对不起美国:中国不会崩溃

In a recent piece published in the Wall Street Journal, The Coming Chinese Crackup, China scholar and George Washington University professor David Shambaugh boldly predicts that the Communist Party of China (CCP)'s endgame has begun. Although, in the past, such brave predictions of the CCP's collapse have been proven wrong, the fact that such a prediction has come from Shambaugh, a leading China expert, makes it all the more interesting. In a report from China's Foreign Affairs University, Shambaugh was named the second most influential China expert in the United States. As such, Chinese scholars and officials will take his opinions seriously.

华尔街日报最近发表了一篇文章，标题为《中国即将崩溃》。本文作者沈大伟是乔治华盛顿大学的教授，也是研究中国问题的专家。他在文中预测中国GCD（CCP）的统治已进入了‘诸神的黄昏'阶段。尽管这种预言过去曾多次被打脸，但从沈大伟这样一位专业的中国通口中说出这样的话，使整件事变得更加有趣了。据中国外交学院的一份报告显示，美国最有影响力的中国专家中，沈大伟名列第二。与此同时，中国学者和官员们也会认真聆听他的意见。

Professor Shambaugh listed five indicators that point to China's coming collapse. However, a closer analysis of these five points reveals that Shambaugh's conclusion is based on incorrect facts and flawed interpretations of China's recent socioeconomic and political developments.

沈教授列出了五个中国崩溃的征兆。但对这五点做进一步的分析，我们可以发现沈教授的结论建立在错误的论据上，他对于中国近期的社会经济和政治发展所做出的诠释是有瑕疵的。

First, he asserts that wealthy Chinese are fleeing China. Actually, this is only half true. While a large number of wealthy Chinese have migrated to countries like Canada, most of them still do business in China, meaning that they are still have a positive outlook on China's future. In any case, a good number of these wealthy people move their assets out of China to avoid corruption charges, which has nothing to do with China's future development. Moreover, in recent years an increasing number of overseas students have chosen to come back to China because they have confidence in China's future.

首先，他声称中国的富人正在逃离中国。事实上，这句话只对了一半。尽管有许多富有的中国人移民加拿大等国，但大部分的移民仍留在中国做生意。这意味着他们仍旧看好中国的前景。总之，数量可观的有钱人转移资产到海外来逃避贪污的指控，这与中国未来的发展毫无关联。更有甚者，近年来学成归国的留学生数量正在不断增加，因为他们对中国的发展有信心。

The second indicator is increasing political repression and CCP insecurity. Actually, not much has changed in this area, compared to the Hu Jintao presidency. The party insecurity thesis is an old argument and one can say that the CCP has always been insecure, especially since 1989. So what is so special about the present that signals the Party's endgame? Indeed, one can argue that the Party's endgame is soon, no matter what it does. If the Party opens up, then civil society will rise up and overthrow the regime; if the Party continues to be repressive, it will breed insecurity, which will cause its collapse.

第二个迹象是政治迫害和中国CCP的不安全感与日俱增。事实上，与Hu主席在位时相比，这方面的变化并不大。关于中国CCP不安全感的观点是个老话题，我们可以说中共从来就没安全感，特别是在1989年之后。那这一点是如何成为中国CCP即将灭亡的佐证的呢？事实上，无论怎样都会有人宣称中共的末日就在眼前。如果中共实施开放，人民会起义推翻GCD的统治。如果中共继续实施政治迫害，中共的不安全感将进一步扩大，最终导致其灭亡。

Third, Shambaugh argues that Chinese officials come across as wooden and bored. But many Chinese offic als were always like that, so there is nothing new in this observation. It is definitely not something t hat can support Shambaugh's "China collapsing" argument.

第三，沈教授表示中共官员给人的印象木讷无趣。但许多中国官员从前就是如此，这方面的观察毫无新意,也不支持沈大伟中国崩溃的观点。

Fourth, Shambaugh points out there is massive corruption in China. Shambaugh is right about the serious ness of the corruption issue in China. But he neglects to mention that the anti-corruption campaign has been very successful so far, and the main reason for this is because it has the public's support. Corr upt officials know this too, which is why they are unable to fight back.

