中国金融改革阵痛不可避免

At the beginning of July, a mix of the most thoughtful Chinese and foreign policy makers, academics and market practitioners gathered in Shanghai for the annual Lujiazui financial forum. The economic backdrop wasn't great. Europe continues at the edge of the precipice while the US has lost momentum and emerging markets are also slowing. The world still hasn't recovered from the global financial crisis made in the US and swiftly exported to much of the world.

7月初，一批卓有见地的中外政策制定者、学者以及市场从业者齐聚上海，参加一年一度的陆家嘴金融论坛。其时，经济形势并不乐观。欧洲仍在悬崖边徘徊，美国经济增长乏力，新兴市场增长也在放缓。世界经济仍未从全球金融危机中恢复。这场危机发端于美国，随后迅速波及世界大多数国家。

Meanwhile, hopes that China will save the planet look increasingly forlorn. Exports, a lagging indicator, came in at a relatively strong 11.4 per cent while far weaker imports, a leading indicator, at just over 6 per cent, suggest as much.

与其同时，中国拯救世界的希望日趋渺茫，其进口和出口数据都表明了这一点。经济运行的滞后指标——出口增长强劲，增长率达到11.4%；而经济运行的先行指标——进口则表现得疲软得多，增长率仅略高于6%。

One of the lessons that China learnt from the global financial crisis is that the west doesn't have much to teach it when it comes to building a financial system. Yet China is outgrowing the system that served it well up to now. So change is inevitably coming and the Communist party, obsessed with control, may not be able to control the process. No matter what the pace or degree of change, it is likely to be a painful process for the beneficiaries of today's system, and also likely to present painful trade-offs for those in charge of the process.

中国在全球金融危机中学到的一点是，西方金融体系建设经验的借鉴价值不高。但不断增长的中国实体经济正逐渐超出其金融体系的承载能力，虽然迄今为止，该体系仍能够较好地满足中国的金融需求。因此，改革不可避免，而控制欲极强的中国政府可能无法掌控改革的过程。对目前体系的既得利益者来说，不论改革的速度或程度如何，这可能都将是一个痛苦的过程，也可能令掌控改革进程者面临痛苦的抉择。

Meanwhile, much of the discussion in Shanghai was dedicated to the hottest topics on the reform agenda; the liberalisation of interest rates, the gradual dismantling of capital controls and the expanding international use of the renminbi.

与此同时，陆家嘴论坛上很多讨论都围绕金融体系改革议程表上最热的一些议题展开，比如利率自由化、逐步放开资本管制、以及推进人民币国际化。

For example, in recently adjusting interest rates in the hope of sparking more demand for loans in China's slowing economy, the changes have been asymmetrical. For the first time, Beijing cut the interest rates on loans more than on deposits while leaving the banks with some discretion to raise the return on deposits. With inflation down to 2.2 per cent, real rates are no longer negative. The numbers are small but they represent a big change in the template.

比如说，中国央行最近的调息就是不对称的。在经济增长放缓的背景下，调息的目的是刺激贷款需求。贷款基准利率的下调幅度首次超过存款基准利率，同时，银行首次获得了一定范围内的利率自由浮动权限。由于通胀率已降至2.2%，实际利率不再为负。虽然实际利率水平仍然很低，但这反映了利率形成模式的一个巨大变化。

Still, Beijing was being far more reactive than proactive in introducing this departure. Regulators were responding to changes in the market that they haven't been able to control. For one thing, banks matter less. Many people and companies are putting their money in trust company products with far better returns than those on offer at the banks. And even at the banks, as much as half of all new deposits are going into wealth management products, according to Fitch Ratings, while there have been no new net corporate deposits at all in five years. If the authorities hadn't acted, they would merely have accelerated the flight out of deposits and out of the banks. That "amounts to de facto interest rate liberalisation", notes Chris Wood of CLSA in Hong Kong.

