特定的安全目标，在这方面过于咄咄逼人，我们就不能指望能维持美元在国际体系中至高无上的地位。

Second, in global as well as domestic politics, the middle class counts the most. It sometimes seems that the prevailing global agenda combines elite concerns about matters such as intellectual property, investment protection and regulatory harmonisation with moral concerns about global poverty and posterity, while offering little to those in the middle. Approaches that do not serve the working class in industrial countries (and rising urban populations in developing ones) are unlikely to work out well in the long run.

其次，在国际以及国内政治中，中产阶级都应该是摆在第一位的。有时候，主流国际议程一方面是精英们关心的问题，如知识产权、投资保护和监管协调，另一方面是有关全球贫困和子孙后代的道德担忧，但很少关心中产阶级。不为工业化国家里的劳动者阶级（以及发展中国家不断壮大的城市人口）谋福利的政策，从长远来看不太可能成功。

Third, we may be headed into a world where capital is abundant and deflationary pressures are substantial. Demand could be in short supply for some time. In no big industrialised country do markets expect real interest rates to be much above zero in 2020 or inflation targets to be achieved. In the future, the priority must be promoting investment, not imposing austerity. The present system places the onus of adjustment on “borrowing” countries. The world now requires a symmetric system, with pressure also placed on “surplus” countries.

第三，我们的世界或许在朝这样的方向前进：资本充足，通缩压力巨大。需求不足的问题可能会持续一段时间。在所有大型工业化国家，市场都不指望2020年的实际利率会比零高出太多，也不指望通胀目标能够实现。未来的重心必须是促进投资，而非实施紧缩政策。现行体制将调整的责任放在了“借款”国身上。如今世界需要一种对称的体制，让“盈余”国也承担起责任。

These precepts are just a beginning, and many questions remain. There are questions about global public goods, about acting with the speed and clarity that the current era requires, about co-operation between governmental and non-governmental actors, and much more. What is crucial is that the events of the past month will be seen by future historians not as the end of an era, but as a salutary wake up call.

上述原则只是个开始，还存在许多问题。有全球公共品问题，有在采取行动时拿出当今时代所要求的速度和清晰度的问题，有政府和非政府行为主体之间合作的问题，等等。重要的是，过去一个月的事件将被未来的史学家视为一记及时的警钟，而非一个时代终结的标志。

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

注：本文作者是美国哈佛大学(Harvard)查尔斯•W•艾略特校级教授(Charles W. Eliot University Professor)，曾担任美国财政部长。