当土耳其变得更像阿拉伯国家

After more than a decade in power, RecepTayyip Erdogan has come to tower over Turkey.

在掌权十多年后，雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)终于凌驾于土耳其之上。

The country has started to slip its westernmoorings.

土耳其开始脱离西方怀抱。

A republic shaped to be secular andwesternised is in some respects beginning to resemble its Arab neighbours.

当初以世俗化和西方化为设计宗旨的一个共和国，在某些方面开始变得就像其阿拉伯邻国。

Mr Erdogan, who five years ago, during theArab uprising, urged countries in the region to adopt secular constitutions,has now chosen identity politics —with sectarian trimmings.

在5年前的阿拉伯起义期间，埃尔多安曾敦促中东国家实行世俗宪法，现在他选择了带有宗派色彩的身份认同政治。

Polarisation has brought the presidentunparalleled electoral success.

观点极化让这位总统在选举中获得空前成功。

He has sharpened the Sunni, Islamist andTurkic identity of his Justice and Development party (AKP), and has worked tolock his opponents into separate blocs for the quasi-Shia Alevi and Kurdishminorities.

他在自己的正义与发展党(Justice and Development party, AKP)中增强了逊尼派、伊斯兰主义者和突厥人的势力，并努力将对手限定在准什叶派的阿列维人和库尔德人等少数群体。

He has trampled on the rule of law and,after the shock of mid-July’s abortive coup, decreed emergency rule.

在今年7月中旬的未遂政变之后，他践踏法治，颁布了紧急法令。

Turkish officials can and do point out thatFrance —the European state the Turkish republic arguably has most copied —alsodeclared a state of emergency after last November’s jihadi assault onParis.

土耳其官员们可以（而且确实）指出，法国（可以说是土耳其共和国模仿最多的欧洲国家）在去年11月圣战主义者袭击巴黎之后也宣布进入紧急状态。

But the emerging reconfiguration of Turkey’s armedforces and security services may be heading towards models more familiar to theArabs and Iranians.

但土耳其武装部队和安全部门正在浮现的改组表明，它们正趋向阿拉伯和伊朗模式。

Mr Erdogan and his government wereprofoundly shaken by the plot, which they blame on followers of FethullahGulen, leader of a shadowy Islamist cult allied to the AKP for a decade butlocked in an escalating power struggle with its leaders for the past fiveyears.

埃尔多安及其政府因政变而遭受深远冲击——他们指称是一个隐居的伊斯兰主义团体领导人法士拉•葛兰(Fethullah Gulen)的追随者们发起了政变。这个团体曾与AKP结盟十年，但在过去5年与AKP领导人的权力斗争日益升级。

Almost half of Turkey’s generalshave been arrested or cashiered as Gulenist infiltrators since the coup, inpurges that have ensnared more than 100,000 people.

自政变以来，土耳其近半数将军被视为葛兰分子而被捕或者革职，这场大清洗让逾10万人受到牵连。

Turks across the political spectrum areshocked not just at the violence of the mutineers, who killed 240 people, butalso because, as one liberal analyst puts it, It is very hard for us to graspthat our national army was in fact somebody else’s army.

不同政治见解的土耳其人都感到震惊，不仅仅是因为导致240人丧生的暴乱活动，还因为像一位自由派分析师所说的那样，我们很难理解，我们国家的军队怎么成了某个外人的军队。

Mr Erdogan, by contrast, emboldened bysurvival and sensing an opportunity, called the coup a gift from God enablinghim to cleanse the army.

相比之下，埃尔多安因幸免于难而变得大胆起来，并察觉到一个机遇，他将此次政变称为安拉赐予的礼物，让自己能够清洗军队。

Among Turkey’s neighbours, insecure rulershave developed a model whereby a well-armed national guard (in Saudi Arabia),republican guard (in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Ba’athist Syria) or revolutionaryguard (in Iran) serve as a counterweight to the regular army and as praetoriansfor the regime.

