一个险些推迟二战结束的事件 plot that nearly prevented war from ending

On the night of August 14 1945, as Japan prepared to surrender to the Allies, a group of rebel officers launched a coup d’état and seized control of Tokyo’s Imperial Palace.

1945年8月14日夜里，就在日本准备向盟军投降之际，一群反叛的军官发动了一次政变，控制了日本皇宫。

Determined to fight on, even if it meant the annihilation of their country, the plotters ransacked the palace looking for the prepared recording of Emperor Hirohito’s surrender message and very nearly prevented the end of the second world war.

政变的策划者下定决心要继续战斗——即使这意味着整个日本被消灭也在所不辞。他们全面搜查了皇宫，寻找已准备好的裕仁天皇(Emperor Hirohito)宣读投降诏书的录音，差一点就阻止了二战的结束。

The events of that night — symbolising a loss of political control over the military — have come sharply into focus on Friday’s 70th anniversary as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, seeks to reinterpret Japan’s pacifist constitution and make it easier for its armed forces to fight.

当晚发生的事件，象征着日本政界丧失了对军方的控制。在日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)试图重新解释和平宪法、减少日本军队作战的法律障碍之际，这一事件在周五的日本投降70周年纪念日上突然引起极大关注。

The main actors from that August night are long dead, but one man still living spoke with almost all of them. In the mid-1960s, Kazutoshi Hando interviewed the protagonists for his book Japan’s Longest Day , a classic account of the hours leading up to the surrender. “Even 20 or 30 years later the plotters still thought it was wrong for Japan to capitulate,” he said in an interview with the Financial Times.

当晚的主要行动人员久已不在人世。不过，一位曾和几乎所有人谈话过的人依然健在。上世纪60年代中期，半藤一利(Kazutoshi Hando)曾采访过事件的当事人，以便为他的《日本最漫长的一天》(Japan's Longest Day)提供素材。该书是一部解释日本投降前多个小时内所发生事情的经典著作。在接受英国《金融时报》采访时，半藤一利表示：“即使在二三十年后，政变的策划者仍然认为日本投降是错误的决定。”

The book — remade as a film for the 70th anniversary — is almost unbearably tense. The fanatics plead with the head of the army to lead their coup, only for him to commit ritual suicide instead, while gangs of students roam the streets seeking to assassinate the prime minister.

为纪念日本投降70周年，该书被翻拍成一部电影。这本书节奏极其紧张，令人几乎喘不过气来。当时，政变者狂热地请求军队首脑领导他们的政变，结果却导致他以自杀收场。与此同时，成群的学生在街上游荡，试图刺杀日本首相。

It is often assumed that Japan’s surrender was inevitable after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but even after the devastation of those cities half of the cabinet refused to accept the allies’ terms. The deadlock was only broken when the prime minister in an unprecedented step asked the Emperor, a constitutional figurehead, to decide whether to surrender.

人们往往有一种想当然的看法，认为在广岛和长崎遭遇原子弹袭击后，日本投降已不可避免。然而，即使是在这两座城市遭遇毁灭性打击之后，日本内阁仍有半数成员拒绝接受盟军条款。日本首相采取了史无前例的举措，才打破了这一僵局：他请日本宪法规定的最高首脑——日本天皇——决定是否投降。

The surrender came as a shock to a military that was planning to fight to the last man.

对于打算战斗至最后一人的日本军方来说，投降的命令令他们极为震惊。

A successful coup was plausible. “The plotters probably thought they had a 50:50 chance,” says Mr Hando. The moment of greatest danger came on the morning of August 14 when the rebel officers knew the cabinet would meet at the prime minister’s residence. They planned to confine all members of the peace faction then install a military government.

就这样，发动一场成功的政变似乎很有道理。半藤一利表示：“策划者们也许认为，他们成功的机会一半对一半。”最危险的一刻发生在8月14日早晨。当时，反叛的军官了解到，日本内阁将在首相的官邸会晤。这些军官计划扣押所有主和派成员，再任命一届军政府。

If that had happened, says Mr Hando: “There would have been no way to form a new cabinet with the power to surrender. It would have ended as it did in Nazi Germany.” The Allies would have invaded Japan to be met by waves of suicide attacks.

半藤一利表示，如果这一切真的发生，“或许就没办法组建有权投降的新内阁了。结局可能会像德国纳粹政府那样。”盟军将入侵日本，并遭遇一轮又一轮的自杀式袭击。

But the prime minister got wind of the danger and had his colleagues meet at the Imperial Palace instead, The plotters seized the palace later in the night in a desperate attempt to prevent the Emperor’s broadcast of surrender.

不过，当时的首相听到了危险的风声，要求他的同僚改在日本皇宫会晤。当夜晚些时候，策划者占领了皇宫，以一种绝望的企图，试图阻止日本天皇发出投降广播。

In the book it is striking just how little the atomic devastation of two cities seemed to play on the minds of the politicians planning surrender and the officers trying to stop them.

在这本书中，一个有趣的问题是，在计划投降的政客和试图阻止他们的军官头脑里，两座城市被原子弹毁灭似乎没有产生什么影响。

Years after writing Japan’s Longest Day, Mr Hando says he came to think the atomic attacks were more significant: they shocked Japan’s top brass, who had been told such weapons could not be ready in time for the war, but now feared an atomic attack on Tokyo.

半藤一利表示，在完成《日本最漫长的一天》多年之后，他逐渐认识到原子弹袭击的意义要更大一些：这两次袭击震惊了日本高层军官。这些人此前一直被告知，这种武器不会被及时研发出来，投入此次战争。然而如今，他们却要担心对东京的原子弹袭击。

But he says Japan’s leadership had a sketchy understanding of what nuclear weapons really meant: it took until three days after Hiroshima, for example, to confirm the weapon used was atomic. “The leaders understood better than the general public, but there were still many who didn’t comprehend it fully,” says Mr Hando.

不过，半藤一利表示，日本领导层对核武器的真正威力理解十分肤浅：比如，直到广岛遭袭三天后，他们才确认袭击广岛的武器是原子弹。半藤一利表示：“领导人了解的情况比普通公众更多一些，但仍有许多人未完全了解这种武器。”

The author, now aged 85, is part of the dying generation with personal memories of the war. He remembers feeling deeply moved when Japan adopted its pacifist constitution in 1947, and while he says an old man has no right to decide, he clearly opposes Mr Abe’s changes.

这位现年85岁的作者，也是正在死去的拥有战争个人记忆的一代人中的一份子。他还记得，1947年日本采纳和平宪法时，他大受感动。此外，虽然他表示作为一位老人无权决定什么，但是他明确反对安倍的改革。

Japan’s greatest assets is the international trust its post-war pacifism has earned, says Mr Hando. “To throw that away on a needless national security law...I think is completely unnecessary.”

半藤一利表示，日本最大的资产，是通过战后的和平主义战略赢得的国际社会的信任。“我认为，为了一条不必要的防务安全法律抛弃这一切，是完全不必要的。”