中国债市派对遇冷

Too big to ignore but too opaque to entirely trust. China is engaged in a charm offensive to lure foreign money into its bond market, which has grown in a short period of time from a minnow to the third largest in the world, after the US and Japan.

太大而不容忽视，但又因太不透明而无法完全信任。中国正在发起一场魅力攻势，吸引境外资金进入其债券市场，后者已在很短时间内从无足轻重成长为全球第三大债市，仅次于美国和日本。

The opening of the bond market to foreigners is part of a transformation in the international financial system, which is slowly linking up with a Chinese economy that was once walled off behind tight capital controls. It is a crucial step in Beijing’s plan to turn the renminbi into one of the anchor currencies of the global economy.

向境外投资者开放债市是国际金融体系变革的一部分，该体系正慢慢地与曾经躲在严格资本管制围墙后面的中国经济接轨。此举是北京将人民币打造成全球经济锚定货币之一计划中的关键一步。

But the risk for China’s economic planners is that no one shows up to their bond market party, amid fears over capital controls and default risk. International fund managers acknowledge that Chinese onshore debt is bound to become a big part of global fixed-income portfolios, but add qualifiers such as “eventually” and “medium- to long-term”. Few, it seems, want to go in first.

但中国经济规划者面临的风险是，出于对资本管制和违约风险的担忧，没有投资者为他们的债市派对捧场。国际基金经理承认，中国的在岸债务势必将成为全球固定收益投资组合中的一大块，但他们加上了“最终”、“中期至长期”等限定词。似乎没人想冲在第一位。

“For an economy that is a tenth of the global economy with a similar share in global exports and investment, the singular lack of financial integration is striking and cannot last,” says Qu Hongbin, chief Greater China economist at HSBC in Hong Kong.

汇丰(HSBC)驻香港大中华区首席经济学家屈宏斌表示：“对于一个规模占全球经济十分之一、出口和投资也占全球相似份额的经济体而言，金融一体化的缺位格外突出，不可持续。”

Until recently, foreign participation in the Chinese market was tightly controlled by quotas and licensing requirements. That changed in February 2016, when the People’s Bank of China threw wide open the doors to the interbank bond market, where most Chinese debentures trade. With one stroke, the central bank cleared the way for banks, insurers, securities firms, asset management companies, pension funds and non-profit endowments to enter the market without prior approval.

直至不久以前，外资进入中国债市还受到额度和许可证要求的严格控制。但这一情况在2016年2月发生了转变，当时中国人民银行(PBoC)放开了银行间债券市场，大多数人民币债券在这一市场交易。中国央行一举为银行、保险公司、证券公司、资产管理公司、养老基金以及非盈利基金进入该市场扫清了道路，取消了事先批准这个要求。

Last month the government widened access further, announcing a programme to let investors in Hong Kong buy Chinese onshore bonds through their own brokerages. Modelled on the Stock Connect programmes linking Hong Kong’s exchange with those in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Shanghai Bond Connect will allow foreigners to buy onshore Chinese bonds without the need for an onshore account.

上月，中国政府进一步放宽准入，宣布了一项允许在香港的投资者通过自家经纪商购买在岸人民币债券的计划。仿照连接港股与上海和深圳股市的“沪港通”、“深港通”计划，“债券通”将让境外投资者无需拥有在岸账户即可购买在岸人民币债券。

Despite expanded access, however, interest from foreign investors has so far been tepid. Foreign holdings of Chinese domestic bonds rose a modest 13 per cent last year, according to central bank figures. At Rmb853bn ($124bn) by the end of 2016, foreign holdings equal only 1.3 per cent of total market value.

然而，虽然市场准入放宽了，但境外投资者迄今兴趣不大。中国央行的数据显示，境外投资者持有的人民币债券去年温和上涨了13%，截至2016年底为8530亿元人民币（合1240亿美元），仅相当于市场总值的1.3%。

“China’s interest rates are modestly higher than in the west, and the long-term prospects for the economy and the currency are still good,” says David Dollar, former US Treasury economic and financial emissary to China and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “However, there are all kinds of risks, and interest rates strike me as low relative to the risks.”

“中国的利率略高于西方，中国经济以及人民币汇率的长期前景仍然不错，”美国财政部前驻华经济和金融特使、现为华盛顿布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)高级研究员的杜大伟(David Dollar)说，“然而，存在着各种各样的风险，同时在我看来，利率相对于风险不算高。”

Fund manager caution

基金经理的谨慎

Among the types of foreign investors, central banks and sovereign wealth funds have responded most positively. After the International Monetary Fund’s decision in late 2015 to add the Chinese currency to its special drawing rights, the renminbi officially assumed the status of reserve currency in October last year. Because all IMF members hold SDRs among their reserves, this change meant renminbi assets automatically entered the reserve portfolios of the fund’s 189 member countries.

