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为什么俄罗斯远东地区对中国如此重要

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VLADIVOSTOK -- Russia is seldom thought of as an Asia-Pacific country. Yet it is one -- thanks to its Far East. The Russian Far East is a huge area of northeastern Eurasia stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean. Allowing Russia direct access to the Asia-Pacific region, the RFE makes it a truly transcontinental nation, the only other such a country being the U.S.

符拉迪沃斯托克—俄罗斯很少被认为是一个亚太国家,尽管它的确属于亚太地区——多亏了它的远东地区。俄远东地区是亚欧大陆东北部的一大片区域,从贝加尔湖延伸到太平洋,使得俄罗斯名副其实的属于亚太地区。远东地区使俄罗斯成为一个横跨大陆的国家,除此之外唯一一个横跨大陆的国家是美国。

为什么俄罗斯远东地区对中国如此重要

The RFE contains all kinds of natural treasures -- oil and natural gas, iron ore and copper, diamonds and gold, pristine fresh water (Lake Baikal alone has 20 percent of the world's unfrozen surface freshwater), timber and fish stocks (for example, the Sea of Okhotsk is one of the most biologically productive areas of the world ocean).

远东地区蕴含着丰富多样的资源——石油、天然气、铁矿石、铜、钻石、黄金、以及纯净的淡水(仅仅贝加尔湖就拥有世界上20%的融化的地表淡水)、木材、鱼类资源(例如,鄂霍次克海是世界海洋中生物生产力最强的地区)

The entire vastness of the RFE contains just over 6 million residents. Being remote from, and having tenuous transportation links to, the country's European core, suffering from underdevelopment and the lack of infrastructure, the RFE is a source of constant concern for Moscow. Ever since Russia acquired these territories, there have been recurring worries that they are at the risk of being lost due to external aggression, foreign encroachment, internal separatism -- or a combination of the three.

偌大的远东地区却仅仅有600多万居民。远东地区距离俄罗斯欧洲核心地区遥远,交通连接薄弱,饱受发展滞后和基础设施匮乏之苦,远东地区成了莫斯科一直以来的头痛之源。自从获得这部分领土之后,俄罗斯就就一直担心它会因为外部侵略、外国侵占、内部分裂或者三者的综合而失去远东地区。

China's Looming Shadow

中国逼近的阴影

The RFE has historically had an ambivalent relationship with its giant neighbor, China. It is seen as an indispensable economic partner. Yet China is simultaneously a source of threat. After all, the southern part of what is now the Russian Far East used to be under the Qing's nominal sovereignty until the second half of the 19th century. Despite the fact that, at the official level, the border issue between Moscow and Beijing is fully settled by legal treaties, there are lingering concerns in Russia that China might in the future reclaim the land. This is not helped by the well-known sentiments of many in China who still see the 19th-century border treaties with the Russian Empire as "unfair" and count them as part of "the century of humiliation."

俄罗斯远东地区在历史上与它的强大的中国邻居曾有过一段喜忧参半的时期。中国被俄视为必不可少的经济伙伴,尽管中国同时也是一个危险的根源。不过毕竟在19世纪后半叶以前,远东地区的南部地区还是处于清朝的主权管辖范围的。尽管莫斯科与北京关于边界问题已经在官方层面上通过法律条文完全解决了,但是俄罗斯一直有人在担心中国会在不远的将来会重新索要回这片土地。许多中国人都认为19世纪与沙皇俄国签订的条约是“不平等”的,并且认为这些条约是“屈辱的世纪”的一部分,这种普遍的观点又会助长俄罗斯的担忧。

For the time being, Moscow and Beijing are "strategic partners," with the relationship increasingly resembling a quasi-alliance. One major reason China needs a strong bond with Russia lies in the Russian Far East.

