塔利班意图逆袭政界,转型为政党

Any assessment of Afghanistan’s prospects must consider what the Taliban will do after western withdrawal. Most public debate typically assumes it will continue its current strategy of violent conflict, exerting influence by killing soldiers, attacking officials and seeking to take over the country. But this might be wrong.

在评估阿富汗前景时，必须考虑在西方撤离后塔利班会怎么做。在多数公开辩论中，人们通常认为，塔利班会沿续现行的暴力冲突战略，通过杀害士兵、攻击官员和谋求控制整个国家显示自身的影响力。但这种想法可能是错的。

The Taliban is a political organisation; it chooses its methods by taking into account a range of factors: how the public interprets its actions, what it can afford and what its operatives are willing to do. All of these factors will change as the western presence diminishes and the economy adjusts to a steady drop in foreign aid.

塔利班是个政治组织，它在选择行动方式时会考虑一系列因素：民众会如何解读它的行为？它可以承受什么代价？以及本组织内部人员愿意做些什么？随着西方逐步撤离以及阿富汗经济努力适应外部援助逐渐减少的局面，所有这些因素都会发生变化。

First, the optics of attacking the Afghan National Army will change when it is no longer so obviously allied with outsiders. Right now, the Taliban can credibly claim to be attacking a foreign proxy force when it strikes out at the ANA and Afghan National Police. That claim resonates because most Afghans are given regular, tangible reminders of the foreign presence as convoys of heavily armoured foreign military vehicles festooned with weapons and sensors roll noisily through their streets. But will the claim that the ANA is a tool of foreign occupiers still resonate when Nato convoys no longer pass through villages and down the main roads? Perhaps, but it will be a much harder sell.

首先，一旦阿富汗国民军不再明显与外部力量结盟，塔利班攻击这支部队带给人的感觉就会发生变化。目前，塔利班在袭击阿富汗国民军和阿富汗国民警察部队时，可以理直气壮地宣称其攻击的是一支为外国人效命的部队。这种说法会得到认同，因为每当外国军队载满武器和探测装置的重型装甲车轰隆隆地列队驶过阿富汗街头时，都会生动地提醒当地民众外国势力的存在。而当北约军队不再从他们的村庄中、他们的大路上穿过时，阿富汗国民军为外国占领者所利用这种说法还会有人买账吗？也许会有，但会更难叫人信服。

Second, the Taliban will also face a very different set of challenges as key sources of foreign support dry up. Most analysts believe that the Pakistani security establishment has tolerated Afghan Taliban leaders on its soil because it viewed them as a means of forestalling the consolidation of an Indian-allied pro-American state on its northern border. But that does not mean it wants the Taliban to win power.

其次，随着关键的外部支持来源中断，塔利班还将面临许多不同于以往的挑战。多数分析人士认为，巴基斯坦安全机构能够容忍阿富汗塔利班领导人藏身巴基斯坦，是为了防止本国北部边境上出现一个与印度结盟并且亲美的统一国家。但这不代表巴基斯坦希望塔利班掌权。

Pakistan has little to gain from an ethnocentric Pashtun state next door, especially as it is fighting a militant Pashtun movement on its own soil. As the amount of military power the Taliban needs to prevent the Kabul government from controlling southern Afghanistan drops, so too will support from Pakistan. We can also expect a decline in Pakistan’s willingness to allow the Taliban havens in the border regions.

邻境出现一个奉行种族中心主义的普什图国家对巴基斯坦没什么好处，更何况巴基斯坦在本土正在与一个激进的普什图运动做斗争。塔利班阻止政府控制阿富汗南部所需的军事力量会比以往少，但与此同时巴基斯坦对其的支持也会减少。此外，巴基斯坦容许塔利班安然盘踞边境地区的意愿想必也会下降。

Third, the Taliban will lose revenue as the western presence declines. The organisation’s finances are, of course, opaque. But, right now, the group earns money by “taxing” logistics convoys supplying its enemies and charging fees to aid organisations seeking to work in conflict-ridden areas (the latter can be indirect, with the aid agencies paying security groups who then pay protection fees). As the foreign presence draws down, funding will dry up. Moreover, the Taliban’s ability to appeal to donors to support the fight against non-Islamic invaders will shrink.

