内部问题隐现: 中国经济未来荆棘密布

Over the next decade, China’s growth will slow, probably sharply. That is not the view of malevolent outsiders. It is the view of the Chinese government. The question is whether it will do so smoothly or abruptly. On the answer depends not only China’s own future, but also that of much of the world.

未来十年，中国经济的增长将会放缓，甚至是剧烈放缓。这不是心怀恶意的外人观点，而是中国政府的观点。问题是放缓的过程将是平稳的还是剧烈的。这个问题的答案不仅关乎中国的未来，也关乎世界许多国家的命运。

Official Chinese thinking was on display at last month’s China Development Forum, organised by the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), which brought influential foreigners together with high-level officials. Among the background papers was one prepared by economists at the DRC, entitled “Ten-year Outlook: Decline of Potential Growth Rate and Start of a New Phase of Growth”. Its proposition is that China’s growth will slow from more than 10 per cent a year from 2000 to 2010 to 6.5 per cent between 2018 and 2022. Such a decline, notes the paper, is consistent with the slowdown since the second quarter of 2010 (see chart).

上个月中国国务院发展研究中心(DRC)组织的中国发展高层论坛(China Development Forum)展示了中国官方的观点。该论坛聚集了有影响力的外国人士和中国高级官员。背景论文中有一篇国务院发展研究中心经济学家撰写的文章，题为“十年展望：潜在增长率下降以及新增长阶段的开始”(Ten-year Outlook: Decline of Potential Growth Rate and Start of a New Phase of Growth)。文章提出，中国将从2000年到2010年10%以上的年均增长率，下降到2018年到2022年6.5%的年均增长率。文章还指出，这种下降与2010年第二季度以来的经济放缓趋势是一致的（见图表）。

The authors note two possible reasons for the decline: either China has fallen into the “middle income trap” of aborted industrialisation; or it is managing the “natural landing” that occurs when an economy begins to catch-up with advanced economies. This latter scenario played out in Japan in the 1970s and South Korea in the 1990s. The DRC paper argues that, after three and a half decades of 10 per cent growth, it is at last happening to China.

作者列出了增速降低的两个可能原因：要么中国陷入了工业化失败的“中等收入陷阱”；要么中国正在努力应对增速的“自然回落”，当一个经济体开始追赶发达经济体时，会出现这种回落。第二种情况分别在上世纪70年代的日本和90年代的韩国出现过。国务院发展研究中心的这篇文章认为，在经历了35年左右10%的增长率之后，同样的事最终在中国也发生了。

Here are a few reasons why the authors say this view is plausible. First, the potential for infrastructure investment has “contracted conspicuously”, with its share in fixed asset investment down from 30 per cent to 20 per cent over the last decade. Second, returns on assets have decreased and overcapacity has soared. The “incremental capital output ratio” – a measure of the growth generated by a given level of investment – reached 4.6 in 2011, the highest since 1992. China is getting less growth bang for its investment buck. Third, growth of the labour supply has fallen sharply. Fourth, urbanisation is still rising, but at a decelerating rate. Finally, risks are growing in the finance of local governments and real estate.

文章作者认为这种观点成立的原因有以下几点：第一，基础设施投资潜力“明显收缩”，过去十年，基础设施投资在固定资产投资中的比例从30%下降到20%。第二，资产回报率下降，产能大量过剩。2011年，“增量资本产出率”（衡量一定投资水平对增长的贡献率）达到了4.6，为1992年以来的最高值。投资对中国经济增长的贡献正在降低。第三，劳动力供应增长显著放缓。第四，城市化仍在扩大，但速度有所下降。最后，地方政府财政和房地产风险增加。

This melange of reasons is enough, argue the authors, to indicate that a transition to slower growth has begun. To analyse prospects more rigorously, the authors employ an economic model. Its most striking result is that long-established trends reverse. Fixed investment rose to 49 per cent of GDP in 2011. But this is forecast to fall to 42 per cent in 2022. Meanwhile, the share of consumption in GDP is forecast to rise from 48 to per cent to 56 per cent in 2022. Again, the share of industry is forecast to decline from 45 per cent of GDP to 40 per cent, while the share of services is to jump from 45 per cent to 55 per cent. The economy is consumption-led, instead of investment-led. On the supply side, the principal driver of the decline in growth is the collapse in the growth of the capital stock, as investment growth collapses. (See charts.)

文章作者认为，这一系列的原因足以表明中国经济已经开始向较低增速过渡。为了更加精确地分析前景，作者采用了一个经济模型。最令人吃惊的结果就是，与现在相比，经济的长期趋势将颠倒。2011年固定资产投资占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重增加至49%，但预计将在2022年降至42%。与此同时，预计2022年消费占GDP的比重将会从48%上升至56%。类似地，预计工业占GDP的比重将会从45%下降至40%，而服务业的比重将会从45%上升至55%。经济将由消费拉动而不是投资拉动。从供应的层面来看，造成增长放缓的主要原因是，随着投资增长瓦解，资本存量增长崩溃（见图表）。

The view that such a growth slowdown is imminent is quite plausible. But one can advance a more optimistic view. According to the Conference Board’s data, China’s GDP per head (at purchasing power parity) is the same as Japan’s in 1966 and South Korea’s in 1988. These countries then had between seven and nine years of superfast growth ahead, respectively. Relative to US levels (another measure of catch-up potential), China is where Japan was in 1950 and South Korea in 1982. That suggest yet more growth potential. China’s GDP per head is just over a fifth of US levels. It seems to have much further to go.

