国际时事:埃及政变的余波

It was not just the tumultuous crowds in Tahrir Square that cheered last week’s implosion of Mohamed Morsi and mainstream Islamism in the Arab world’s most populous country. As the coup d’état in Cairo unfolded, Bashar al-Assad was doing a war dance on the Muslim Brotherhood’s grave.

埃及总统穆罕默德•穆尔西(Mohamed Morsi)被罢黜，阿拉伯世界人口最多国家的主流伊斯兰主义发生内爆，这些事引发的欢呼声不仅来自开罗解放广场(Tahrir Square)上喧嚣的抗议人群。随着埃及政变的爆发，叙利亚总统巴沙尔•阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)在穆斯林兄弟会(Muslim Brotherhood)的坟墓上跳起庆祝胜利的舞蹈。

“What is happening in Egypt is the fall of what is known as political Islam,” the Syrian president gloated to a newspaper mouthpiece of his regime, which is locked in savage combat with a rebellion that is being hijacked by Sunni Islamist groups.

阿萨德幸灾乐祸地对其政权的喉舌报纸表示：“埃及正在发生的事情，是所谓‘政治伊斯兰’(political Islam)的垮台。”阿萨德政权正与叛军陷入一场野蛮战争，这场反叛正被逊尼派伊斯兰主义团体劫持。

There is no doubt the pan-Islamist Brotherhood, a mythic movement since its foundation in 1928, has spectacularly self-destructed barely a year after Mr Morsi was elected president by a narrow majority.

毫无疑问，泛伊斯兰主义的穆兄会在穆尔西以微弱多数当选总统一年后，引人注目地自我毁灭了。自1928年创建以来，穆兄会一直是一个神秘组织。

The Islamist political bandwagon, which picked up speed once the Arab spring upheavals placed the Brotherhood and like-minded groups at or near the centre of political gravity, has definitely seized up. Does the hubris of the Brotherhood in the land of its birth herald a setback for political Islam across the broader Middle East?

伊斯兰主义的政治潮流确实已经碰壁。在“阿拉伯之春”抗议活动让穆兄会和志同道合的团体处于或接近政治重心时，这股潮流曾经汹涌澎湃。穆兄会在其诞生地的骄傲自大，是否预示着“政治伊斯兰”将在整个中东地区受挫？

The Morsi meltdown was as extraordinary as his ascent. He was only the second choice of the Brothers after Khairat al-Shater, their deputy supreme guide, was banned from running – and instead ended up as the go-to head of a shadow Brotherhood government.

穆尔西的倒台与他当时上台一样不同寻常。他只是穆斯林兄弟会的第二选择，此前，该组织副首领海拉特•沙特尔(Khairat al-Shater)被禁止参加总统竞选。结果，沙特尔成了在幕后活动的穆兄会影子政府的头头。

These pan-Islamists, with their siren call that “Islam is the solution”, were supremely organised as a semi-underground opposition. Yet once in power they seemed unable to find the levers of governance, instead devoting energy to a march through the institutions, with loyalty and secretiveness rather than efficiency and accountability as their watchwords.

这些泛伊斯兰主义者（他们提出的蛊惑人心的口号是“伊斯兰是解决方案”）作为半地下的反对派势力时组织极其出色。然而，一旦掌权，他们似乎找不到治理的操纵杆，只能把精力投入在各个机构安插自己人，把忠诚与秘密（而非效率和责任）当作箴言。

In the chaos after the 2011 revolution that overthrew the army-backed dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak, Mr Morsi ended up in contest with an ancien regime holdover. While that meant he could only win with the support of liberals, leftists and secular youth activists, he decided against including them in a coalition for change, instead promoting a sectarian power grab behind a rambling discourse of impertinent paternalism. Mr Morsi and the Brotherhood’s biggest bet, paradoxically, was that they could co-opt the army, by ringfencing its privileges inside the Islamist-inspired constitution they rammed through in November. But the Brothers – and their gerontocrat leaders – misjudged the diversity of a young society. Egypt’s flexible generals did not make that mistake, and their action rearranged the regional furniture.

在2011年爆发革命、推翻了胡斯尼•穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)得到军方支持的独裁政权后的混乱局面中，穆尔西在选举中与前政权遗留的势力展开较量。尽管这意味着他只是在自由派、左翼势力以及年轻的世俗活动人士的支持下才获胜，但他决定不去团结他们，以形成一个推动改革的执政联盟，而是在杂乱无章的、盛气凌人的家长式话语背后，沉迷于宗派权斗。讽刺的是，穆尔西以及穆斯林兄弟会的最大赌注是，他们可以笼络军方——具体手段是在去年11月强行通过以伊斯兰主义为蓝本的宪法，保障军方的特权，但穆兄会（及其老年领导人）错判了一个年轻社会的多元化程度。埃及反应灵活的将军们没有犯这个错误，他们的行动重画了该地区的版图。

Saudi Arabia, built on an alliance of absolute monarchy and Wahhabi Muslim absolutism, greeted the coup with unusual alacrity, delighted at the failure of a rival brand which purported to combine Islam and democracy. The United Arab Emirates, in the middle of a crackdown on the Brotherhood, could scarcely contain its glee. Sultan al-Qassemi, an Emirati commentator, tweeted that “Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak tried to get rid of the Brotherhood. Only Morsi succeeded”.