第四，沈大伟指出中国的腐败现象很普遍。沈教授对于中国腐败的担心是对的,但他没有提到迄今为止中国的反腐斗争十分成功，并且成功的原因是得到了群众支持。腐败的官员也同样清楚这一点，那是他们无力反击的原因。

Shambaugh's final argument is that the Chinese economy is slowing. Arguably, this fifth factor is the only new point in Shambaugh's argument, as the previous four factors have been features of China's political culture for quite some time. As such, this argument deserves serious consideration.

沈教授最后的论点是中国经济发展速度正在变慢，这可能是沈教授文章中唯一具有新意的一点。前四项观点早已被视为中国政治文化的特点。因此，我们有必要认真考虑第五项观点。

Shambaugh seems to believe that a slowing economy will lead to widespread grievances, which in turn will lead to civil unrest. This will lead to the collapse of the regime. Arguably, this is what fueled the Arab Spring and may be applied to China today.

沈教授似乎相信经济放缓会引起大范围的民怨，最终导致中国内乱，最后瓦解中共的统治。作为阿拉伯之春的导火索，也许同样适用于今天的中国。

However, there are several problems with this argument.

然而，这一观点有几个问题。

First, China's economic slowdown is not an economic meltdown. It is true that compared to China's past sensational growth rate, a six to seven percent growth rate is a slowdown. But which other major economy can grow at this rate? China's economic growth must be viewed in a relative sense.

首先，中国经济放缓并不是滑坡式的下跌。与过去中国爆发性的增长相比较，6%到7%的增长率确实慢下来了。但还有哪个主要经济体能有这个增长速度呢？我们应用‘相对增长速度'来看待中国的经济。

Second, would a slowdown, or even a massive financial meltdown lead to widespread disruption in Chinese society? The answer actually depends on how the effects of the slowdown are distributed throughout society. As Confucius pointed out long ago, Chinese people tend to get riled up more about inequality than scarcity(患均不患寡), which is just as true today. Most ordinary Chinese hate a high level of inequality, especially if such inequality is a result of corruption rather than legitimate hard work. While a severe crisis would lead to a massive loss of jobs and lower incomes, if the U.S. economy survived the 2008 global financial crisis, there is no reason to believe the Chinese economy cannot overcome a similar one.

第二，中国经济放缓，甚至大范围的金融危机是否会导致中国社会土崩瓦解？答案取决于社会如何分担经济放缓的后果。很久以前孔子曾经说过，中国人不患寡而患不均，今天也同样如此。绝大多数中国平民仇富，特别是那些非法腐败所取得的财富。当严重的经济危机导致大范围的失业和收入降低时，如果美国能从2008年经济危机的打击中恢复元气，那我们没有理由相信中国不能克服同样的困难。

Third, even if a severe economic crisis hits China and causes greater social grievances, why does this mean that social unrest will automatically lead to an uprising against the regime? In other words,, this claim is premised on the belief that the Chinese government's legitimacy relies solely on economic performance.

第三，即使中国产生严重的经济危机，由此而引发了更严重的社会问题，为什么认为中国内乱会导致人民揭竿而起，推翻中国GCD的统治？换句话说，这种假设建立在中国政府的合法统治权仅仅依赖于经济表现的观点上。

Unfortunately this assumption, though widely held among scholars, is no longer true. Economic growth is certainly important for most Chinese people, but education, the environment, corruption, and legal justice matter just as much as growth. As long as the Chinese government seriously tackles problems in those areas, support for the CCP will remain high. This explains why the Xi administration has initiated bold reforms in all these areas.

