希腊公投开启潘多拉魔盒

August 1914 was a descent into hell. May 1945 was an escape from hell. July 2015, the month of a surreal Greek referendum that had no clear question and an answer whose meaning is disputable, will go down in history as a continuation of hell — for Greece, and for Europe.

1914年8月欧洲坠入地狱。1945年5月，欧洲逃离地狱。2015年7月将作为希腊乃至整个欧洲再次滑入地狱的日子载入史册——在这个月里，希腊举行了离奇公投，这次公投没有提出明确的问题，而给出的答案是否有何意义也颇具争议。

Policy makers in some eurozone capitals will shed crocodile tears and explain the No vote as a regrettable, but voluntary act of Greek self-exclusion from Europe’s monetary union. They will unfold a prepared narrative according to which Greece’s European creditors — a more accurate term than allies or partners — bear no blame whatsoever for this debacle.

欧元区一些国家的政策制定者将会流下鳄鱼的眼泪，并把希腊人对国际救助条款说“不”的投票结果解释为，希腊令人遗憾、但自愿地选择从欧洲货币联盟自我排除。他们将拿出已经事先准备好的说辞，而在这种说辞中，希腊的欧洲债权人——比盟友或伙伴更为精确的说法——对这场灾难不承担任何罪责。

Secretly, or not so secretly, some will relish getting the head of Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s radical leftist premier, served to them on a platter. But the question to which they will have no convincing answer is what the Greek disaster implies for the cause of European unity or the stability of the Balkans.

一些人将私下或公开地希望希腊激进的左翼总理亚历克西斯•齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)的头颅盛在盘子里呈到自己面前。但是，有一个问题他们将无法令人信服地回答：希腊灾难对欧洲一体化的大业或巴尔干地区的稳定意味着什么。

In Greece the No vote will widen political fissures in a society knocked senseless by an economic slump. Greeks who voted Yes will treat the outcome as a calamity comparable to the 1922 military defeat at Turkish hands that resulted in the annihilation of Greek civilisation in Asia Minor. Greeks who voted No will rapidly learn that there is no salvation, only misery, ahead.

在希腊，否决结果将扩大社会中的政治裂缝，而经济低迷已经把社会打击得失去了理智。投支持票的希腊人将会把这种结果视为堪比1922年军事失利于土耳其之手的灾难，当时的失利导致了小亚细亚地区希腊文明的毁灭。投反对票的希腊人将很快明白未来不会有什么救赎，只有痛苦。

The question to which no Greeks will have a convincing answer is how, at long last, to put their country on a path of modernisation in which political parties, business oligarchs, trade unions and ordinary citizens act, at least some of the time, in the public interest. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Greece is doomed to be a ward of Europe for many years to come, a condition that hardly encourages self-reliance and commitment to reform.

而希腊人将无法确切回答的问题是，终究该如何让自己的国家走上现代化的正途，使各政党、商业寡头、工会和普通公民至少在某些时候采取符合公众利益的行动。就像波黑和科索沃一样，希腊注定将在未来很多年成为欧洲的一个病区，在这种情况下将很难鼓励其自力更生并下定决心推进改革。

Mr Tsipras and his ruling Syriza party were too cunning to phrase the referendum question as “in or out of the euro”, a wording that would have permitted Greeks to understand that what was really at stake was their modern European identity. As a result, the outcome does not resolve the fundamental conundrum: that most Greeks want to stay in the eurozone but detest the austerity that has bled them dry since 2010.

齐普拉斯及其领导的执政党激进左翼联盟党(Syriza)太过狡猾，没有将此次公投的问题描述为“留在还是退出欧元区”，而这种描述本可以让希腊人明白公投真正攸关的是他们的现代欧洲身份。结果，公投并未解决根本问题：多数希腊人希望留在欧元区，但痛恨自2010年以来逐渐榨干他们的紧缩政策。

Mr Tsipras and his government will forever bear the responsibility for having thrown away the best cards he had, upon winning Greece’s parliamentary elections in January, for negotiating a new rescue deal with the creditors. Greece had, and still has, a strong case for debt relief. Greece had, and still has, a strong case for shifting the emphasis of a new rescue deal away from austerity and towards economic growth.

