奥巴马比批评者更懂伊朗 Obama reads Iran better than his critics

Those whom the gods will destroy they first make mad. Critics of Barack Obama’s Iran deal have been giving a good impression of having lost the plot. An Israeli cabinet minister described it as “one of the darkest days in world history”. Republicans liken Mr Obama to Neville Chamberlain. All agree that a deal that removes about two-thirds of Iran’s nuclear capability and freezes the rest will somehow hasten the day it has the bomb. In the next two months, before Capitol Hill votes on it, we will hear a lot more such bombast. It comes down to whether Congress believes Iran is capable of acting rationally or whether it is a uniquely malevolent country that has outfoxed America and its partners in the negotiating chamber.

上帝欲使其灭亡，必先使其疯狂。美国总统巴拉克攠巴马(Barack Obama)与伊朗核协议的批评者给人一种丧失理智的强烈感觉。以色列一位内阁部长称其为“世界历史上最黑暗的日子之一”。共和党人则将奥巴马比作内维尔张伯伦（Neville Chamberlain，二战前对纳粹德国实行绥靖政策的英国首相——译者注）。所有人都认为，一个消除伊朗大约三分之二的核能力、冻结其他核设施的协议，将以某种方式加快伊朗拥有核武器的那一天来临。在美国国会就该协议投票之前的未来两个月里，我们还会听到大量此类的夸大言辞。这归根到底要看国会是否相信伊朗能够理智行事，抑或伊朗是一个与众不同的邪恶国家，在谈判室里智胜了美国及其伙伴。

The chances are that Mr Obama’s deal will prevail. He needs the veto-proof support of just a third of each chamber — 34 senators and 145 in the House of Representatives. Even then, however, it is no sure bet. In the next 60 days it will face the onslaught of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and every Republican presidential hopeful. In addition to viewing Iran in an apocalyptic light, each has further motives for wishing to sink the deal.

奥巴马的协议很可能获得通过。该协议只要分别获得参众两院三分之一议员（34名参议员和145名众议员）的支持，就不怕遭到否决。然而即便如此，它也不是板上钉钉的事情。未来60天期间，它还将面临以色列、沙特阿拉伯以及每一位共和党总统候选人竞争者的攻击。除了以世界末日的透镜看待伊朗之外，这些人还各自有其它动机希望该协议夭折。

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the logic is simple. Iran is Saudi Arabia’s chief competitor that claims to speak for the region’s Shia minority, a large chunk of which lives in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich east. In a sectarian zero-sum game, anything that boosts Iran is bad.

沙特方面的逻辑很简单。伊朗是沙特的主要竞争对手，号称代表该地区的什叶派少数人群（其中一大部分生活在沙特盛产石油的东部省份）。在一场宗派冲突的零和游戏中，任何有利于伊朗的事情都是坏事。

Israel’s opposition is also straightforward. As the region’s only nuclear weapons state — albeit an undeclared one — it wants to keep its monopoly. The fact that the deal would set back Iran’s breakout capacity from two months to a year is false comfort, say the Israelis. By bringing a pariah state in from the cold, it will perversely raise the chances Iran eventually goes nuclear.

以色列的反对也直截了当。作为中东地区唯一拥有核武器的国家（尽管没有宣告），以色列希望保持其垄断地位。以色列人表示，核协议将让伊朗取得足够裂变材料的时间从两个月倒退至一年，这一点给人一种虚假的安慰。另一方面，让一个被抛弃的国家重新进入国际社会，将以某种方式提高该国最终拥有核武器的几率。

Finally, Republicans see Mr Obama as a feckless president who is jeopardising US power simply by talking to a terrorist state. The quality of the deal is irrelevant. Nothing short of regime change will do. Some of these motives overlap. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, shares the Republican party’s personal animus towards Mr Obama. What unites them is a refusal to see Iran as capable of change.

最后，共和党人认为奥巴马是一个不负责任的总统，他与一个恐怖主义国家谈判，这件事本身就会危及美国实力。协议质量是无关的。除了政权更迭，其它解决方案都不行。这些动机中有些是重叠的。例如，以色列总理本雅明蔠呑尼亚胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)和共和党人一样对奥巴马抱有个人敌意。让他们站到一起的原因是，他们都拒绝认为伊朗会改变。

Mr Obama has taken the opposite tack. A realistic negotiator puts himself into his adversary’s shoes. The starting point on Iran is that its desire to go nuclear is entirely rational. US-led coalitions have invaded two of Iran’s direct neighbours, Iraq and Afghanistan in the past 15 years. American troops are still there. As a rule, the US does not invade countries that have nuclear weapons. Moreover, the US labelled Iran part of the “axis of evil” in 2002, at a time when Tehran wanted to help the US in Afghanistan, where they shared enmity with the Taliban (as they still do). Mohammad Khatami, the moderate cleric who was then Iran’s president, had also signalled a nuclear deal was possible. Had President George W Bush responded, a far better one would have been available. Instead, he branded Iran evil. Unsurprisingly, Tehran stepped up its clandestine efforts.