建立在绝对君主制与瓦哈比派穆斯林绝对主义结盟基础上的沙特阿拉伯，对此次政变做出了不同寻常的爽快反应，对一个号称要将伊斯兰与民主体制结合起来的竞争品牌的失败感到高兴。正在打击穆兄会的阿联酋也几乎难以抑制喜悦。阿联酋评论人士苏丹•阿尔卡塞米(Sultan al-Qassemi)在微博客网站Twitter上发帖称：“纳赛尔(Nasser)、萨达特(Sadat)和穆巴拉克曾试图除掉穆斯林兄弟会。只有穆尔西成功了。”

As the Saudis, Emiratis and Kuwait pledge $12bn to Egypt, the Brotherhood’s former financial sponsors in Qatar and Turkey look to be the main losers, as region-wide tremors ripple from Gaza to Rabat.

沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋和科威特承诺为埃及提供120亿美元援助，穆兄会以前在卡塔尔和土耳其的财务后台看上去将成为主要的输家。从加沙到拉巴特（摩洛哥城市——译者注），整个地区都感受到余波的震荡。

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the emir behind Qatar’s activist Arab spring policy, abdicated last month in favour of his son – who has fired a prime minister identified as sympathetic to the Brotherhood. Persistent reports say Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential preacher close to the Brotherhood, is no longer welcome in Doha. The gas-rich emirate is pilloried on Twitter in a caricature showing the deposed Mr Morsi scurrying towards a Qatar Airways flight under a fusillade of shoes.

曾经积极支持“阿拉伯之春”的卡塔尔国王谢赫•哈马德•本•哈利法•阿勒萨尼(Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani)上月将王位传给儿子，新国王已辞掉被指认为穆兄会同情者的卡塔尔首相。不断有报道称，与穆兄会关系亲密、颇具影响力的传道者谢赫•阿尔卡拉达维(Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi)在卡塔尔不再受欢迎。Twitter上的一幅漫画嘲讽天然气储量丰富的卡塔尔，漫画中，被罢黜的穆尔西在众人向他扔鞋之际，狼狈跑向卡塔尔航空(Qatar Airways)航班。

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the neo-Islamist prime minister of Turkey, who has cast his country’s lot with Syria’s rebels, was also a Morsi ally. “There cannot be such a thing as a democratic coup,” he said, mindful of the overmighty Turkish generals he has brought to heel. But like Mr Morsi, Mr Erdogan stands accused of interpreting a majority at the ballot box as authority to ride roughshod over society. For Turkey’s prime minister, last month’s Taksim Square rebellion was an internationally orchestrated prelude to a coup; unsurprisingly, he summoned all his top aides to an emergency meeting last week on the events in Cairo.

土耳其的新伊斯兰主义者总理雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)支持叙利亚叛军，他也曾是穆尔西的盟友。他表示：“不存在民主政变这种事。”他显然留意着他已“搞定”的土耳其军方。但就像穆尔西一样，埃尔多安面临的指责是，将赢得选举解读为获得肆意凌驾于民意之上的授权。对于土耳其总理而言，上月伊斯坦布尔塔克西姆广场(Taksim Square)爆发的抗议活动，是一场国际势力策划的政变的前奏；不奇怪的是，他上周就埃及政变召集所有高级助手召开了紧急会议。

But if mainstream Islamism is found wanting in the 21st century, there is no evidence Arabs believe Wahhabism is the face of their future. The way the Saudis and their allies throw their billions of dollars around (as well as how Qatar deployed its wealth) shows they know that too – and that they are not immune to a Tahrir or a Taksim.

然而，如果说主流伊斯兰主义在21世纪被发现存在不足，那么也没有证据证明，阿拉伯人认为瓦哈比主义是面向未来的出路。从沙特阿拉伯及其盟友抛出巨额援助的手笔（以及卡塔尔动用其财富的方式）表明，他们明白这点——他们也可能遭遇类似解放广场或塔克西姆广场的抗议。

They want to drive the Brothers back into the catacombs and radicalise the way Islamists view democracy, as a western trick to keep them from power. The message they want to send is what Essam al-Haddad, Mr Morsi’s foreign policy adviser, wrote on Facebook last week as the coup unfolded: that this “message will resonate throughout the Muslim world loud and clear: democracy is not for Muslims”.

他们希望把穆兄会赶下地狱，并让伊斯兰主义者对民主的看法变得激进，把民主视为西方让他们永远不能掌权的伎俩。他们希望传达的信息，正是穆尔西的外交政策顾问哈达德(Essam al-Haddad)在政变爆发时在Facebook上的留言：这一“信息将响亮而清晰地传遍穆斯林世界：民主不适合穆斯林”。