目前莫斯科与北京是“战略合作伙伴”,并且二者的关系正逐步向准联盟靠近。中国需要同俄罗斯维持紧密关系的一个重要原因就是远东地区。

First, Beijing wants to have a secure and peaceful northern border with Russia, so that it can concentrate its military resources and planning on other strategic theaters, above all in the Western Pacific. The memories of confrontation with the Soviet Union, when China had to expend enormous efforts on reinforcing its frontiers with a hostile neighbor to the north, have not yet faded away.

首先,北京想同俄罗斯维持一个稳定和平的北方边界,这样它就可以集中他的军事资源应对其他的战略地区,主要是西太平洋地区。与前苏联的对抗,中国不得不花费巨大的精力来加强他同北方敌人的边界(防卫力量),而中国对此还记忆犹新。

Second, China's voracious economy needs the RFE's natural resources, which makes sense not only economically but also, at least as much, strategically. There are signs that China is beginning to see Eastern Russia as an important "strategic rear area", a proximate overland supplier of a range of vital primary commodities. This is directly related to China's intensifying contest with the U.S. for primacy in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing is increasingly worried that, if this rivalry comes to a head, Washington may use its trump card -- launching a naval blockade of the sea lanes through which China receives most of its imported primary growing dependence on imported raw materials and rising concerns about the fraught relations with the U.S., and it's Indo-Pacific allies, seem to have resulted in Beijing's attaching much greater priority to the RFE than was the case five or 10 years ago.

第二点 中国经济增长的巨大需求需要俄罗斯远东地区的自然资源,这在经济和至少战略上都说得通。有迹象表明中国开始将俄罗斯远东地区视作重要的后方战略区域;一个多样且重要的初级产品(未经加工或因销售习惯而略作加工的产品)的内陆直接供应地。这直接和中国强化同美国在亚太地区的主导权的竞争有关。北京愈来越担忧如果这场竞争激化,华盛顿可能使用其杀手锏-对中国海上通道进行封锁。中国大多数初级产品进口依赖于海上通道。对原材料进口不断加强的的独立性和对对美关系极其印度洋盟友的担忧似乎已经使北京,相比5年10年以来,将俄罗斯远东地区视作重要目标

Until recently, the Chinese economic presence in the RFE was quite limited. The number of Chinese migrants in the RFE has also been modest -- no more than 300,000 -- most of them as sojourners rather than permanent residents. There are, however, indications that China's footprint in the RFE is about to grow. China's interest in the RFE has coincided with Moscow's hour of need. Although just a few years ago the Kremlin was reluctant to allow the Chinese direct access to the most valuable industries of the Far East, it had to change its mind when faced with Western isolation over Ukraine and now having few alternatives but China. Moving, or rather being pushed, closer to China amidst confrontation with the West, Moscow has lifted formal and informal restrictions on Chinese investments that existed hitherto and begun to actively court Chinese capitals.

直到最近,中国在远东地区的经济存在还很有限。远东地区中国移民的数量也不是很多—不超过300000—大部分都只是暂住居民而不是永久居民。然而有迹象表明中国在远东地区的存在感将要加强,中国在远东地区的利益正好与莫斯科的需求一致。尽管几年前克里姆林宫还是不情愿中国直接插手远东地区最有价值的产业,但是现在俄由于乌克兰问题而受到西方的孤立,它不得不改变想法了,并且除了中国它也没有多少备选的国家。莫斯科在于西方的对抗中,更接近或者说被迫接近中国,它已经放宽了目前对中国投资的正式或非正式的限制,并且开始积极寻求中方的投资。

The main thrust has been in the hydrocarbon sector, epitomized by the gargantuan 400 billion, 30-year contract signed in May 2014 by Gazprom and CNPC to supply the RFE's gas to China. In other landmark developments, focused on eastern Russia, Moscow agreed to sell Chinese companies stakes in the country's most lucrative oil field and the world's third biggest copper field.

