中国矿产资源存储过剩的代价

Beijing has suffered a decades-long anxiety attack at the thought that the global marketplace would not be able to meet China's demand for natural resources. But now they have exactly the opposite problem: Traders are using abandoned warehouses, parking lots and granaries to store all the surplus iron ore, copper, coal and other metals and minerals they've accidentally bought in preparation for a sustained economic expansion that isn't happening. Oops.

数十年来，中国曾一直认为全球市场可能没法满足中国对自然资源的需求，并为此忧心忡忡。然而现在他们却面临着截然相反的问题：贸易商们正在把过剩的铁矿石、铜、煤炭以及其它金属和矿物资源一古脑地存进原本被废弃的仓库、停车场和谷仓中。这些人在偶然的状况下买进这些资源，为经济持续扩张做准备，却发现这种扩张并未到来。唉！

The Chinese have become good at extracting resources when and where Western market economies won't. Just don't mistake that brawn for brains. Today's gluts are not precisely the opposite side of the coin of growing list of uneconomical Chinese mining investments abroad. Rather, they are both facets of the same dodecahedron, as it were: Beijing's near-pathological refusal to trust market prices for anything.

有时候，西方国家并不想在某些时间、从某些地点获取资源，于是中国人就利用这样的时机竭力榨取资源，而且做得越来越熟练，不过，可别把这种有勇无谋当成明智之举。中国在海外不断增长的矿业投资并不盈利，而且还导致了资源过剩。这种不盈利和资源过剩不能说是一个硬币的两面，而更像是一个十二面体的两个不同侧面，反映的都是这样一个事实：中国政府一意孤行地拒绝相信任何东西的市场价格。

A simple example concerns iron ore. Stocks are about one-third greater than their four-year average, Reuters reported last month, and although stores have come down slightly since then a significant overhang remains. This is a major turn from a few years ago, when Beijing obsessed about high iron ore prices resulting from China's seemingly insatiable appetite.

可以举一个简单的有关铁矿石的例子。据路透社(Reuters)上个月报道，当时铁矿石的库存量比过去四年均值高出三分之一。尽管从报道发出之日到现在，库存量已经稍有下降，但总量依然相当可观。与前几年相比，这是一个非常重大的变化。彼时，中国那看起来永远无法满足的胃口令铁矿石的价格居高不下，政府还在为此烦恼不已。

Remember BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers reassuring Beijing that the global spot market would provide, even as the old system of cartelized price negotiations fell apart? Had Beijing cared to reflect on that advice at the time, it might have seen an opportunity in high spot prices. For years, planners have aspired to force consolidation on China's steel industry, to little avail. Rising input prices would ordinarily be a force pushing in that direction. Look at what has happened to the U.S. airline industry in the face of high fuel and labor costs.

必和必拓首席执行长高瑞思(Marius Kloppers)曾安抚中国政府说，即便卡特尔式价格谈判的旧体系最终破产，全球现货市场也能提供足够的资源，还有人记得这番话吗？如果中国当时能稍微想一想这个建议的话，那么它当时也许能够在高企的现货价格中看到机会。多年来，计划者们一直渴望在中国的钢铁行业内以强力推动整合，然而收效甚微。通常来说，不断上涨的投入价格会成为推动行业朝整合方向发展的力量，不信的话，看看美国航空业在面临高额的燃料和劳动力成本时发生了什么。

Instead, Beijing deployed loose credit to help steelmakers dampen the effects of ore prices and stay in business. Even now, with producers already on the skids amid a growing glut of finished steel, Beijing intends to invest $20 billion in new mills under its latest stimulus.

相反，政府却放松信贷，帮助钢铁生产商降低铁矿石价格上涨对其造成的影响，以免被淘汰出局。眼下，成品钢供过于求的状况日益严重，生产商们的情况也每况愈下，然而即便如此，中国政府仍然计划通过最新一次刺激方案再给钢铁生产商投入200亿美元。

Meanwhile, Beijing went on a buying spree to snap up overseas mines at a cost of billions of dollars. Those investments, whatever they might have done to secure supply (answer: not much), didn't affect global prices appreciably since they were generally made in existing mines instead of in exploration projects to increase production. And they now mean that Beijing stands to lose as global price declines make those projects less profitable.

同时，中国仍旧在砸下数以十亿计的美元无节制地抢购海外的铁矿。这些投资，无论在保障供给方面有多大用处（答案是寥寥无几），都不会对铁矿石的全球价格产生多大影响，因为这些投资大部分流向对现有的铁矿石进行开采，而非投向能增加产量的勘探项目。这意味着政府将承受亏损，因为铁矿石全球价格的下跌使得这些投资项目的利润大大减少。

And then there's copper, imports of which have grown some 70% this year as economic growth slows. Recent photos taken by investment-bank analysts show where those imports end up. The copper sits in bonded warehouses, piled to the rafters, blocking doorways and occupying parking lots.

