得不偿失的工业间谍活动
Normally, economists do not measure the antics of spies.
正常情况下，经济学家不会衡量间谍行为有多愚蠢可笑。
But these are not entirely normal times; or not as far as the American business community and US Department of Justice is concerned.
但现在并非完全正常的时期；或者说，至少对美国企业界和美国司法部(DoJ)而言是不正常的。
In recent months, the DoJ has pursued cases where American officials think that spies for China have been stealing commercial secrets from American companies.
最近几个月，美国司法部一直在追查中国间谍案，美国官员们认为，为中国工作的间谍在窃取美国公司的商业机密。
This year, for example, the FBI apprehended Allen Ho, an American national born in Taiwan, and accused him of stealing nuclear technology for the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN has stirred up controversy because it is one of the investors in the planned UK nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point).
例如，今年美国联邦调查局(FBI)拘押了在台湾出生的美国公民何则雄(Allen Ho)，指控他为中国国有的中广核集团(China General Nuclear Power Group)窃取核技术（中广核引发争议，因为它是英国拟议中的欣克利角(Hinkley Point)核电站的投资者之一）。
Separately, the DoJ and FBI have accused Chinese-born nationals of stealing know-how from advanced underwater vehicle technology to military-grade carbon fibre.
另外，美国司法部和联邦调查局指控华裔美国人窃取各种专业技术，从先进的水下潜航器技术到军用级碳纤维。
They have even chased spies who tried to steal the technique for using titanium dioxide to make consumer goods appear ultra-white; this technology, owned by DuPont, is used for items ranging from the filling in Oreo biscuits to tennis court lines.
他们甚至追查一些间谍试图窃取利用二氧化钛让消费品看上去显得超白的技术；这种技术由杜邦(DuPont)拥有，用于各种产品，从奥利奥饼干(Oreo)的馅料到网球场边线。
US security officials say this is just the tip of an espionage iceberg — one that has forced the DoJ to switch its attention from traditional sleuthing to a keener focus on industrial spying.
美国安全官员们表示，这只是间谍活动的冰山一角，大量间谍活动已迫使美国司法部将注意力从传统侦查转向更密切关注工业间谍活动。
As John Carlin, assistant attorney-general for national security, observes : We still do the traditional spy cases.
负责国家安全事务的美国助理总检察官约翰.卡林(John Carlin)认为：我们仍在侦查传统的间谍案件。
But a lot of the cases now are not traditional espionage, insofar as they’re not necessarily a trained member of the other country’s spy service.
但现在很多案件并非传统间谍案，因为涉案人员不一定是其他国家间谍组织受过训练的成员。
Instead, they’re getting the information by cyber-enabled means or stealing it by bribing an insider.
他们通过网络手段获得信息或者通过收买内部人士窃取信息。
What has hitherto been missing from the DoJ policy shift, however, is a sense of economics.
然而，就美国司法部的政策变动而言，此前被忽视的一点是经济学评估。
Although the FBI has estimated that industrial espionage costs American companies $19bn a year, nobody has examined the other side of the balance sheet: the impact on Chinese companies or anyone else.
尽管联邦调查局估计，工业间谍每年给美国企业带来190亿美元的损失，但没有人考察这个资产负债表的另一面：对中国企业或者其他方面的影响。
Business leaders and politicians should look at fascinating work just published by economists Albrecht Glitz and Erik Meyersson.
企业高管和政治人士应看看经济学家亚伯雷希.格列茨(Albrecht Glitz)和埃里克.迈尔森(Erik Meyersson)刚刚发表的一篇引人入胜的论文。
They examined the impact of one of the best-documented and systematically organised pieces of industrial espionage ever seen: the campaign by the East German Stasi to steal secrets from West German companies between 1969 and 1989.
他们考察了迄今记录最完整、系统化有组织的工业间谍活动之一：1969年至1989年东德情报和秘密警察机构史塔西(Stasi)从西德公司窃取商业机密。
The researchers crunched 151,854 pieces of information in Stasi files that informants took from West German businesses.
研究人员研究了史塔西档案中的15.1854万条信息，这些信息是线人从西德公司获取的。
All were sorted into 16 categories, of which office appliances, computing and electronics was the largest.
这些信息被分成16类，其中办公室用具、电脑和电子产品最多。
The data were compared with statistics about East German productivity then adjusted to remove impact from indigenous innovation (or ideas which were not stolen).
研究人员把这些数据与东德生产率数据进行了对比，然后做出调整，排除了自主创新（或者并非来自窃取的创意）的影响。
Their conclusions are that East German companies enjoyed big productivity gains from spying.
他们的结论是，东德公司从间谍活动获得大幅生产率提升。
For the East German economy, the immediate returns to industrial espionage were substantial.
对于东德经济而言，工业间谍活动取得了立竿见影的显著回报。
This is chilling for American companies.
这将令美国企业不寒而栗。
It also offers easy ammunition for China-bashing US politicians such as Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee.
它也为敲打中国的美国政治人士提供现成的弹药，例如共和党总统提名人唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)。
But there is an important twist.
但这里有一个重要的情节转折。
After the Berlin Wall came down, East German industry collapsed.
在柏林墙倒下后，东德工业很快瓦解。
Economists have blamed this on problems such as an uncompetitive exchange rate.
经济学家们一直将其归咎于不具竞争力的汇率等问题。
Mr Glitz and Mr Meyersson by contrast suggest that, because the Stasi was addicted to industrial espionage, East German companies did not pay enough attention to original research and development.
相比之下，格列茨和迈尔森认为，由于史塔西沉迷于工业间谍活动，东德公司没有对原创研发投入足够多的关注。
They conclude that spying may have proved productive [for East Germany] in catching up with its capitalist neighbours under a communist regime because it was done on such an industrial scale.
他们总结称，间谍活动在帮助东德在共产党政权统治下赶上资本主义邻国方面可能被证明为具有成效，因为它是以工业规模展开的。
Yet in the long run this espionage actually hurt the economy.
然而，长远来看，这种间谍活动实际上会损害经济。
Could this happen in the case of the US and China? The academic research is limited and the parallels are not exact.
就美国与中国而言，是否可能会发生同样的情况？这方面的学术研究有限，对比也不完美契合。
China has sophisticated intellectual capital of its own and is a vastly more successful economy than East Germany was.
中国本身拥有强大的智力资本，而且远比当年的东德经济成功。
Nevertheless, the next time Donald Trump, or anyone else, accuses China of stealing jobs and ideas, it is worth remembering this thought-provoking moral.
然而，下次当唐纳德.特朗普（或者其他任何人）指责中国窃取就业和创意时，我们有必要记住这个发人深省的故事。
Yes, industrial espionage provides for powerful political rhetoric.
没错，工业间谍活动提供了强有力的政治说辞。
And, yes, it is likely to create drama at the DoJ in coming months.
同样没错的是，它可能会在未来几个月在美国司法部制造戏剧。
It has also hurt some US companies, as well as groups in Europe, Japan and South Korea.
它还损害了一些美国公司以及欧洲、日本和韩国的企业。
But, in the long run, a country’s best economic weapon is its ability to keep producing new ideas, over and over again.
然而，长远来看，一国最好的经济武器是不断产生新创意的能力。
American politicians should feel both comforted and challenged.
美国政治人士应该既为此感到欣慰，也有受到挑战的忧患意识。