不幸的是，这种假设虽然被学者们普遍接受，但并不正确。对于大部分中国人而言，经济增长虽然非常重要，但教育、环境、腐败和法律也一样重要。只要中国政府认真解决这几方面的问题，中国人民将继续拥护中国GCD。这也是习主席领导的中国政府在上述几方面开始大刀阔斧改革的原因。

Finally, even if there is political unrest will it necessarily topple the regime? This depends on the balance of power between the government and the dissenters. Where is the political opposition in China today? Does the political opposition enjoy the widespread support of ordinary Chinese people? Is there any leader who might want to play the role of Gorbachev? None of these factors exist in China.

最后，如果一个国家内乱的话，是否必将动摇政府的统治？这取决于政府和异见者之间的权力博弈。而中国的反对派在哪里？中国的反对派是否获得了人民的广泛支持？是否有人想做中国的戈尔巴乔夫？中国不具备上述任何一个条件。

In sum, in order to make the argument that an economic slowdown would lead to regime change, one would have to make the argument that all of the above factors would come into play. Yet, Shambaugh's argument does not demonstrate this. Indeed, a slowing economy is actually bringing several benefits to China. A slower but stable growth rate would mean less pollution, fewer land-grabbing incidents, less corruption, less energy consumption, and lower socioeconomic expectations, all of which lead to reduced social tensions in China, decreasing the possibility of a regime collapse.

总而言之，为了证明经济放缓将导致政权更替，作者必须保证上述所有条件能起作用。但沈博士的观点并未证明这一点。事实上，经济放缓反而使中国受惠。缓慢但稳定的增长速度意味着污染、征地冲突、腐败、能源消耗的减少，社会经济预期下降，中国社会的紧张局势有所缓解，政权崩溃的可能性反而降低了。

Implicit in Shambaugh's argument is the claim that China and the CCP will collapse unless they adopt We stern-style liberal democracy. But he never attempts to answer a simple question: is Western-style libe ral democracy what most ordinary Chinese people want?

沈教授的文章中暗示，除非服下西式民主的药方，否则中国和中国CCP必然崩溃。但他从未试图回答这样一个简单的问 题：中国人民需要西式民主吗？

As Orville Schell and John Delury point out, wealth and power are the two things that most Chinese peop le have pursued throughout the last century. Today, with China's rising power and influence, internation al respect can be added to this duo.

夏伟和鲁乐汉（两位都是研究中国问题的美国历史学者)指出，上世纪以来，中国人民唯二的追求是财富和权利。今天，随着不断上升的权力和影响，中国追求的目标还包括在国际上受到尊重。

Do the Chinese also desire liberty, democracy, human rights, and so on? Of course they do. My own research, which will be presented in a forthcoming article based on survey data, shows that even among the most liberal Chinese, the desire for liberty and democracy quickly weakens as long as the Chinese government does a good job of tackling corruption, environmental pollution, and inequality. Democracy is seen as a means, rather than as an end.

中国人民是否渴望自由、民主、人权等等？当然。我即将发表一篇文章来展示我的研究结果。其中的调查数据显示，即使在那些自由程度最高的中国人中，只要中国政府妥善处理腐败、环境污染和不平等问题，他们对于自由和民主的追求意愿就会消退。民主被视为一种手段，而不是结果。

Research done by late professor Shi Tianjian also shows that Chinese culture still favors authoritarianism even as people also desire democracy. Through this context, we can understand that Xi Jinping has become so popular among the Chinese masses because of his bold reform measures, which range from soccer-reform to overhauling state-owned enterprises. Even in the area of political reform, Xi is proceeding steadily as consultative democratic mechanisms will soon be implemented at various governmental levels. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Xi has been the most creative leader in the last three decades. If anything, the level of support for the CCP is higher now than it was in the last decade. Ignoring this reality seriously misreads Chinese politics today.