但中国政府引入这一改革在很大程度上仍是被动之举，而非主动为之。监管机构引入改革是在对它们一直控制不了的市场变化做出应对。市场变化之一是，银行的重要性下降。许多个人和公司正在将资金投入信托产品，所获收益远高于银行所能提供的回报。而惠誉评级(Fitch Ratings)数据显示，即使在银行系统内，多达一半的新增存款来自对理财产品的认购，而近五年来净企业储蓄没有任何增加。如果当局未采取行动，个人和企业只会加快取出存款并将资金从银行抽出的步伐。香港里昂证券(CLSA)分析师克里斯?伍德(Chris Wood)指出，这“事实上相当于利率自由化”。

But such liberalisation is a double-edged sword. The banks have thrived on the large gap between the rates at which they lend and what they pay out on deposits but now that is gap is narrowing. That is extremely inconvenient. Banks will need more capital to help them deal with bad debts from the last round of fiscal stimulus, which is always done through the banks.

但利率自由化是一柄双刃剑。存贷款高利差为银行带来了丰厚的利润，而如今利差正在降低，这将引发各种问题。银行将需要更多资本金，帮助它们消化上一轮财政刺激遗留下来的坏账。在中国，财政刺激总是通过银行来完成。

China continues to move toward capital account liberalisation as well. In the past, much of the demand for renminbi from the rest of the world was rooted in the expectation that the currency would appreciate. Now such expectations have vanished but demand remains in part because of a dollar shortage, especially in Asia.

中国也在继续推进资本账户自由化。在过去，海外人民币需求绝大部分来自人民币升值预期。如今这种预期已经消失，但海外人民币需求依然存在（尤其是在亚洲地区），部分原因在于美元短缺。

Beijing wishes to control the level of the renminbi. In the past, when Beijing relied more heavily on exports to support economic growth, controls kept the renminbi from appreciating too much. But times have changed. In trade-weighted terms, the renminbi has already appreciated a lot and many hedge fund managers think today the currency is about where it should be.

中国政府希望控制人民币汇率水平。在过去、中国政府更加依赖出口来支撑经济增长时，管制避免了人民币大幅升值。但如今情况变了。人民币贸易加权汇率的升值幅度已经较大，许多对冲基金经理认为，目前人民币币值基本处于合理水平。

Now, in a reversal of fears of undue appreciation, there are whispers in the capital as well as on the sidelines of the forum in Shanghai about a potential flight of capital, whether just out of the banks or, more alarmingly, out of the country altogether. The trigger could be benign, such as a rally in the stock market, which has been in the doldrums for years, attracting funds away from the banks. Or it could be something darker, such as riots in the streets.

如今，在北京以及上海陆家嘴论坛的非正式讨论中，风向逆转了。人们不再担心人民币过度升值，大家私下里议论的是出现资本外逃的可能性，无论资金是仅仅逃出银行系统，还是干脆逃离中国。其中，后一种情形是更令人担心的。触发资本外逃的导火索可能是好事，比如持续多年低迷的股市止跌回升（这会吸引资金从银行系统中流出），也可能是坏事，比如骚乱事件。

Fears of capital flight are one factor that keeps Beijing from lifting capital controls.

对资本外逃的担忧是中国政府目前尚不敢放开资本管制的原因之一。

But those who set the policy agenda have their own agendas as well. In Indonesia, after all, one reason that the rupiah went from about 2,500 to the dollar to almost 20,000 without any effort to impose measures to halt the outflows during the Asian financial crisis almost 15 years ago was because the elite wanted to get their own money out. Self-interest also influences outcomes.

但政策议程的制定者们也有自己的议程表。在约15年前的亚洲金融危机中，印尼盾兑美元汇率从1美元兑2500印尼盾跌至1美元兑近20000印尼盾，而印尼政府未采取任何措施来阻止资本外流，其原因就在于，精英阶层想把自己的资金挪到海外。私利也会影响政策结果。