莫迪的非自由主义倾向威胁印度民主

As India completes 70 years of its independence, the nation’s democracy is becoming Janus-faced. Its electoral vibrancy is not in doubt, but the polity’s performance between elections is acquiring profoundly illiberal traits.

在刚刚庆祝完独立70周年的印度，民主制度正在显示出两面性。印度选举制度的活力是毋庸置疑的，但在介于两次选举之间的时间，印度政治制度开始表现出极度非自由主义民主的特征。

In political theory, an illiberal democracy is defined as one that only pays attention to elections, while it violates, in the years between elections, some core democratic principles, especially freedom of expression.

在政治学理论中，非自由主义民主指的是这样一种民主：只关注选举，而在介于两次选举之间的那几年，却违背一些民主制度的核心原则，特别是言论自由。

It views elections as the only measure of democracy and once elected, it seeks unrestrained power, often on behalf of the majority community. The India of Narendra Modi, prime minister, is beginning to resemble this description.

这种民主制度将选举视为民主的唯一尺度，而某一政党一旦当选，通常就会代表多数团体寻求不受制约的权力。纳伦德拉?莫迪(Narendra Modi)总理领导下的印度，已经显示出这种迹象。

The electoral vigour of Indian democracy is well known. Since 1952, there have been 16 national and 362 state elections, mostly free and fair. Power has peacefully changed hands eight times in Delhi and so often at the state level that scholars have stopped counting.

印度民主制度在选举上的活力众所周知。自1952年以来，印度已经进行过16次全国大选和362次邦一级选举，其中大部分是自由、公正的。印度中央政府已经实现了8次和平的权力移交，地方一级的权力更迭更不胜枚举。

In 1992, a third tier of local elected governments was added.

1992年，印度在原有的两级民选地方政府之外，又增设了一级民选地方政府。

Since then, roughly 3m local legislators have been elected every five years.

自那以后，每隔5年，就有约300万地方议员通过选举产生。

Over the past three decades, defying western democratic experience, the poor and the less educated have voted as much as, if not more than, the richer and more educated classes. Elections have become civic festivals.

过去30年，与西方民主经验不同的是，印度的贫民阶层、及受教育程度较低的民众，和富裕、及接受过良好教育的阶层一样多、甚至更多地行使投票权。选举已成为公民的节日。

Comparative evidence shows that democracies can be established at any level of income, but their mortality rate is very high at lower levels of income. The longevity of Indian democracy, a lower middle income country even after four decades of high economic growth, is thus remarkable and receives a lot of plaudits.

有可比证据显示，民主政体可以建立在任何经济发展水平之上，但当建立在较低经济发展水平上时，民主政体崩溃的几率非常高。即使经过40年的高速经济增长，印度仍是一个中低等收入水平国家，因此，印度能够长久维持民主体制，尤显瞩目并享誉全球。

But its increasing illiberalism is also worthy of critical attention. Especially alarming is how the Modi government has dealt with freedom of expression. Previous governments, too, faltered on this issue.

但印度与日俱增的非自由主义也有必要以批判的眼光关注。尤其令人担忧的是莫迪政府对言论自由的处理方式。印度以往历届政府在这个问题上也同样做得不好。

Books, for example, were often banned, when some group claimed they were offended by novels or treatises. Individuals or organisations that took sharp anti-government stands were also harassed.

例如，当一些群体声称某些小说或专著冒犯了他们时，这些图书就常常遭到封禁。那些持激烈反政府立场的个人或组织也常被找麻烦。

But this process has now reached qualitatively different proportions. Often equating dissent with lack of patriotism, the government has created a regime of fear, hysteria and retribution.

但这种状况现已变质。常常把异见等同于不爱国的印度政府，创造了一个制造恐惧、歇斯底里和实施惩罚的政权。

Civil society organisations have been threatened and writers attacked. Independent voices in the press are noticeably declining. Many journalists are afraid to criticise Mr Modi for fear of reprisal. Business executives say they cannot openly criticise economic policies, such as demonetisation, for fear of retribution. Scholars watch what they say or write. The famously argumentative Indian is now being silenced and turned into a consenting Indian.

民间团体遭到威胁，作家遭到攻击。媒体中独立的声音明显减弱。许多记者因为担心遭到报复不敢批评莫迪。企业高管们说，由于害怕受到惩罚，他们无法公开批评经济政策，例如废止两种大钞的政策。学者们也不敢乱说话或乱写文章。以喜欢争辩著称的印度现在被迫噤声，变成了一个唯唯诺诺的国家。

Freedom of expression, as an idea, also covers what citizens eat and the trade they legally engage in. Under the slogan of cow protection, vigilante groups, with impunity, punish beef eating, the trade in cattle and ownership of slaughter houses.

言论自由，作为一种理念，也包括公民的饮食习惯及合法的交易活动。在保护圣牛的口号下，纠察队对食用牛肉者、交易活牛者及屠宰场所有者处以私刑，而这种私刑行为不受法律制裁。

Such vigilante action is integrally connected to the ideology of Hindu nationalism, which animates Mr Modi’s organisational base. Their belief is that cow protection is central to Hinduism, and Hinduism is the core of Indian nationhood, even though the constitution says that India as a nation belongs to all religious groups. Cow protection and nationalism have got intertwined.

这些“护牛”私刑行动与印度民族主义的意识形态有内在联系，印度民族主义正是莫迪的基层感召力之源。这些基层选民相信，保护圣牛是印度教的核心教规，而印度教是印度国家认同的核心——尽管印度宪法规定印度是一个属于所有宗教团体的国家。保护圣牛和民族主义已经密不可分。

Mob violence especially targets Muslims, who eat beef, own a lot of slaughter houses, and are among the biggest practitioners of the trade in cattle. A government that should be committed to the security of all its citizens is failing the nation’s largest minority. On completing his term, India’s vice-president, a Muslim, recently argued that Muslims are feeling increasingly insecure.

这些暴行尤其将穆斯林作为攻击目标，穆斯林吃牛肉，拥有许多屠宰场，而且从事与牛相关行业的人数极多。一个本该致力于保护全体公民安全的政府，正在辜负这个国家最大的少数群体。印度的一位穆斯林副总统最近在任期结束时称，穆斯林感到越来越没有安全感。

Mr Modi has criticised vigilantism, but not strongly enough. More importantly, in March, he picked as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, the largest Indian state, a politician-monk, who heads a private vigilante force that has become many times larger since he rose to power, and is known for cow protection and anti-Muslim fervour.

莫迪对“暴力护牛”表示了谴责，但不够强烈。更重要的是，今年三月，他将一个当过印度教祭司的政客任命为印度最大邦北方邦(Uttar Pradesh)的首席部长，此人领导着一支私人纠察队（自他上台以来该组织壮大了数倍），并以高涨的“护牛”及反穆斯林热情闻名。

The practice and rhetoric of Mr Modi, thus, clearly diverge. Unsurprisingly, his base has turned a blind eye to his words. His criticism of mob violence was again perfunctory in his independence day speech.

因此，莫迪的言与行明显大相径庭。不出所料，拥护他的选民对他话置若罔闻。他在独立日演讲中对暴行的谴责又是一次表面文章。

It will indeed be sad if the largest democracy of the developing world turns into a polity that mainly works for its Hindu majority and targets the minorities and government critics. Unless free expression is restored and vigilante violence checked, that is where India’s democracy is headed.

如果发展中世界最大的民主国家变成一个主要服务于多数印度教徒，同时处处针对少数民族和政府批评者的国家，那就太悲哀了。印度民主制度恰恰就正在朝这个方面前进——除非恢复言论自由并制止暴力私刑。