警惕三驾马车危害希腊主权 My plan to resist the troika’s attack on Greek sovereignty

Aparadox lurks in the foundations of the eurozone. governments in the monetary union lack a central bank that has their back, while the central bank lacks a government to support it.

一种矛盾隐藏在欧元区的根基之中。欧元区各国政府缺少一个支持它们的中央银行，而欧州央行也缺少一个支持它的政府。

This paradox cannot be eliminated without fundamental institutional changes. But there are steps member states can take to ameliorate some of its negative effects. One such step that we contemplated during my tenure at the Greek ministry of finance focused on the chronic liquidity shortage of a stressed public sector and its impact on the long-suffering private sector.

如果没有根本性的体制变革，这种矛盾就无法被消除。但是，成员国可以采取一些措施，减轻部分这一矛盾带来的负面影响。我在担任希腊财长期间所思考的一项此类措施，聚焦于压力重重的公共部门的长期流动性短缺及其对长期受困的私营部门的影响。

In Greece, where the central bank is unable to support the state’s endeavours, government arrears to the private sector — both companies and individuals — have been a drag on the economy, adding to deflationary pressures since as far back as 2008. Such arrears consistently exceeded 3 per cent of gross domestic product for five years.

在希腊，央行无法支持国家的发展努力，政府对私营部门（包括企业和个人）的逾期债款一直拖累希腊经济，加重了自2008年就出现的通缩压力。此类逾期债款连续5年都超过了国内生产总值(GDP)的3%。

The phenomenon is both the cause and consequence of delayed tax payments to the state, reinforcing the cycle of generalised illiquidity.

这种现象既是延迟向国家纳税的原因，也是其后果，加剧了全面流动性不足的恶性循环。

To address this problem, our simple idea was to allow the multilateral cancellation of arrears between the state and the private sector using the tax office’s existing payments platform. Taxpayers, whether individuals or organisations, would be able to create reserve accounts that would be credited with arrears owed to them by the state. They would then be able to transfer credits from their reserve account either to the state (in lieu of tax payments) or to any other reserve account.

为了解决这一问题，我们的简单想法是利用税务部门现有的支付平台，让政府与私营部门之间进行多边债务互免。纳税人（不论是个人还是组织）将能够开设储备账户，将国家拖欠他们的债务金额计入其中。然后，他们可以将储备帐户中的信用分转移支付给国家（代替缴税），或转移至任何其他储备帐户。

Suppose, for example, Company A is owed ㄠ洀 by the state; and it owes 30,000 to an employee — plus another 500,000 to Company B, which provided it with goods and services. The employee and Company B also owe, respectively, ㄠ　,000 and ㈠　　,000 in taxes to the state. In this case the proposed system would allow for the immediate cancellation of at least ㈠10,000 in arrears.

例如，假设国家欠A公司100万欧元；而A公司欠一名员工3万欧元，还欠B公司（为A公司提供了商品和服务）50万欧元。该员工和B公司还分别欠国家1万欧元和20万欧元的税款。在这种情况下，该支付系统将使得至少21万欧元的债务可以立刻抵消。

Suddenly, an economy such as Greece’s would acquire important degrees of freedom within the existing European monetary union. In a second phase of development, which we did not have time to consider properly, the system would be made accessible through smartphone apps and identity cards, guaranteeing that it would be widely adopted.

倘若如此，像希腊这样的经济体将突然间在当前的欧元区内获得重要自由度。在第二个发展阶段（我们没有时间对此周密考虑），该支付系统将可以通过智能手机应用和身份证登录，以保证它将被广泛采用。

The envisaged payments system could be developed to create a substitute for fully functioning public debt markets, especially during a credit crunch such as the one that has afflicted Greece since 2010. Organisations or individuals could buy credits from the tax office online using their normal bank accounts, and add them to their reserve account. These credits could be used after, say, a year to pay future taxes at a discount (for example, 10 per cent).

可以开发出这种设想中的支付系统，用来替代功能齐全的公共债务市场，尤其是在信贷紧缩期间，例如自2010年以来困扰希腊的信贷紧缩期。机构或个人可以利用自己的普通银行账户、以在线方式从税务部门购买信用分，并将它们加入自己的储备账户。这些信用分可以在一段时间（比如一年）后用来按折扣（如10%）缴纳未来的税款。

As long as the total level of tax credits was capped, and fully transparent, the result would be a fiscally responsible increase in government liquidity and a quicker path back to the money markets.

只要税收抵免的总体水平设定了上限而且完全透明，结果将是以对财政负责的态度增加政府的流动性，踏上一条更快速回归资金市场的通道。

Handing over the reins of the finance ministry to my friend, Euclid Tsakalotos, on July 6, I presented a full account of the ministry’s projects, priorities and achievements during my five months in office. The new payments system outlined here was part of that presentation. No member of the press took any notice.

7月6日，在将希腊财政部的领导权交给了我的朋友欧几里德察卡洛托斯(Euclid Tsakalotos)时，我对财政部的项目、重点事项以及自己任职5个月期间的成绩进行了详细的介绍。这里所概述的新支付系统就是那次介绍的一部分。但当时没有任何媒体注意到这一点。

But when a subsequent telephone discussion with a large number of international investors, organised by my friend, Norman Lamont, and David Marsh of the London-based Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, was leaked — despite the Chatham House rule we agreed with listeners, under which speakers are not identified — the press had a field day. Committed to unlimited openness and full transparency, I granted OMFIF permission to release the tapes.

但当随后的一场与许多国际投资者的电话讨论被泄露后——尽管我们与听众同意遵循的查达姆宫规则(Chatham House Rule)意味着发言者身份不被公开——媒体忙了一整天。这次讨论是由我的朋友诺曼拉蒙特(Norman Lamont)和总部设在伦敦的官方货币与金融机构论坛(OMFIF)的戴维氠什(David Marsh)组织的。因为承诺了无限制的开放和完全透明，我授权该论坛发布了讨论录音。

While I understand press excitement about elements of that exchange, such as having to consider unorthodox means of gaining access to my own ministry’s systems, only one matter is of significance from a public interest perspective. There is a hideous restriction of national sovereignty imposed by the “troika” of lenders on Greek ministers, who are denied access to departments of their ministries pivotal in implementing innovative policies.

虽然我理解媒体对那次交流的细节（例如必须考虑使用非常规手段进入财政部系统）的兴奋，但从公共利益的角度出发，只有一个问题意义重大。债权人“三驾马车”对希腊国家主权强加了骇人的限制，使得希腊各部长无法进入自己的部门，而这些部门对实施创新性政策至关重要。

When a loss of sovereignty, arising from unsustainable official debt, yields suboptimal policies in already stressed nations, one knows that there is something rotten in the euro’s kingdom.

当主权丧失（源自不可持续的官方债务）导致已陷入紧缩的国家只能采取次优政策时，人们就可以知道欧元王国某个环节已经失灵。