富裕的民主国家萎缩 新的全球权力均势

It was only the day before yesterday that the rich democracies imagined a post-cold war global order fashioned in their own image. Now they are running away from the world. There were to be three pillars to the new order. As a benign hegemon, the US would underwrite the international peace and advance the spread of liberal democracy.

仿佛就在前天，富裕的民主国家还按照自己的观念构想了冷战后的世界秩序。如今它们正从世界退缩。按照它们的构想，新秩序将会有3个支柱。作为一个温和的霸主，美国将为国际和平背书并推动自由民主的传播。

Europe would export its model of postmodern integration to its near neighbourhood and beyond — remember those predictions that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would soon be like the EU? A declining Russia would join China and the rising powers of the east and south in recognising their national advantage in becoming stakeholders in a western-designed system.

欧洲将向邻国及其他国家输出后现代的一体化模式——还记得关于东盟很快将和欧盟一样的预测吗？日益衰落的俄罗斯将和中国以及东半球和南半球的新兴国家一起认识到，成为西方设计的体系中的利益相关者符合自己的国家利益。

That was then. The US is still by a margin the pre-eminent power but, whether Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump wins the presidency in November, the domestic political impulse is to pull back from the world.

这就是当时的情况。如今，美国还算是头号强国，但今年11月无论是希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)还是唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)赢得总统大选，美国国内的政治冲动都是从世界退缩。

Europe is too busy filling the cracks in its own project to pay heed to what is happening elsewhere. Engulfed by crises — the eurozone, migration and most recently Brexit — it is a continent that has lost the capacity to think strategically. Meanwhile, China and Russia have no inclination to accept rules written by the US.

欧洲正忙着填补自身一体化项目的裂痕，无暇关注其他地方的情况。由于接连陷入危机——欧元区危机、移民潮以及最近的英国退欧——欧洲大陆失去了战略思考能力。与此同时，中国和俄罗斯无意接受美国制定的规则。

What happened? The war in Iraq, intended to demonstrate the reach of American power, instead delineated its limitations. The global financial crash of 2007-08 cruelly exposed the weaknesses of liberal capitalism.

结果发生了什么？伊拉克战争本应彰显美国巨大的影响力，结果却展示出其力有不逮。2007年至2008年的全球金融危机无情地暴露了自由资本主义的缺陷。

Europe’s integrationist dreams were shattered by the consequent eurozone shock. China grew faster than anyone had expected, accelerating the redistribution of power in the global system.

随后的欧元区危机让欧洲的一体化梦想破碎。中国的增长超过所有人的预期，加快了全球体系中的权力重新分配。

The common thread now is nationalism. In the US this takes the form of “America-first” — some say, belligerent — isolationism. For President Vladimir Putin, armed revanchism is about all he has left: Russia is weak in all the dimensions of power except the military.

现在的共同主题是民族主义。在美国，这是（一些人挑衅地说）以“美国优先”的孤立主义的形式存在的。对俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)来说，武装复仇主义与俄罗斯的现状有关：从军事以外的其他所有维度来说，俄罗斯都是实力疲弱。

Europe, with its populism and pocket-sized authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, is unlearning the lessons of its history. China wants to expunge the memory of 100 years of humiliation. You could say they are all Westphalians now.

欧洲没有吸取历史的教训，如今民粹主义兴起，并出现了匈牙利总理维克托•欧尔班(Viktor Orban)等“缩微型”威权人物。中国希望消除100年的屈辱记忆。你可以说它们现在都是威斯特伐利亚的（威斯特伐利亚和约是指于1648年10月24日分别在神圣罗马帝国明斯特市和奥斯纳布吕克市（威斯特伐利亚区）签定的一系列和约，标志着三十年战争的结束。威斯特伐利亚和约在欧洲大陆建立了一个相对均势状态的格局，但这种格局并不稳定，事实上，随后的各国兴衰更替以一种令人目眩的速度进行着。——编者注）。

I was reminded of the gulf of misunderstanding and mistrust at a gathering this week in Beijing. The annual Xiangshan security forum is the place where China’s military and political elites speak to the world. It is a fascinating event for a westerner — a place where the voices of Europeans and Americans have to compete for time at the podium with those of such nations as East Timor, Cambodia, Mongolia and, of course, China’s ally of convenience, Russia.