最主要的推动力是在油气方面,集中体现在2014年5月俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)与中国石油天然气公司(CNPC)签订的远东地区向中国提供天然气的协议,总额达极其庞大的4000亿美元,时间长达30年。其他具有里程碑意义的进展方面,集中在俄东部地区,莫斯科同意出售给中方公司俄罗斯最赚钱的油田和世界上第三大铜矿的股票。

Recent Russo-Chinese deals in the RFE have not been limited to resource-extraction industries. In 2014, Russian and Chinese government-affiliated companies announced they would jointly develop Zarubino port, strategically located in the south of the RFE at the junction of Russian, North Korean and Chinese borders. The port at Zarubino will give China direct access to the Sea of Japan, which it has long coveted. The port, with the expected throughput capacity of 100 million tons, will mostly handle Chinese cargoes. Chinese companies have also become the principal investors in a large-scale integrated casino resort near Vladivostok, which is slated to open in 2015 and aims to service mostly visitors from China.

最近中俄在远东地区的贸易不再仅限于资源开采业。2014年中俄政府的附属公司宣布他们将共同开发扎鲁比诺港,这个港口位于远东地区南部,是中朝俄三国交界的地方,极具战略意义。中国可以通过位于扎鲁比诺的港口直接进入日本海,这时中国觊觎已久的。这个港口,预期有一亿吨的吞吐量,将主要装卸中国的货物。中国企业也是一个位于符拉迪沃斯托克附近的大兴综合性赌场度假村的主要投资者,该度假村预定在2015年开业并且服务对象主要是中国游客。

Speaking at Saint Petersburg's Economic Forum in May 2014, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao called for the linking up of the RFE with northeast China in order to "turn the two into a big market -- a new economic bloc in Asia." In dealing with the RFE, Beijing can deploy its giant state-owned corporations, which boast some of the deepest pockets in the world and are driven by the government's strategic calculations as much as by purely commercial considerations. Compared to Western companies with shareholder responsibility, they can make hefty investments with much longer planning horizons and without expecting short-term returns. This gives China a significant advantage in the RFE, where business projects often require massive financial outlays, are accompanied with significant risks, and do not promise quick profits.

在2014年5月的圣彼得堡经济论坛上,中国国家副主席李源潮发表讲话并呼吁加强远东地区与中国东北部地区的衔接,为了“是这两个地区合成为一个大市场——一个亚洲的新的经济联盟”。在对待远东地区方面,北京可以部署他的庞大的国有企业,其中一些是世界上经济实力最雄厚的企业,国企以此为傲。这些企业是为了国家战略计划服务并且纯粹的为了追求经济利益。和西方股份制的公司相比,它们可以用更加长远的目光进行大型的投资,并且不要求短期的回报,这使得中国在远东地区有了一个极其重要的优势。(因为)远东地区的投资经常是需要数额庞大的支出并且伴随着明显的风险,而这些投资也不一定能获得快速的收益。

The RFE is one piece in China's long-term geopolitical game aimed at creating zones of influence along its continental frontiers in Eurasia. Two other major areas, where Beijing pursues similar goals of securing its borders, getting preferential access to rich natural resources, and probably gaining there a degree of political control in the future, are continental Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Incidentally, large parts of these regions, like the RFE, were in the past under China's sovereignty or suzerainty. Another common feature of Beijing's policy toward the "rear areas" is to bind them up with the neighboring regions of China: southwestern China (especially Yunnan province) for Southeast Asia, western China (Xinjiang) for Central Asia, and northeastern China (Heilongjiang) for the RFE.

