阿根廷债务困局走向何方 经济问题导致社会不稳

Argentina’s 12-year dispute with a group of hedge funds holding out for full payment on defaulted Argentine bonds is proving to be one of the most wasteful debt restructurings in history.

阿根廷与一群坚持要求全额偿付其违约债券的对冲基金长达12年的争执，已证明是历史上最耗神耗力的债务重组之一。

During the past few years an unedifying legal battle waged in New York courtrooms has steadily unpicked the restructurings that allowed Argentina to pick up the pieces after its $95bn default in 2001. Basing their rulings on a tight definition of the so-called pari passu clause that guarantees equal treatment for bondholders, US judges have declared it illegal for Argentina to make payments to the holders of restructured bonds unless it includes full payments to holdouts too.

过去几年里在纽约法庭上展开的不光彩的诉讼战，逐步破坏了阿根廷的债务重组努力，后者本会让阿根廷在2001年950亿美元债务违约之后重整旗鼓。按照他们对所谓的同等权益条款(pari passu clause)的严格定义，即所有债券持有人有权得到同等对待，美国法官宣布阿根廷向接受重组的债券持有人偿付是不合法的，除非偿付也包括向拒绝重组的债权人全额偿付。

This week, the unresolved dispute reached its doleful climax. Unwilling to bow to the demands of the holdouts, and consequently unable to keep the restructured bonds current either, Buenos Aires threw up its hands and gave up on its attempts to pay its creditors under US law.

本周，久拖不决的争执达到了令人沮丧的顶峰。由于不愿屈从那些拒绝重组债权人的要求，从而也无法推进偿付接受重组的债券持有人，阿根廷政府放弃了按照美国法律偿付债权人的努力。

Neither side can claim the moral high ground. Central to the holdouts’ case has been that in two restructurings, Argentina strong-armed creditors into accepting a savage haircut worth just 25 cents on the dollar. Yet if warrants linked to economic growth are added, the payouts have in some cases been worth much more.

双方都不能说占据了道德高地。拒绝重组债权人的核心论点是，在两次重组中，阿根廷都威逼债权人接受折后仅余债券面值25%的野蛮折价(haircut)。然而，如果加上与经济增长挂钩的权证，某些情况下的偿付价值要高得多。

Of greater systemic concern, the points of law in the hedge funds’ favour have led to a situation where it will be easier for other holdouts to block future sovereign restructurings. This is an unwelcome possibility, however difficult Argentina’s behaviour has been.

就更大的系统性担忧来说，有利于对冲基金的法律观点已导致一个情况，即其他拒绝重组的债权人将更容易阻碍未来的主权债务重组。这是一个不受欢迎的可能性，无论阿根廷的行为多么令人不快。

President Cristina Fernández has revelled in her “won’t pay, can’t pay” attitude. While this is central to her political image as someone who takes on financiers and wins, it is also a fiction. Argentina’s restructurings have not reopened international markets. The bigger worry is that her intransigence poses a real threat to the economic wellbeing of her compatriots. Although the initial reaction has been muted, Argentina’s default is likely to lead to a squeeze in trade finance and higher borrowing costs. Argentina has no easy options. Restructuring all of its debt into bonds issued under local law would be one way of thumbing its nose at the pesky holdouts and the US courts. But the costs would be huge. A general default could lock the country out of capital markets for years at a time when it needs international capital to develop its deposits of shale gas.

阿根廷总统克里斯蒂娜•费尔南德斯(Cristina Fernández)沉迷于其“不会偿付、偿付不了”的态度。尽管这对她塑造与金融家较量并取得胜利的政治形象至关重要，但这种态度也只是个幻想。阿根廷的债务重组没有重新打开国际市场。更大的担忧在于，费尔南德斯的不妥协对其同胞的经济福祉造成了实实在在的威胁。尽管市场反应最初波澜不惊，但阿根廷违约可能导致贸易融资紧张和借款成本上升。阿根廷没有轻松的选择。将所有债务重组为按照当地法律发行的债券，将是向恼人的拒绝重组债权人和美国法庭表达蔑视的一种方式。但这样做的代价将是巨大的。全面违约将让阿根廷在需要国际资本以开发页岩气资源之际，多年无法进入资本市场。

That leaves settling, which has difficulties too. For instance, it exposes Argentina to claims from other holdouts, which Buenos Aires costs at $15bn. Another problem is the so-called RUFO clause in the restructured bonds. This prohibits Argentina from offering investors more than the 30 cents on the dollar it paid holders that accepted the restructuring.

那么就只剩下和解，但这也很困难。例如，阿根廷将面对其他拒绝重组债权人的索偿，阿根廷政府估计索偿规模为150亿美元。另一个问题是债务重组中所谓的“未来发行权利”条款(Rights upon Future Offers，简称RUFO)。之前阿根廷向接受重组的债券持有人偿付面值的30%，而RUFO条款规定，阿根廷现在向投资者支付的赔偿不得超过这一比例。

Allowing the stand-off to continue profits no one. Meanwhile, the holdouts are racking up legal fees and must want to settle. The outlines of a deal exist. Argentina could meet the holdouts’ claim, or some compromised figure, with fresh bonds, issued on a deferred basis to sidestep the RUFO clause which expires at the end of 2014. All the holdouts could be invited in, settling the problem for good.

让僵局持续下去不会令任何人受益。与此同时，拒绝重组的债权人的诉讼费用不断攀升，他们必然希望和解。和解协议的轮廓是存在的。阿根廷可以以延期方式发行新债券，避开将于2014年底到期的RUFO条款，来满足拒绝重组债权人的索偿要求，或达成一个折中数字。所有拒绝重组的债权人都可以受邀加入，彻底解决这个问题。

Whether this can be agreed swiftly, if at all, is another matter. Indeed the case once again illustrates the need for a better way of managing sovereign defaults. The collective action clauses since introduced into many bond contracts, which oblige minorities to accept majority writedowns, are no fail safe. The pari passu clause should be scrapped, even at the price of higher borrowing costs.

这一方案能否迅速达成一致（如果真的会达成一致的话）则是另一回事。实际上，此案再次说明亟需一种更好的方式来管理主权债务违约。后来很多债券合约中引入的集体行动条款也并非万全之策，这种条款迫使少数债权人接受多数债权人同意的减记比例。应取消同等权益条款，就算以更高的借款成本为代价也在所不惜。

In the absence of clarity, well-paid lawyers to hedge funds will continue to exploit the confusion in other debt workouts, and perhaps other jurisdictions. Debt bondage of this kind is the last thing the world needs.

在没有明确解决方案的情况下，对冲基金聘请的收入不菲的律师，将继续利用其他债务重组方案、乃至其他司法管辖地区的含混之处。这种债务奴役是这个世界最不需要的。