还有铜。尽管今年经济增速放缓，铜的进口却增长了约70%。投行分析师近期拍摄的照片显示，这些进口铜最终被堆在了保税仓库中，高及屋椽，不但堵住了门口还占据了停车位。

This accumulation is far out of proportion to China's "consumption," meaning copper that actually goes into a furnace somewhere and comes out as wire or pipe that's used for something. There's debate about what that level of consumption is, but there is currently a real possibility it is falling as growth slows and Beijing tamps down the overheated property market.

这种程度的“积累”与中国的“消费”完全不成比例。所谓“消费”，意味着铜真的进入了熔炉，被制成铜线或铜管投入使用。尽管消费水平目前到底属于哪一层次尚存争议，但目前随着中国经济增速放缓，政府又在抑制过热的房地产市场，铜的消费量很有可能下滑。

But those piles in the warehouses aren't waiting to be made into pipe. They are collateral. At times when Beijing tries to restrain formal yuan credit creation at the banks, cash-starved companies have resorted to importing commodities instead as a means to raise capital.

但仓库中那些成堆的铜并不是等着被制成铜管的。它们是抵押品。在政府试图抑制银行以正规手段进行信用创造时，急需资金的公司就只好将进口商品作为一种筹资手段。

Here's how it works. The Chinese firm borrows dollars to buy copper, which is then stored in bonded warehouses. After the warehouse issues a letter of credit confirming the copper exists, the company uses the letter as collateral for a yuan-denominated loan for perhaps 85% of the value of the copper. Dollar credit becomes yuan credit, circumventing Beijing's tightening.

他们是这样操作的。中国公司借美元来买铜，然后将其存在保税仓库中。在仓库出具证明证实这些铜确实存在后，公司便将这个证明当作抵押品，换取人民币贷款（金额大约相当于铜价的85%）。美元信贷于是变成了人民币信贷，成功地绕开了政府的收紧措施。

This explains why, contrary to normal usage, copper prices tend to rise when Chinese monetary policy is tight, and fall as it loosens. Sure enough, as Beijing has been lowering required reserve ratios for banks in an easing measure, traders are starting to export surplus "financial" copper again. If you can get normal credit, there's no reason to mess around with a metal.

这就解释了，为什么铜价在中国收紧货币政策的情况下会出现上升的倾向，而在货币政策放松时会出现下降的倾向，这种情形和铜真正投入使用的结果截然相反。当然，在中国政府放松政策降低银行存款准备金率时，贸易商们就开始出口剩余的作为金融工具的铜。如果你能通过正常渠道获得贷款，自然就没有理由掺和与金属有关的麻烦事了。

The original sin here is Beijing's steadfast refusal to allow the market to set a price for capital. When credit quotas, administrative guidance and political connections replace a market interest rate and arm's-length risk assessment in allocating money, gamesmanship will abound. Today's copper glut is a result.

原罪就在于中国政府坚决不许市场为资本定价。在资金分配方面，一旦信用配额、行政指令和政治关系替代了市场利率和公平的风险评估，各种小动作自然层出不穷。眼下，铜供应过剩便是结果之一。

Then a perverse effect occurs when Beijing tries to stimulate the economy by adding liquidity to the bank system. This looser money triggers a lower copper price. This squeezes some of the otherwise profitable small firms who have borrowed via copper and now see the value of their collateral falling-and the risk that their loans will be called rising.

因此当中国政府试图通过增加银行系统的流动性来刺激经济时，一种反常的效应便出现了：宽松的货币政策促使铜价下跌。这使得一些在正常状况下（货币政策变宽松导致铜价上涨）能赚得一些利润的小公司受到了挤压，他们通过将铜抵押获得了贷款，结果却发现他们的抵押品正在贬值，贷款被收回的风险也在增加。

The recent unused mounds of resources are often presented as a case of Chinese buyers having incorrectly forecast demand for commodities. Yes, but the "why" behind that points to a more serious problem. This isn't the sort of error in business judgment companies make all the time in a market economy. Anyone in a market can misjudge the future. Rather, today's gluts arise from Beijing's chronic disregard for what price signals tell it about the present.

近期这些成堆的闲置资源常常被当作一个中国买家在预测商品需求方面出错的案例。这诚然是不错的，但错误背后的“为什么”却指向了一个更复杂的问题。这不是市场经济中所有公司都时不时会犯的那类商业判断错误。市场中，任何人都有可能误判未来，但相比之下，目前的矿产资源过剩则是中国政府长期对价格信号所反映出的“当下”视而不见的结果。