远东地区是中国长远的地缘政治策略的一部分,目的是为了在亚欧大陆上创造一个沿着中国大陆边界的势力范围。另外两个主要的地区是东南亚和中亚,在这些地方中国想达到类似的目的,即保卫边疆,获得对丰富得然资源的优先开采权,并且将来可能对这些地方拥有一定程度上的政治控制。顺便说一下,在过去,中国对这些地方都曾经拥有主权或宗主权。北京对于他的“后方”地区的政策的一个共同的特点是把这些地区同他们相邻的地区捆绑在一块:中国西南部(尤其是云南省)和东南亚,中国西部(新疆)和中亚,中国东北部(黑龙江)和远东地区。

Despite its seeming enthusiasm about the growing intimacy with Beijing, Moscow is aware of the costs and risks of embracing China. China's privileged access to the RFE could lead to Chinese economic dominion which would not only exclude other foreign competitors but can also begin to squeeze Russian companies out of the RFE. Economic sinicization may, sooner or later, set the stage for the erosion of sovereign control

尽管莫斯科和中国好像打得火热,它也清楚向中国靠近的代价。中国在远东地区的特权可能会确立中国在该地区经济上的统治地位。这不仅会赶走其他国家的竞争者也会把俄罗斯的企业从远东地区排挤出去。经济上的中国化,迟早都会为弱化(俄罗斯在该地区的)主权控制打好基础。

There is a probability that China's exclusive economic penetration of the RFE would eventually be followed by a rising degree of geopolitical control, ultimately jeopardizing Russian sovereignty and threatening to turn the RFE into not just a raw material appendix but also a military-strategic base for China in the North Pacific, especially if Moscow enters a full-fledged alliance with Beijing. The RFE could become exactly what some Chinese prefer to call it -- "Outer Manchuria," a territory where Russian sovereignty is getting increasingly tenuous and where matters are decided in Beijing and Harbin rather than Moscow or Vladivostok.

中国在远东地区的排他性的经济渗透很有可能最终会导致一个(对该地区)更高程度的地缘政治控制,到最后会危机俄罗斯的主权,并且有把远东地区不仅当做他的原材料提供地而且还是一个太平洋北部的的中国的军事基地的威胁,尤其是如果俄罗斯成了中国的一个全面的盟友。远东地区有可能真的成为一些中国人称呼它的那样—“外满洲里”,在该地区俄罗斯的控制力正在减弱并且(关于它的)重大事项是由北京和哈尔滨决定而不是莫斯科和符拉迪沃斯托克。

Some security experts in Russia even discuss a scenario in which China moves to annex the RFE by a surprise attack. This is not to say that such an invasion is imminent or likely. However, it cannot be ruled out, if Russia becomes too weak -- particularly if it descends into chaos due to a severe political or economic crisis. If China tries to grab the RFE, this may draw in other players Would the U.S. pre-emptively occupy Chukotka, Magadan, Kamchatka and the Arctic shore of Yakutia before Chinese enter these territories? And would Japan, in turn, take control of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands?

俄罗斯的一些安全部门专家甚至讨论了一种情景——中国通过突袭来夺取远东地区。这并不是说这种侵略即将发生或者有可能发生。但是如果俄罗斯变得很薄弱——尤其是当它由于一些政治或者经济危机而突然陷入混乱的时候,并不排除有这种可能。如果中国夺取远东地区,这可能会招来其他国家。美国会先发制人的抢在中国前面占领楚科奇,勘察加,马加丹和雅库特的北极海岸吗?并且日本会随后占领库页岛和千岛群岛吗?

The United States and the Russian Far East

美国和俄罗斯远东地区

Sarah Palin may not have been too far from the truth when she said that she could see Russia from her backyard. In fact, Alaska's Little Diomede Island sits just over two miles from Russia's Big Diomede Island in the middle of the Bering Strait.

Sarah Palin说她在她的后院里能够看见俄罗斯,这可能真不是在说谎。实际上,阿拉斯加的小代奥米德岛仅仅距离俄罗斯的白令海峡中心的大代奥米德岛两英里开外。

The RFE's may not at present have a major economic importance for the U.S., as America has its own abundant supply of many of the natural resources the RFE has to offer. However, from a geopolitical perspective, the RFE's significance for the U.S. is only growing, as Sino-American rivalry in the Asia-Pacific shows no signs of abatement.