已过世的石天健教授同样表示，尽管中国人民追求民主，但中国文化仍青睐集权统治。在这种背景下，Xi主席大胆的改革，从中国足球改革到国有企业改制，获得中国大众的衷心欢迎就变得容易理解了。即使是在政治改革领域，习主席正在各级政府层面推行稳健的协商民主机制。 因此，我们可以毫不夸张的说，习主席是过去三十年来最具有创造力的领导人。甚至可以说，中国GCD的支持率比过去十年更高了。无视这一事实将会错误地解读中国的政治现状。

Then, why do so many Western analysts not see this reality? What do Shambaugh's article and similar writings reflect about the mentality of some Western thinkers and analysts?

为什么这么多的西方分析师都没能看清现状呢？沈教授的文章和那些类似的‘中国崩溃论'是如何反映西方智囊和分析师思想的呢？

Perhaps implicit in such arguments is the collective worry or fear that China will continue to become stronger, more prosperous, and more assertive in international affairs. The West has not prepared for a possibility where it is no longer the dominant force in the world. After the Cold War, many Western democracies have adopted the triumphal "End of History" thesis.

也许这些文章集中、隐晦的表达了对于中国变得更加强大、更加繁荣、在国际事务中扮演更重要角色的忧虑或畏惧。西方社会还没有准备好面对这样一个现实，即他们不再是统治世界的中坚力量。冷战结束后，许多西方民主国家已经接受了‘历史终结'的观点。（*弗朗西斯﹒福山提出的历史终结论：人类历史的前进与意识形态之间的斗争正走向"终结"，随着冷战的结束，"自由民主"和资本主义被定于一尊，是谓"资本阵营"的胜利。）

However, now that a strong and authoritarian China has emerged, one not compliant with the standard "liberal democracy model" advocated by the West, it is seen as a threat. The "China threat" narrative is understandable, as people tend to fear something they do not understand or that looks different. And China today is a great "other," but because it is strong, it is more threatening than a weak "other." A strong China causes cognitive dissonance among many Western analysts because according to their theories, an authoritarian China should be weak. This explains the selective reading by Western scholars of China's political reality.

然而，强大、专制的中国已经崛起，因为中国并不遵守西方‘自由、民主'的模式，西方将其视为威胁。‘中国威胁论'是可以理解的，因为人们对他们不理解的事务，或者看上去不一样的东西感到害怕。今日之中国是个巨大的‘外来者'，但因为中国的强大，她比其他弱小的‘外来者'更具有威胁性。 许多西方分析师因为中国的强大产生了意见上的分歧，因为从理论上来说，专制的中国应该是弱小的。这解释了为什么西方学者会选择性的解读中国的政治现状。

Therefore, Shambaugh's seriously flawed due to its problematic logic. However, this does not mean that there is no merit at all in his piece.

因此，沈教授有问题的逻辑产生了严重的偏差。但他的文章还是有可取之处的。

For one, Shambaugh rightly reminds us that China's political system can be quite unstable despite the appearance of stability on the surface and efforts at reform. China's political system does need to be more open, more inclusive, and more democratic; and it will someday. The ultimate outcome of Xi's ongoing reforms remains to be seen. Nonetheless, all existing indicators point to the development of a stronger and more effective system of governance within China. Instead of a quick collapse, a mighty, confident, assertive, and authoritarian China will be around for quite a while. As such, discussion about China should take this reality into account, rather than imagining the victory of the West's vision for China, however uncomfortable this may be.

文章中有一点是正确的，沈教授提醒我们，尽管表面上很平静，中国政府也正致力于改革，但中国的政治体系并不稳定。中国的政治体系必须更开放、更包容、更民主；而这一天必将来临。习主席改革的最终成果指日可待。而所有现存的迹象表明，中国将发展成为一个更强大、管理体系更高效的国家。与其说中国即将崩溃，不如说在很长一段时间内，中国还是那个强大、自信、坚定的集权国家。所以，不管有多困难，关于中国的讨论应把这一现实考虑进去，而不是往中国身上生搬硬套西方的成功模式。

Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau and Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights.

陈定定先生是澳门大学政府和公共管理专业的助理教授，也是德国柏林全球公共政策研究所（GPPi）的外籍研究员。他的研究领域包括：中国外交政策、亚洲安全、中国政治和人权。