西方该不该与叙利亚合作

The US and much of the world have been rudely awakened to the fact that the group formerly known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is both a dangerous terrorist organisation, and considerably more than that. The deadly reality of its capabilities and ambitions is captured in the latest title by which Isis styles itself: the Islamic State. It is a de facto government with evolving borders that seeks to impose its vision of society on the millions of people over whom it rules. And, as it has dramatically shown since the capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul in June, it seeks to expand its borders and the numbers subject to its control.

美国和世界大部分地区被这样一个事实粗暴地唤醒：原先被称为“伊拉克与黎凡特伊斯兰国”（Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant，简称Isis）的组织，远不止是一个危险的恐怖主义组织；它的致命实力和野心，反映在它给自己的最新封号上：伊斯兰国(Islamic State)。这是个事实上的政府，有着仍在变化的边界线，谋求将自己的社会愿景强加于自己统治的数百万号民众头上。此外，这个组织还谋求扩张自己的边界，扩大自己控制的民众数量。自6月攻占伊拉克摩苏尔以来，这一意图已表露无遗。

The biggest question now facing western states is what to do about Syria. Iraq’s neighbour is where Isis established itself and from where it directs its operations. The fact is that the world cannot defeat Isis in Iraq, or limit its potential elsewhere, if it continues to enjoy sanctuary in Syria. Yet this is a country whose president, Bashar al-Assad, stands accused by the west of war crimes as part of an onslaught against his own citizens that has fuelled a conflict costing almost 200,000 lives.

西方国家眼下面临的最大问题在于，该如何对待伊拉克的邻国叙利亚。Isis就是在叙利亚站稳脚跟的，至今仍从叙利亚指挥各项行动。事实是，如果Isis继续在叙利亚拥有根据地，世界就无法在伊拉克击败Isis，也无法在别的地方遏制它的潜在危害。然而，为难的是，西方谴责叙利亚总统巴沙尔•阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)在一场针对本国人民的战争中犯下战争罪，对一场导致近20万人死亡的冲突负有责任。

The first thing that needs to be done, despite White House reluctance, is to make good on what General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, suggested last week. The US should attack Isis targets across the border from Iraq inside Syria. More could and should be done, too, to slow the flow of recruits, arms and dollars.

当务之急是（尽管白宫不情愿这样做）尽快落实美国参谋长联席会议主席马丁•邓普西(Martin Dempsey)上将上周的提议：美国应跨过伊拉克边境，打击叙利亚境内的Isis目标。我们还应该、也有能力加大努力，减慢Isis招募成员以及筹措武器和资金的速度。

Yet even with support from US special forces, Kurdish peshmerga, Sunni tribesmen and Iraqi ground troops operating at home – together with attempts to close borders and banks – there are limits to what air power can achieve. What is needed are ground forces operating inside Syria. This is where things get complicated. Very complicated.

然而，即便有美军特种部队、库尔德“自由斗士”、逊尼派部落以及本土作战的伊拉克地面部队的支持，并采取措施尝试关闭边境和银行，空中打击的效果仍将是有限的。我们需要的是在叙利亚境内作战的地面部队。谈到这一点，事情就变得非常复杂了。

In principle there are four options. The US and European governments could provide ground forces. But, with widespread hostility to renewed military involvement following wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a political non-starter. An expeditionary force would be an undertaking of enormous cost and risk, with no prospect of speedy success and likely to yield at best only limited progress. Given public attitudes, it is not going to happen.

基本上，我们有4种选择。美国和欧洲政府可以出动地面部队。但考虑到伊拉克和阿富汗战争后普遍的反战情绪，这在政治上是不可能实现的。出动远征军成本高昂、风险巨大，也不可能迅速取得胜利，至多只会取得有限的进展。考虑到民意，这是一种不可能的选择。

A second option would be to create a pan-Arab expeditionary force, one with units from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and possibly Egypt. Organising and deploying such a force would be extremely difficult. It might also trigger intervention from other outsiders with a stake in Syria’s future, including Iran. If this were to happen, what is already a bad situation could become worse.

第二个选择是，由约旦、沙特、阿联酋、或许还有埃及，共同出兵组建一支泛阿拉伯远征军。这样一支军队的组织和部署将异常困难，或许还会引发其他与叙利亚未来利益相关的外部力量的干预，其中包括伊朗。若如此，已经很糟的情况可能变得更糟。

The third option is to create an internal Syrian opposition, building on elements that already exist. But this, too, would take a good deal of time, and it would be a tall order for any such force to contend successfully with both the Syrian government and Isis.

第三个选择是以现有力量为基础，组建一支叙利亚内部的反政府武装。但这需要花费很长时间，而且指望这样一支部队能同时击败叙利亚政府和Isis是不现实的。

The fourth option is to turn to the regime of Mr Assad to take the lead in defeating Isis. This would mean accepting for the foreseeable future a regime that has committed war crimes; that is supported by Iran and Russia, with which the west has considerable strategic differences; and that is opposed by countries, including Saudi Arabia, with which the US has more often than not co-operated.

第四个选择是，转向阿萨德政权，让其领导对Isis的打击。这意味着在可预见的未来接受一个犯有战争罪的政权；一个得到与西方存在显著战略分歧的伊朗和俄罗斯支持的政权；一个经常与美国合作的国家（包括沙特）反对的政权。

Such a policy change would be costly but not as costly as a scenario in which Isis could use Syrian territory from which to mount attacks on the region and beyond. The Assad government may be evil – but it is a lesser evil than Isis, and a local one. Such an accommodation would require a great deal of diplomacy if it were to succeed. Understandings would have to be reached with Damascus, with the mostly secular opposition, much depleted by three years of brutal battles against Isis and the regime; and with outside backers (mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia) about how Syria was to be run, both now and in the future, and what would happen in liberated areas.

这样的政策转向代价高昂，但假如Isis以叙利亚为根据地，对中东乃至世界其他地区发动攻击，我们将付出更为高昂的代价。阿萨德政府或许邪恶，但没有Isis邪恶，而且只局限于本土。这种安排要想取得成功，需要做大量外交工作。我们必须就叙利亚现在和未来的治理方式、以及如何对待已经被反对派解放的地区，与大马士革方面、基本上世俗的反对派（与Isis和阿萨德政权的三年残酷斗争已使其被削弱）以及双方的外部支持者（主要是伊朗和沙特）达成谅解。

As is often the case, the more attractive options may not be feasible, while the option that could prove feasible would present distinct difficulties. The calculus argues for determining whether creating a pan-Arab force or developing a viable internal opposition are possible in the near future; if not, the US and Europe may have to live with, and even work with, a regime they have for years sought to remove. What is certain is that it should be a priority to convene a meeting of all the relevant governments – which, if initial discussions with other countries show promise, should include the Assad regime – to determine whether a common policy towards Syria and Isis can be forged.

就像经常发生的情况一样，更诱人的选择或许不可行，而可能可行的选择面临明显的困难。从逻辑上说，应当确定在较近的未来是否有可能组建一支泛阿拉伯部队，或扶植一支有望成功的内部反对力量；如果不可能，那么美国和欧洲或许就必须容忍一个自己多年来寻求推翻的政权继续存在，甚至与这个政权合作。有一点是肯定的，那就是当务之急是召集所有相关政府开会，确定能否制定一套针对叙利亚和Isis的共同政策；如果与其他国家的初步讨论有眉目，那么也应邀请阿萨德政权参与讨论。