增长放缓即将到来的观点非常可信。但我们可以持一种更加乐观的观点。世界大型企业联合会(Conference Board)数据显示，当前中国人均GDP（按购买力平价计算）与1966年的日本和1988年的韩国相等。这两个国家后来分别出现了7到9年的超速增长。与美国相比（追赶潜力的另外一种衡量），中国与1950年的日本和1982年的韩国水平相当。这就表明中国还有更多的增长潜力。中国的人均GDP只有美国的五分之一略多一点，似乎还有很大的增长空间。

However, there is also a case against this optimistic view. China is an order of magnitude bigger even than Japan. Its opportunities, particularly in the world economy, must be relatively smaller. Furthermore, as former premier Wen Jiabao often stated, China’s growth has been “unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable”. This is true, on a number of dimensions. But the most significant is the dependence on investment, not just as a source of extra capacity, but as a source of demand. Consistently rising investment rates are not sustainable, since the returns ultimately depend on additional consumption.

然而，这种乐观的观点也有反面论据。中国的数量级甚至高于日本。其机会，特别是在世界经济中的机会，必定相对较少。此外，正如中国前总理温家宝经常说的，中国的增长“不平衡、不协调、不可持续”。这在诸多层面上都是事实。但最重要的是对投资的依赖，投资不仅是额外产能的来源，也是需求的来源。不断增加投资率是不可持续的，因为投资回报最终取决于消费增加。

This is where a far more pessimistic view emerges. As the experience of Japan has shown, managing a shift from a high-investment, high-growth economy to a lower-investment, lower-growth economy is very tricky. I can envisage at least three risks.

于是就出现了一种悲观得多的观点。日本的例子表明，实现高投资、高增长的经济体向低投资、低增长的经济体的成功转型是非常困难的。我可以列举至少三点风险。

First, if expected growth falls from over 10 to, say, 6 per cent, the needed rate of investment in productive capital will collapse: under a constant incremental capital output ratio the fall would be from 50 per cent to, say, 30 per cent of GDP. If swift, such a decline would cause a depression, all on its own.

首先，如果预期增长率从10%以上下降到（比如说）6%，必要的生产资本投资率就会大幅下降：若增量资本产出率恒定，生产资本投资占GDP的比重将会从50%下降到30%。如果下降过程非常快，单是这种下降就会引发萧条。

Second, a big jump in credit has gone together with reliance on real estate and other investments with falling marginal returns. Partly for this reason, the decline in growth is likely to mean a rise in bad debts, not least on the investments made on the assumption that past growth would continue. The fragility of the financial system could increase very sharply, not least in the rapidly expanding “shadow banking” sector.

第二，由于中国经济对房地产和其他投资的依赖，信贷出现大幅增长，而这些投资的边际收益率在下降。部分出于这个原因，增长的下降可能意味着不良贷款的增加，尤其是那些押注过去的增速会持续的投资。金融体系可能变得极为脆弱，尤其是快速扩张的“影子银行”领域。

Third, since there is little reason to expect a decline in the household savings rate, sustaining the envisaged rise in consumption, relative to investment, demands a matching shift in incomes towards households and away from corporations, including state enterprises. This can happen: the growing labour shortage and a move towards higher interest rates might deliver it smoothly. But, even so, there is also a clear risk that the resulting decline in profits would accelerate a collapse in investment.

第三，鉴于家庭储蓄率下降的可能性不大，要想维持设想中的消费相对于投资的持续增长，需要相应地将收入从企业转移到家庭，包括国有企业。这是可能发生的：日益扩大的劳动力短缺以及利率的上涨趋势可能会顺利实现这种转变。然而，即便如此，仍存在一个显著的风险——随之而来的利润下降可能会加速投资的崩溃。

The government’s plan is, of course, to make the transition to a better balanced and slower-growing economy smoothly. This is far from impossible. The government has all the levers it needs in its hands. Moreover, the economy continues to have much potential. But managing a decline in the growth rate without an investment collapse and financial disruption is far trickier than any general equilibrium model suggests.

毫无疑问，政府的计划是顺利地转型为更加平衡、增长放慢的经济。这是很有可能实现的。中国政府掌握着所需的所有要素。此外，中国经济依然有很大的潜力。然而，在不引起投资崩塌和金融动荡的情况下实现增速放缓，比任何一般均衡模型所显示的都要棘手得多。

It is easy to think of economies that long showed superlative performance, but failed to manage the inevitable slowdown. Japan is an example. China can avoid that fate, partly because it still has so much growth potential. But the chances of accidents are high. I would not expect one to stop China’s rise altogether. But the decade to come could be far bumpier than the last.

长期表现优越的经济体没能把握好不可避免的放缓，这样的例子不难列举。比如日本。中国可以避免这种命运，部分原因是它依然有很大的增长潜力。但出现意外的可能性也很大。在我看来，任何意外也不可能一下子让中国的增长停止，但未来十年注定要比过去十年更加艰辛。