奥巴马却采取不同的策略。一名务实的谈判者善于从对手的视角看待问题。伊朗问题的起点是，该国发展核武器的想法是完全理性的。在过去15年里，以美国为首的盟国入侵了伊朗的两个近邻——伊拉克和阿富汗。美军部队现在仍驻扎在这两个国家。一般说来，美国不会入侵拥有核武器的国家。此外，2002年正当德黑兰希望在阿富汗帮助美国之际——伊朗也对塔利班抱有敌意（现在仍是如此）——美国却将伊朗贴上“邪恶轴心”的标签。时任伊朗总统的温和派神职人员穆罕默德哈塔米(Mohammad Khatami)也暗示称，有可能签署核协议。如果当时美国总统乔治·W·布什(George W Bush)做出回应，将会得到一份比现在好得多的协议。结果布什却将伊朗归入邪恶国家之列。并不令人意外的是，德黑兰加快了其秘密研发核武器的努力。

Second, Iran’s decision to mothball its nuclear ambitions in exchange for economic relief is also rational. It is unlikely to give up on it lightly. It followed a decade’s worth of US-led sanctions that has brought the country’s economy to its knees. The regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, supreme leader, clearly thinks it will help its chances of survival.

其次，伊朗决定搁置核野心以换取经济制裁的解除也是理性的。伊朗不太可能轻易放弃自己的核计划。它采取此举之前，以美国为首的国际社会实施了10年制裁，令伊朗经济陷入瘫痪。最高领导人阿亚图拉阿里哈梅内伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)的政权显然认为，搁置核野心有助于增加政权的生存机会。

It is possible, as Mr Obama’s critics predict, that Iran will spend much of the estimated $100bn in unfrozen assets on regional proxies — Hizbollah at the forefront. So what? Compared to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) and its mimics, Hizbollah is a restrained actor. Its theology is absolutist and it has carried out terrorist attacks. But it is not a death cult. In a world of bad choices, boosting Hizbollah’s clout is an acceptable price to pay for a deal that delays — and possibly dispels — the spectre of a Middle East nuclear arms race.

正如奥巴马的批评者所预测，伊朗可能会用估计有1000亿美元的解冻资产的很大一部分资助地区代理人，尤其是真主党。但这又如何？与“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”(ISIS)及其模仿者相比，真主党算是一支克制的力量。真主党的宗教体系是专制主义，该组织曾发动过恐怖袭击，但并不是一个死亡邪教组织。在一个只有糟糕选择的世界，对于一份能延迟（且有可能消除）中东核军备竞赛隐患的协议，提升真主党的影响力是一个可以接受的代价。

None of this cuts much ice with Mr Obama’s critics. Yet his detractors offer no realistic alternatives. Many Republican candidates are promising to rescind the Iran deal on “day one” of their presidency. Diplomatic norms prevent Mr Obama from pointing out that Iran is a more promising candidate for peaceful change than Saudi Arabia. Unlike that country, Iran has a quasi-democracy. About half of its university graduates are female. There are competing power centres within Iran’s theological regime. Prospects for further relaxation are easy to imagine. By contrast, the House of Saud rests on brittle foundations. Who dares guess what would come after it? Iran is a natural counterbalance to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi theocracy. As a non-Arab country, it is incapable of dominating the Middle East. There is also the small matter of how to defeat Isis. Without Iran’s help, the US would be in far worse straits.

这些理由都不能说服奥巴马的批评者，但他的诋毁者们也拿不出现实可行的替代方案。多名共和党总统候选人竞争者承诺，上任“第一天”就要取消伊朗核协议。外交规矩意味着奥巴马不能指出，比起沙特阿拉伯，伊朗更有希望发生和平变革。与沙特不同，伊朗拥有一个准民主体制，约一半的大学毕业生是女性。伊朗的神权政权内部存在着相互竞争的权力中心，很容易想象进一步放松的前景。与此形成对比的是，沙特王室根基脆弱，谁知道接替它的会是什么？伊朗是沙特阿拉伯瓦哈比(Wahhabi)神权政治的天然抗衡。作为非阿拉伯国家，伊朗无法主宰中东。此外，别忘了还有如何击败伊斯兰国的“小”问题。没有伊朗的帮助，美国将陷入更糟糕的困境。

There are moments when US presidents take risks that alter the world as we know it. Ronald Reagan’s friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev is one instance. Richard Nixon’s opening to China is another. Mr Obama’s deal with Iran is almost as breathtaking in its scope.

在历史长河的某些关头，美国总统冒险改变世人熟知的世界格局。罗纳德里根(Ronald Reagan)与米哈伊尔戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)的友谊是一例，理查德尼克松(Richard Nixon)向中国开放又是一例。奥巴马与伊朗达成协议之举是近乎同样宏大的手笔。