第三，随着西方从阿富汗逐步撤出，塔利班将会失去收入来源。当然，塔利班的财务状况是不公开的。不过该组织现在有两条收入来源：一是向为敌方运输给养的后勤队伍“抽税”，二是向试图在冲突多发地带开展工作的救援组织收费——后者可能采取间接方式，即救援机构付钱给安全组织，后者再向塔利班支付保护费。随着外国势力逐渐撤出，以上资金来源也会枯竭。另外，塔利班也将更难用支持其抵抗非伊斯兰入侵者的名义吸收捐款。

The changes will make it harder for the Taliban leadership to control its organisation. Press reports in 2010 and 2011 revealed that Taliban leaders in Pakistan had problems convincing mid-level commanders to fight as aggressively as they would like because the risks were so great during the US “surge”. More recent reports suggest there is scepticism among rank-and-file fighters about their leaders’ recent decision to open an office in Doha to explore reconciliation with the Afghan government. Just like any political organisation, Taliban mid-level operatives and fighters have their own interests and must be motivated to follow orders.

上述这些变化将使塔利班领导层更难以控制本组织。2010年和2011年就有媒体报道说，塔利班在巴基斯坦的领导人难以说服中层将领全力作战，因为在美国增兵期间形势变得很危险。更近的报道指，普通战士中间对于领导人近期做出的在多哈设办公室探讨与阿富汗政府和解前景的决定抱着怀疑态度。与所有政治组织一样，塔利班中层及普通战士也有自身利益，他们要有动力才会服从命令。

Exactly how the Taliban leadership responds to this environment will be a critical factor in determining Afghanistan’s political future. The nascent negotiations in Qatar are an encouraging sign that the group may shift into less violent methods, using the threat of force to win policy concessions without violence. But other outcomes are possible. They could mirror the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Palestine Liberation Organisation, conducting periodic terrorist attacks to gain policy concessions. Alternatively, the Taliban could splinter as the sources of external funding that give central leaders leverage disappear. At some point, the central leadership may no longer be able to follow through on its commitments and will then become largely irrelevant as peace – or war – is made between a string of local commanders and Kabul.

塔利班领导层在这种环境下会如何行事，将是决定阿富汗政治前景的一个关键因素。刚开启的卡塔尔谈判是一个令人鼓舞的迹象，表明塔利班可能转向不那么暴力的方式，以自身拥有的力量相威胁，不诉诸暴力而取得政策上的让步。但也可能出现其他结果。他们可能会效仿爱尔兰共和军临时派(Provisional Irish Republican Army)以及巴勒斯坦解放组织(Palestine Liberation Organisation)的发展道路，不时发动恐怖袭击，以此获得政策让步。还有一种可能是，随着使塔利班核心领导层获得权力砝码的外部资金来源中断，塔利班可能会走向分裂。在某个时候，核心领导层可能再也无力履行其承诺，而当一批地方指挥官和阿富汗政府走向和平或开战，核心领导层可能会变得不那么有分量。

The group’s leaders therefore face a narrow window of opportunity to lead the Taliban into Afghan politics. Right now, the differences between local commanders’ political interests and those of the central leadership in Pakistan are small – and the leadership still has the resources to make sure that most of its followers do, well, follow. But it must make the leap before the flow of money starts to decline and local commanders no longer see much point in following through on commitments their leaders make at the bargaining table.

因此，塔利班领导人目前有一个狭窄的机会窗口来带领塔利班跻身阿富汗政坛。眼下，地方指挥官与身处巴基斯坦的核心领导层在政治利益上分歧不大，领导层也仍然有财力确保大多数追随者听命行事。但是，在资金流开始减少、地方指挥官不再认为值得遵守领导人在谈判桌上许下的承诺之前，塔利班领导层必须完成上述飞跃。

Right now, all sides have strong reasons to strike a deal and the power to enforce it. Here’s hoping they do so.

眼下，各方都有充足理由达成一项协议，也有力量将协议加以落实。但愿他们会这么做。