在不同类型的境外投资者中，央行和主权财富基金的回应最为积极。国际货币基金组织(IMF) 2015年末决定把人民币纳入其特别提款权货币篮子之后，人民币去年10月正式拥有了储备货币的地位。因为所有IMF成员国在本国外汇储备中都持有特别提款权货币，这一变化意味着人民币资产自动进入了该组织189个成员国的外汇储备资产组合。

Beyond these automatic purchases, many other sovereign investors take their cue from the IMF. “As the renminbi becomes a bigger part of the SDR basket, central bank reserve managers, large sovereign pension plans and the like will probably have to adjust their holdings to reflect the higher allocations within global sovereign portfolios,” says Manu George, senior investment director for Asian fixed income at Schroders Investment Management.

除了这些自动购入，其他许多主权投资机构也从IMF得到启发。施罗德投资管理公司(Schroders Investment Management)亚洲固定收益部门高级投资主管马努?乔治(Manu George)表示：“随着人民币在特别提款权货币篮子中份额扩大，央行储备经理、大型主权养老金计划等很可能将不得不调整所持资产，以反映全球主权投资组合中人民币债券较高的配置。”

Global central banks owned $84.5bn worth of renminbi assets as foreign exchange reserves at the end of last year, equal to 1.1 per cent of global reserves, IMF data show.

IMF的数据显示，截至去年底，全球央行拥有价值845亿美元的人民币资产作为外汇储备，相当于全球外汇储备总额的1.1%。

Taken together, the IMF and PBoC data suggest that central banks account for about two-thirds of total foreign holdings of Chinese bonds. Adding SWFs — whose renminbi holdings are mostly excluded from the IMF data — the government share of total Chinese bond holdings appears higher still. The flipside of these figures, however, is considerable caution on the part of private fund managers.

综合来看，IMF和中国央行的数据似乎表明，各国央行占外国持有中国债券总额约三分之二。加上主权财富基金——其人民币资产持有量基本被IMF数据排除在外——各国政府在中国债券持有总量中的份额显得更高。然而这些数据说明的另一面是，私人部门基金经理仍相当谨慎。

One factor is the risk of defaults. The first default in the Chinese bond market occurred only in 2015 by Shanghai Chaori Solar, after years in which bailouts were the norm. Though bonds remain safer than other credit in China, defaults have become more common.

违约风险是一个因素。中国债券市场的第一起违约在2015年才发生，违约方为上海超日太阳能科技(Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology)；此前多年里救助是常态。虽然债券仍比中国的其他信贷安全，但违约已变得更加常见。

Legal bankruptcies are also increasingly common, following years in which a bankruptcy law passed in 2006 was little used. Even so, large restructurings of important companies are typically orchestrated by government officials through extra-legal negotiations, which introduce political considerations into the process.

破产案件也日益常见；中国的企业破产法在2006年通过后，曾经在多年里很少动用。即便如此，重要企业的大规模重组一般还是由政府官员通过法外谈判来安排的，整个过程会纳入政治考虑。

“For large enterprises with debt in the hundreds of billions, they are traditionally handled through administrative means. Local governments or even the State Council will take control and settle things out of court,” says Wang Xinxin, a professor at Renmin University Law School in Beijing.

北京中国人民大学法学院教授王欣新表示：“对于背负数千亿美元债务的大企业，传统上是通过行政手段处理的。地方政府乃至国务院都是在法庭外接手和解决事情。”

In the case of Huishan Dairy, whose shares dropped 85 per cent last month, provincial authorities in northeastern Liaoning province ordered creditors not to sue. The case showed how officials will intervene with debt problems even at a privately owned company, if its potential collapse threatens the local economy or the solvency of local banks. The ban on legal action meant that even creditors with collateral were at risk of being unable to enforce their claims.

以辉山乳业(Huishan Dairy)为例，该公司股价上月下跌85%，地处中国东北的辽宁省政府下令债权人不得起诉。该案例表明即使是民营企业，只要其潜在崩溃威胁到当地经济或当地银行的偿付能力，官员们就会干预债务问题。禁止起诉意味着，即使是拥有抵押品的债权人，也面临着无法执行其债权的风险。

Another issue is credit ratings. The three large global rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s — all have Chinese joint ventures. But rating methodologies differ substantially.

另一个问题是信用评级。惠誉(Fitch)、穆迪(Moody’s)和标准普尔(Standard & Poor’s)三大全球评级机构都有中国合资企业，但评级方法有很大不同。

“There seems to be a disparity in analysing companies. If it’s one notch — OK, fine. But you can’t have the equivalent of an A rating onshore and then have Fitch and S&P rate it as a B,” says Jamie Tadelis, co-head of sales at SC Lowy, a Hong Kong investment bank.

