中国经济金融风险的债转股有什么不好

Earlier this year Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, responding to a press conference question about financial risk in the economy, said: “We can also use such market-oriented format as debt equity swap [by commercial banks] to help bring down the corporate leverage ratio.”

今年早些时候，中国总理李克强在一场新闻发布会上回应有关中国经济中金融风险的问题时说：“（我们）也可以通过市场化债转股的方式来逐步降低企业的杠杆率”。

This remark was seized upon by the media, both inside and outside of China, but there has been almost no policy clarification by officials.

中外媒体都注意到了这句话，但中国官员几乎还没有从政策层面进行任何阐释。

While details are sketchy, to say the least, I have nevertheless been surprised at the generally negative response to the proposal from analysts reported in the western news.

至少可以说，细节还没有敲定，但在西方媒体的报道中，分析师们对债转股的提议普遍持负面看法，这让我感到惊讶。

Allowing banks to swap debt for equity in their borrowers is a prerequisite for consensual restructuring of indebted companies. For example, some businesses may be viable with a lower debt burden. If they can negotiate a “haircut” with lenders then they can continue to trade, preserving jobs and achieving a turnround. Alternatively, a debt reduction could pave the way for new investment, or enable struggling firms to be acquired by competitors driving synergies and much needed sector consolidation.

允许银行将债务转为对借款人的股权，是在双方同意的情况下对负债企业进行重组的前提条件。比如，有些公司只要减轻债务负担就能继续运营下去。如果它们能够和贷款人协商进行减记，它们就能维持运营，保留就业岗位，实现扭亏为盈。削减债务还能为新投资铺平道路，或者让处境艰难的公司被竞争对手收购，从而产生协同效应，实现亟需的行业整合。

But banks are not motivated to write down their loans if they get nothing back in return. In doing so the banks take a loss and if the company can be turned around all of the upside goes to the shareholders. Allowing banks to take an equity stake in return for writing off some portion of their loans (they will rarely convert all) enables the banks to share in any upside. In successful cases, the equity upside could exceed the amount of the original loan.

但是，银行如果得不到任何回报就没有动力减记贷款。那样做银行要蒙受损失，即使公司扭亏为盈，好处也都归股东。允许银行持有一部分股权，以减记公司的一部分贷款（银行很少会将全部债务转为股权），一旦公司获得盈利，银行能够从中分一杯羹。在成功的案例中，股权带来的红利可能超过原始贷款的金额。

To make an example, suppose Company X owes Bank Y $100m. Company X has a decent underlying business and with say $40m of investment in new plant and equipment its management believes they could improve margins and increase sales and ebitda.

举个例子，假如X公司欠Y银行1亿美元。X公司的基础业务经营得不错，其管理层相信，如果能够获得4000万美元的投资用于建设新厂房和购置设备，他们就能够改善利润率，提高销售额和息税折旧及摊销前利润(Ebitda)。

But Company X’s debt burden is too high, though it could handle $60m of debt if it got the new investment. In a case like this New Investor Z might sit down with Company X and Bank Y to negotiate a deal involving a debt-for-equity swap. Investor Z puts in $40m of new money for an equity stake. Bank Y also contributes $40m by way of debt forgiveness in return for equity.

但是X公司的债务太重了，不过如果它获得4000万美元新投资，它就能应付得起6000万美元债务。在这种情况下，新投资方Z可能会和X公司、Y银行坐下来协商一项债转股协议。投资方Z拿出4000万美元新投资，获得股权。Y银行也通过债务减免的方式贡献4000万美元，并换取股权。

A deal like this seems fair. Without the new money Company X will fail and everyone loses. Instead, Bank Y is asked to make the same contribution as Investor Z, but shares the returns if things go to plan. Although quite normal elsewhere, restructuring like this cannot happen in China as the banks are forbidden to hold equity.

这样的协议看上去公平合理。没有新投资，X公司就会破产，各方都有损失。而在这样的协议下，Y银行被要求与投资方Z贡献同样的资金，但如果事情按计划进行，两方就能分享回报。像这样的重组在别的地方相当正常，但在中国不可能发生，因为银行被禁止持有股权。

So I fail to see how permitting the Chinese commercial banks to swap debt for equity can be bad per se for the banks or the economy at large. The alternative is either to crystallise a certain loss for the banks or, as is prevalent in China, to kick the can along the road by rolling over non-performing loans ad-infinitum (and we get so called “zombie enterprises”). Either case is bad for both the banking sector and the general economy.

因此，我看不出允许中国的商业银行实施债转股怎么会对银行本身，或者对更大范围上的经济有害。其他方案或者是让银行承担一定的损失，或者就像中国盛行的做法，把不良贷款无休止地展期（于是就产生了所谓的“僵尸企业”）。不管是哪种做法，对银行业和对整体经济都是有害的。

Of course, if debt-equity swaps are mandated by the state or used only to patch up inefficient SOEs that might not be such a good thing. Although little known, there is precedent in China: banks were allowed to make equity conversions around the turn of the century at the same time as the big four asset management companies were established and in the boom years that followed some of these stakes may have done rather well.

当然，如果债转股是政府强制执行的，或者仅仅是用来改善效率低下的国有企业，那么债转股可能就不是那么好的一件事。尽管外界所知不多，但在中国的确有先例：大概在世纪之交的时候，银行被允许进行债务置换，同时四大资产管理公司成立了起来，在之后的繁荣时期，其中一些股份的表现可能相当不错。

In mature economies around the world debt restructurings are negotiated at arm’s length on commercial terms. If no deal can be reached based on transparent information flow and good-faith commercially motivated discussions, only then might a company slide into bankruptcy or liquidation. These are probably the companies that should be allowed to fail. Others can be given a new lease of life, facilitating optimal market-based restructuring in the economy and maximising returns from troubled loans to the banks.

在世界各地的成熟经济体中，债务重组是各方独立自主依据商业条款协商达成的。如果按照信息透明原则、出于商业动机进行诚信的协商还无法达成协议，那时一家公司才会陷入破产或者清算的境地。这些公司很可能应该被允许破产。其他公司则可以被赋予新生，以促成经济中最优的市场化重组，最大化银行从不良贷款中获得的回报。

Permitting Chinese commercial banks to hold equity stakes in their borrowers is an important and necessary step on the long and winding path toward sorting out the country’s multibillion renminbi non-performing loan problem. Policymakers should provide this essential instrument for the banks’ tool kits and, to paraphrase Mr Li again, allow market forces to play a decisive role.

解决中国巨额不良贷款问题需要经历一个漫长而曲折的过程，允许中国商业银行持有借款人的股份是这个过程中重要和必要的一步。政策制定者应该在银行的工具箱中加入这个基本手段，而且——再转述一句李克强的话——要让市场力量发挥决定性的作用。