这让我想起了最近北京一个聚会上的深刻误解和不信任。香山年度安全论坛是中国军事和政治精英向全球发表讲话的场所。对西方人来说，这是一个极具吸引力的论坛，在该论坛上，欧洲人和美国人必须与东帝汶、柬埔寨、蒙古，当然还有中国的权宜盟友俄罗斯等国的人士争夺上台发言时间。

The chosen theme for 2016 was the search for a “new model of international relations”. The subliminal message was that the west should recognise that the old order has passed and it is time to engage with China in co-designing its replacement.

2016年论坛的主题是寻找“新型国际关系”。言外之意是，西方应该认识到，旧秩序已经成为历史，现在是与中国接触共同设计新秩序的时候了。

Western talk of adapting the existing system to accommodate Beijing failed to recognise that what is required is something entirely new. Above all, the US, as the status quo outsider in east Asia, should adjust to the new realities. The alliance system of the second half of the 20th century does not fit the geopolitical realities of China’s rise.

西方表示将会调整现有体系以容纳中国，这反映出他们未能认识到，中国需要某种全新的秩序。最重要的是，作为现状下东亚的外来者，美国应该调整以适应新现实。20世纪后半叶建立的同盟体系不切合中国崛起的地缘政治现实。

Apart from some sharp words about Beijing’s resolve to protect its claims and interests in the South China sea, the language of the hosts was mollifying. China seeks positive sum co-operation and is determined to avoid the “Thucydides trap” of a clash between an established and rising power. But the new order cannot look like the old.

除了发表决心捍卫南中国海上的主张和利益的激烈言辞以外，中国的言辞还算温和。中国寻求正和合作，并决心避免落入老牌大国与新兴大国冲突的“修昔底德陷阱”(Thucydides Trap)。但新秩序不可能像旧秩序。

Like what then? You catch talk in the background about a new concert of great powers, modelled on the work of Metternich at the 19th-century Congress of Vienna. Or perhaps a series of regional power balances with the US and China at the apex? A less sanguine view is that order will simply be replaced by half-organised disorder.

那么像什么？你在这种背景下听到有人提议，以19世纪维也纳会议上梅特涅(Metternich)的构想为模板，诸大国建立新的协调关系。或者是构建一系列的区域性权力均势，美国和中国处于顶点？一种不太乐观的观点是，秩序将被组织涣散的混乱取代。

There yet is another school of thought — call it realism, pragmatism or, more realistically, fatalism — that says there is simply nothing to be done. Later, if not sooner, this multipolar world will find a new equilibrium. Let nations sort out their own problems and conflicts, proponents of this view argue. A new balance will eventually emerge.

还有一种无所作为的思想——我们称之为现实主义、务实主义或者更切合实际地说，是宿命主义。或快或慢，这个多极世界会找到新的均衡。这种观点的拥护者辩称，让各国解决各自的问题和冲突。最终将出现新的平衡。

The snag is that eventually may be too late. The Middle East is burning and Russia wants to upturn the post-cold war settlement in Europe, but the really dangerous great power flashpoints are in east Asia. Add North Korea’s nuclear programme to regional rivalry in the East and South China seas and it is not hard to see US-China competition turning to confrontation and worse.

这种观点的问题在于，最终可能太晚。中东战火纷飞，俄罗斯希望颠覆冷战后的欧洲格局，但大国中真正危险的引爆点是在东亚。综合考虑朝鲜核计划以及东中国海和南中国海上的地区性对抗局势，不难发现美中竞争正在转向对峙乃至更糟糕的局面。

The world is at a hinge point. The post-cold war settlement, organised around unchallenged US power, western-designed global institutions and multilateral rules and norms, has been eroded. The rule of power is chafing against the rule of law, nationalism against internationalism.

世界处于关键时刻。冷战后围绕无可匹敌的美国实力组织起来、由西方设计的全球机制和多边规则的格局已经受到削弱。实力至上主义与法治原则冲突，民族主义与国际主义冲突。

Some think that the simple fact of economic interdependence will save the day — conflict would throw up only losers. But the dynamic can operate in the other direction.

一些人认为，经济彼此依存的简单事实将会让世界转危为安——冲突只会产生输家，没有人能成为赢家。但形势可能朝着相反的方向发展。

It is no accident that the International Monetary Fund’s latest annual report cites political risk as the biggest threat to the world economy. The liberal economic system depends above all on global security order.

国际货币基金组织(IMF)在最新的年度报告中将政治风险列为世界经济的最大威胁，这并非偶然。自由的经济体系首先依赖于全球安全秩序。