香港投资银行SC Lowy销售部联合负责人杰米?塔德里斯(Jamie Tadelis)表示：“在分析公司方面似乎存在差异。如果相差一级，那还好，没问题。但你不能有在岸评级相当于A，而惠誉和标普评级为B的局面。”

Chinese rating agencies counter that their ratings are often higher in part because most bond issuers are state-owned enterprises. Local agencies place more weight than their foreign counterparts on the likelihood of government support for a company, even if such support is not codified in law.

中国评级机构反驳说，他们的评级之所以往往较高，部分是因为多数债券发行人是国有企业。这些本土机构比外国同行更看重政府支持一家企业的几率，即使这种支持在法律上没有明文规定。

“We will pay attention to credit fundamentals, but at the same time, we also pay attention to the degree of credit support from various levels of government. Sometimes this support takes the form of an implicit guarantee,” says Yan Yan, chairman of China Chengxin Credit Rating, a joint venture with Moody’s.

穆迪合资企业——中诚信国际(CCXI)董事长闫衍表示：“我们既注意信贷基本面，也注意各级政府对信贷的支持程度。有时这种支持代表了一种隐形担保。”

Some investors are also worried that the corporate bond market is indistinguishable from the broader debt overhang facing the Chinese economy. Non-financial debt in China hit 277 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 2016, up from about 150 per cent at the end of 2008, when Beijing unleashed a fiscal and monetary stimulus to cushion the impact of the global financial crisis. Corporate debt has been the biggest driver of the overall increase.

一些投资者也担心公司债券市场与中国经济面临的整体债务积压难以区分。2016年底，中国的非金融债务相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的277%，而2008年底约为150%，当时北京释放了财政和货币刺激，以缓解全球金融危机的影响。企业债务是这些年来整体债务增加的最大因素。

However, despite the risk of excessive debt for China’s broader economy, the bond market is a relatively safe entry point for foreign debt investors. Banks — along with non-bank “shadow” lenders such as trusts, securities companies and fund management companies — are where China’s riskiest debt lurks, analysts say.

不过，尽管中国整体经济存在债务过高的风险，但债券市场仍是境外债务投资者相对安全的切入点。分析师们表示，银行，以及信托、证券公司和基金管理公司等非银行“影子”贷款机构，才是中国风险最高的债务存在的地方。

In the bond market, junk bonds barely exist. An approval process filters out the worst would-be issuers. Most actual issuers are large state-owned companies and banks with strong credit profiles. By contrast, the shadow-banking system is the main refuge for weak borrowers unable to access credit from cheaper sources.

在中国的债券市场上，几乎不存在垃圾级债券。一道审批流程筛选掉了最糟糕的潜在发行人。多数实际发行人都是大型国企和银行，具备强大的信用档案。相比之下，影子银行体系是那些无法从更低廉来源获得信贷的劣质借款人的主要避难所。

Moreover, bonds are not the driver of China’s credit boom. Despite rapid volume growth, bonds still account for only 11 per cent of total outstanding corporate and household debt, according to the central bank. By contrast, bank loans comprise 72 per cent, while shadow bank credit makes up 16 per cent.

此外，债券并不是中国信贷繁荣的驱动力。根据中国央行数据，尽管发行量增长迅速，但债券在企业及家庭未偿债务总额中仍仅占11%。相比之下，银行贷款占72%，影子银行信贷占16%。

Trapped money fears

资金陷阱担忧

Even in government bonds, which carry minimal default risk, investors have other concerns, including whether their money could be trapped in China. Late last year, in a bid to curb capital outflows and cut pressure on the renminbi, Beijing cracked down on outbound acquisitions by Chinese companies, after a record-breaking year. Chinese individuals have had difficulty buying foreign exchange for personal use.

甚至在违约风险最低的政府债券领域，投资者也有其他担忧，包括他们的资金是否可能被困在中国。去年末，为限制资本外流、降低人民币压力，中国政府对中国企业的海外并购加强了审查，此前一年中国企业的海外并购规模打破纪录。中国居民的个人购汇也曾遇到困难。

Regulators insist they are merely tightening enforcement and that the moves do not amount to new capital controls. But for investors, this distinction is semantic. In practice, currency conversion and cross-border remittance are more difficult than a year ago.

监管者坚称，他们只是在加强执行，这些举措不构成新的资本管制。但对于投资者而言，这只是语义上的区别。在实践中，外汇兑换和跨境汇款的难度大于一年前。

So far, foreign investors in Chinese stocks and bonds have not faced restrictions. And for the moment, downward pressure on the renminbi has eased and foreign exchange reserves have stabilised, reducing the likelihood of further restrictions. But every dollar of foreign investment that flows into China’s bond market today increases the regulators’ incentive to keep that money from exiting tomorrow if outflow pressure resumes, as many analysts expect it will.