齐普拉斯及其政府将永远背负罪责——他们在1月一赢得希腊议会选举，就扔掉了与债权人就新的援助协议进行谈判的最好的牌。希腊过去曾经有、现在仍然拥有有力理由，要求债务减免；希腊过去曾经有、现在仍然拥有有力理由，要求新援助协议的重心由紧缩转向经济增长。

But with what Loukas Tsoukalis, a Greek economics professor, calls “a lethal combination of arrogance and the diplomatic grace of an elephant”, the Syriza leadership alienated everyone else in the 19-nation eurozone. It is some feat to unite Europe’s squabbling political leaders — just think of the continuing, acrimonious rows over how to handle the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean — but Mr Tsipras and his colleagues managed it, bringing catastrophe to their nation.

但是，凭借希腊经济学教授劳卡斯•楚卡里斯(Loukas Tsoukalis)所称的“大象的傲慢和外交优雅的致命组合”，激进左翼联盟党的领导层疏远了由19国组成的欧元区中的所有其他国家。如果能把欧洲争吵不休的政治领导人团结起来，那可算是某种壮举——只需要想想围绕地中海难民危机如何解决的持续不断的激烈争吵便可以明白——但是齐普拉斯及其同僚做到了，只不过给他们自己的国家带来了灾难。

Europe’s other leaders should take no comfort from this. Their anti-Greek unity is hollow. In theory, the Greek horror show ought to inspire them with the will to grasp the nettle of building the more cohesive banking, economic, fiscal and political union that is essential to the survival of the monetary union launched in 1999. There are, indeed, concrete policy proposals to this effect: the so-called Five Presidents’ Report, published by Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission chief, last month.

欧洲其他领导人不应该对此感到幸灾乐祸。他们的反希腊联盟是没有意义的。从理论上讲，希腊的恐怖秀应该激起他们迎难而上、打造更有凝聚力的银行、经济、财政和政治联盟的决心——这对这个于1999年建立的货币联盟的存续至关重要。现在的确有以此为目的的具体政策提议—— 欧盟委员会(European Commission)主席让-克洛德•容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)于上个月公布的所谓的“五总管报告”(Five Presidents’ Report)。

But in reality each European government is pulled this way and that by the national public opinion from which each, ultimately, derives its legitimacy. This might have been less of a problem if, as Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, suggested in 1994, European monetary union had been limited to a “hard core” centred on Germany and a small group of advanced, neighbouring countries.

但是事实上，每一个欧洲国家政府都被各自的国内公众意见拽向不同方向，因为它们最终都从后者获得合法性。如果如德国财长沃尔夫冈•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble) 1994年建议的，欧洲货币联盟被限制在以德国为中心的“中坚核心”以及少数邻近的发达国家内，上述情况可能问题没那么大。

But the expansion of the eurozone into central, eastern and southern Europe changed the picture. Some of the governments that advocate the strictest possible line in the Greek debt crisis are former communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and, remaining short of western European levels of prosperity, voice outrage at the notion of special treatment for Greece.

但是欧元区扩大至欧洲中部、东部和南部，改变了这种局面。一些主张对希腊债务危机采取最严厉立场的政府，是在2004年加入欧盟(EU)的前共产主义国家的政府，这些国家仍然没赶上西欧的繁荣水平，它们对给予希腊特殊待遇表达了愤怒。

Too many eurozone policy makers are complacent about the risks of political and financial contagion from the Greek nightmare. Arguably, these risks will not emerge in the short term, with the European Stability Mechanism firewall in place and the European Central Bank committed to whatever emergency action is required to protect the eurozone.

太多的欧元区政策制定者对希腊噩梦带来的政治和金融蔓延风险掉以轻心。或许，有欧洲稳定机制(European Stability Mechanism)防火墙，有欧洲央行(ECB)承诺采取任何必要的紧急行动来保护欧元区，这些风险短期内不会出现。

But in years to come, the dangers will become all too evident. Unless a stronger union is built, on solid democratic foundations, Europe’s hell will persist.

但是在未来数年，这种危险将变得十分明显。除非在坚实的民主基础上建立更强大的联盟，否则欧洲将会持续在地狱中煎熬。