现在远东地区对美国来说可能并没有重要的经济价值,因为许多远东地区能够提供的自然资源美国都有他自己的充足的来源。然而从地缘角度上看,远东地区对于美国的重要性正在增加,因为中美在亚太地区的对抗丝毫没有减弱的迹象。

"The greater involvement of Asia's developed economies, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, would help offset China's rising economic influence in the RFE and contribute to a more stable equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific."

“亚洲发达经济体,像是日本、韩国、新加坡(在远东地区的)更多的参与,会帮助抵消中国在远东地区的逐渐增加的经济影响,并且有助于亚太地区的更加稳定的(势力)平衡”

As previously noted, China seeks to secure "rear areas" along its continental periphery -- in mainland Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the RFE. Control over them would greatly expand Beijing's sway in Eurasia and make it feel more confident vis-à-vis Washington. Of the three mentioned areas, the RFE carries an added significance because of its adjacency to North America as well as fronting the ever more significant Arctic. The higher the level of Chinese penetration of the RFE, the more risks it poses potentially for the U.S.

正如之前提到过的,中国试图把它的“后方”同其相邻地区(东南亚大陆、中亚和远东地区)捆绑在一块,对这些地区的控制会大大扩大北京在亚欧大陆的影响并且使北京在与华盛顿的角力中更加自信。在上面提到的三个地区中,远东地区更加重要,因为它与美国相邻并且正对着一直以来极具战略意义的北冰洋。中国对远东地区的渗透越深入,对美国的威胁就越大。

American interest in the fate of the RFE would not be without historical precedent: it was partly thanks to the U.S. diplomatic intervention that the Russian Far East remained Russian, when in the early 1920s Washington successfully pressed Japan, America's main geopolitical opponent at the time, to pull out its troops from the region.

美国对于远东地区命运的关注并不是没有先例:这一定程度上多亏了20世纪20年代美国政治上的干预,成功迫使日本撤回了在该地区的军队,使俄罗斯远东地区仍属于俄罗斯,这时候日本还是美国主要的地缘政治上的对手。

The goal of the U.S. should not be to keep China out of the RFE, for it is neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it should work toward enabling the RFE to integrate with the Asia-Pacific economies, so that China does not become the predominant player. Russia would definitely welcome such a strategy, as it fully corresponds with its own strong interest in having economic alternatives to China. Moreover, Russians are aware that China will not provide the RFE with what it needs, no less than cash, advanced technologies and expertise. This is precisely where America and other developed economies retain a remarkable edge over China.

美国的目标不应该是把中国从远东地区的排挤出去,因为这不可能也是不可取的。相反,美国要确保使远东地区整合到亚太经济体中,这样中国对于远东地区就不能占领导地为了。俄罗斯肯定会对这个战略表示欢迎,因为这正好满足它的强烈需求——找到俄罗斯在经济方面中国的替代者。并且俄罗斯知道中国提供不了远东地区需要的东西——不仅仅是投资,还有先进的技术和专业知识。在这些方面美国和其他发达经济体相比与中国拥有很大的优势

Of course, the Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia now make it difficult for the U.S. to invest in the RFE. However, Washington would be well-advised to at least let the Asians do business with the RFE rather than pressuring them into joining Western anti-Russia sanctions. The greater involvement of Asia's developed economies, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, would help offset China's rising economic influence in the RFE and contribute to a more stable equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific.

当然,美国因为乌克兰问题而对俄罗斯的制裁使得它很难向远东地区投资。然而,华盛顿也会被建议至少要让亚洲国家在远东地区贸易而不是迫使他们加入西方的反俄制裁中来。亚洲的发达经济体,像是日本、韩国、新加坡,在远东地区的更多的参与,会有助于抵消中国对于远东地区逐渐增长的经济影响同时也有助于建立亚太地区更加稳定的平衡。

Artyom Lukin:Professor Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia

Artyom Lukin:俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克的远东联邦大学教授。