在土耳其的邻国当中，缺乏安全感的统治者发展出如下模式：成立全副武装的国民卫队（在沙特阿拉伯）、共和国卫队（在萨达姆•侯赛因(Saddam Hussein)的伊拉克或者阿拉伯复兴社会党(Ba'athist)掌控的叙利亚）或者革命卫队（在伊朗），将其作为政权的御林军，抗衡正规军队。

Given the extent of hostile penetration ofTurkey’s army, and the length of time it will take to replace the purgedcommanders with loyal cadres, some observers are wondering if Mr Erdogan is nowmoving towards a version of this praetorian model, based on the police.

鉴于土耳其军队遭到恶意渗透的程度，而且用自己人取代被清洗出去的将军们需要花费很长时间，一些观察家揣测，埃尔多安是否正以警察为依托，组建某种版本的御林军。

The police is becoming a paramilitary forcewhose first duty is to protect the regime, says one leading analyst.

一位领先分析师表示：警察正成为一支首要职责为保护政权的准军事力量。

A western ambassador says: I think they’re verytempted to do it.

一位西方大使表示：我认为他们渴望这么做。

After all, what saved them was a police onsteroids and special forces; they know how close they came that night, sodefinitely they’re thinking of balancing off the army.

毕竟，救了他们的是就像嗑了药的警察，还有特种部队，他们知道那天晚上他们距离失去一切有多近，因此他们肯定想制衡军队。

Additional measures include moving theparamilitary gendarmerie from defence to the interior ministry, the dissolutionof the presidential guard and a widely anticipated purge of the nationalintelligence service.

其他措施包括将准军事的宪兵队由国防部改为内政部管辖，解散总统卫队，并如广泛预期的那样清洗国家情报部门。

Turkish officials say they are doing nomore than copying how, say, Italy manages its carabinieri or Spain its GuardiaCivil.

土耳其官员们表示，他们只不过是复制其他国家的做法，比如说意大利对其宪兵队的管理，或者西班牙对其国民警卫队的管理。

The answer to why the police are the heroesof July 15 [the date of the coup] is that there had already been a purge ofGulenists inside the police and police intelligence in the previous year and ahalf, says one.

一位官员称：警方为何成为7月15日（政变日）的英雄的答案在于，在过去一年半里，警察和警方情报部门内部已经对葛兰势力进行了清洗。

There is no change in the model.

换句话说，模式没有改变。

One commentator and former AKP supportersays: The police already have the upper hand in terms of trust —of societynot just of Erdogan.

一位曾经支持AKP的评论员表示：警方已经在取得社会信任（不只是埃尔多安的信任）方面占据优势。

Their greater prominence, including massivedeployments of thousands of officers in Ankara and Istanbul last month, istherefore natural.

因此他们的地位上升是自然的，包括上月在安卡拉和伊斯坦布尔投入数千警力。

So, too, some analysts argue, is a firmergovernment grip on the army, which is being gradually stripped of theprivileges and power that defined the military as a caste and once made it thefinal arbiter of political power.

一些分析师辩称，政府加强对军队的控制也是自然的。如今军队正被逐步剥夺特权和权力，过去这些特权和权力让军队成为一个社会阶层，一度让其成为政治权力的最终仲裁者。

This may all sound natural in the voice ofprofessional civil servants or AKP sympathisers.

如果这话从职业公务员或者同情AKP的人士嘴里说出，听上去可能非常自然。

But the voice we are more likely to behearing is Mr Erdogan’s.

但我们更可能听到的是埃尔多安的声音。

And the concentration of power around him,especially if it is going to acquire a permanent paramilitary layer, may notseem natural once the coup panic subsides.

一旦政变引起的恐慌消退，围绕他集中的权力似乎就不会那么自然了，尤其是如果这种集权将要获得一层永久的准军事力量的话。