迄今，购买中国股票和债券的外国投资者没有遭遇限制。同时就目前而言，人民币下行压力已减轻，外汇储备也已企稳，这降低了中国政府实施更多限制的可能性。但流入中国债券市场的每一美元外资，都会加大监管机构像很多分析人士预测的那样，在未来资本外流压力再度出现时阻止资金流出的动机。

“The government’s desire to build up its bond markets, in tandem with the goal of making the renminbi a prominent international currency, suggests that foreign investors can count on relatively unconstrained financial flows,” says Eswar Prasad, professor at Cornell University and former China head of the IMF. “However, investors may not be fully persuaded by the government’s reassurances.”

“政府希望发展债券市场，这符合让人民币成为领先国际货币的目标，这似乎表明外国投资者可以期待相对不受限制的资金流动，”美国康奈尔大学(Cornell University)经济学家、曾经担任IMF中国部负责人的埃斯瓦尔?普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)表示，“然而，投资者可能不会完全相信政府的保证。”

Despite their concerns, foreign investors may soon have little choice but to at least dip their toes. In January, Bloomberg became the first major index provider to include Chinese onshore bonds in a benchmark index. Days later, Citibank’s index unit announced it would add Chinese treasuries to its series of government bond indices. A month earlier, Citi became the first US bank to obtain a coveted trading licence for China’s interbank bond market.

尽管感到担忧，但外国投资者可能很快就会别无选择，只能至少去尝试一下。今年1月，彭博(Bloomberg)成为首个将中国在岸债券纳入基准指数的大型指数供应商。几天后，花旗银行(Citibank)的指数部门宣布，将把中国国债纳入其一系列政府债券指数。一个月前，花旗成为首个获得令人艳羡的中国银行间债券市场交易牌照的美资银行。

Adding Chinese onshore bonds to key benchmark indices would force asset managers’ hands. Inclusion in emerging-market bond indices could create automatic inflows worth $25bn-$40bn. If they are added to global bond indices, an additional $200bn-$300bn could flow in, according to Luke Drago Spajic, Singapore-based head of emerging Asia portfolio management at Pimco.

将中国在岸债券纳入关键基准指数，将迫使资产管理者配置中国债券。纳入新兴市场债券指数可能会自动创造250亿至400亿美元的资金流入。太平洋投资管理公司(Pimco)驻新加坡的新兴亚洲组合主管卢克?斯帕伊奇(Luke Spajic)表示，如果被纳入全球债券指数，可能会再带来2000亿至3000亿美元的流入。

“Once they’re in your index — especially emerging market indices — then if you don’t own them, you could end up with massive tracking error. You can’t own nothing,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“一旦它们被纳入你的指数，特别是新兴市场指数，那么如果你不拥有他们，你可能会遭遇严重的跟踪误差。你不可能什么都不要。”

Beyond passive money, active managers will be attracted by high yields. Chinese 10-year government bonds currently yield about 3.4 per cent, compared with 2.35 per cent for the US, 0.25 per cent for Germany and 0.1 per cent for Japan. That creates an incentive to add more Chinese bonds.

除了被动资金，积极投资型经理将被高收益吸引。中国10年期国债目前的收益率约为3.4%，而美国、德国和日本分别为2.35%、0.25%和0.1%。这给基金经理们带来了增持中国债券的动机。

“The question isn’t just whether investors are going to raise their holdings to benchmark levels. They may have to start buying more than index levels in order to outperform. That’s where it gets interesting,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“问题不仅仅是投资者是否把持有规模增至基准水平。要想跑赢大盘，他们开始购买的数量可能必须超过指数水平。这将变得有意思。”

China’s currency is perhaps the single biggest factor worrying foreign fund managers. The renminbi suffered its worst fall on record in 2016. It has stabilised this year, but most economists believe that it will still fall further over the next 12 months.

人民币或许是让外国基金经理感到担忧的最大单一因素。2016年，人民币汇率遭遇最严重跌幅。今年人民币汇率已企稳，但多数经济学家认为，未来12个月人民币汇率将继续下跌。

“Even with yields very attractive in onshore China, wiping out a lot of that through hedging activity drives overall return prospects lower,” says Schroders’ Mr George.

施罗德投资管理公司的乔治表示：“即便中国在岸债券的收益率极具吸引力，但对冲活动会抹去很大一部分额外收益，拉低总回报率前景。”

Additional reporting by Tom Mitchell, Ma Nan and Xining Liu

米强(Tom Mitchell)、Ma Nan和刘心宁补充报道