如何修补奥巴马主义的不足

Jeffrey Goldberg’s brilliantly composed portrait of Barack Obama’s foreign policy mindset in the The Atlantic is a landmark achievement. It also helps to explain why the US is today a halting and uncertain power in global politics.

杰弗里•戈德堡(Jeffrey Goldberg)在《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)中对巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)外交政策思维的精彩描述，是一项具有里程碑意义的成就。它还有助于解释美国现在为何变成了全球政治中一个迟疑不决且不确定的大国。

Mr Obama will leave office with important international achievements in place, among them the Iran deal, a historic climate change pact and the Asia and Europe trade agreements. He has also conducted himself with grace and dignity in office.

奥巴马卸任时，将在身后留下国际事务方面的一系列重要成就，包括伊朗核协议、具有历史意义的气候变化协议、以及美国与亚洲和欧洲的贸易协议。此外他在任时一直表现得大度和庄重。

The US president was right to focus his conversations with Mr Goldberg on perhaps the most difficult question in American foreign policy: when should presidents order the military to intervene in wars beyond our borders and when should they not? In doing so, however, he seems determined to contest principles that recent presidents have found vitally important in the exercise of American power. Here is where the emerging “Obama Doctrine” often comes up short.

这位美国总统在与戈德堡的谈话中聚焦于美国外交政策中可能最困难的问题，即：总统何时应该命令军队干预发生在境外的战争，何时又不应该？他将谈话的重点放在这个问题上是对的。然而，在这么做的过程中，他似乎打定主意要挑战美国最近几届总统认为在发挥美国影响力过程中至关重要的原则。以下就是新诞生的“奥巴马主义”(Obama Doctrine)往往不完善的地方。

We know that American diplomacy is most often effective when it is backed by a strong military. This is why Mr Obama’s defence of his decision to pull back from striking Syrian military targets in 2013, after having drawn a “red line” against Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, is so troubling. He rejects the notion that his restraint diminished US credibility in the region.

我们知道，美国外交通常在得到强大的军队支持时最有效。这就是为何奥巴马为他2013年的一项决定所做的辩护如此令人困扰的原因。那一年，在巴沙尔•阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)逾越了美国划出的“红线”、使用化学武器后，奥巴马却决定放弃打击叙利亚的军事目标。如今，他否认这种看法：他当初的克制削弱了美国在该地区的可信度。

However much Mr Obama may believe the old rules do not apply, it is an ancient truth that a great power has to back up its threats if it wishes to be respected by its friends and feared by its adversaries.

不管奥巴马有多么相信旧的规则不适用，这仍是一个古老的真理：如果一个大国希望得到友邦的尊敬并让对手恐惧，它必须让自己的威胁算数。

If Mr Obama did not intend to honour his threat, he should never have made it. The result was inevitable — American credibility is undeniably diminished in the Middle East, while that of Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been enhanced.

如果奥巴马不打算言出必行，那么他原本就不应说出威胁的话。结果是不可避免的：美国在中东的可信度毋庸置疑地削弱了，而弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)领导的俄罗斯的可信度却提高了。

We also know that America’s vast network of alliances and security partnerships in Europe and Asia is a key element of its global strength. That is why the president’s criticism of two of America’s closest allies, Britain and France, as “free riders” in their prosecution of Nato’s Libya campaign in 2011 was so counterproductive.

我们还知道，美国在欧亚的巨大盟友和防务伙伴网络，是美国全球实力的关键因素。正因如此，奥巴马对英国和法国的批评产生了巨大的反作用。奥巴马称美国的这两个最亲密盟友在2011年北约(Nato)利比亚行动的执行中“搭便车”。

Americans sometimes forget that the US military accounts for roughly 75 per cent of all Nato defence spending. It may not be fair but Nato has always been a US-led alliance. The real mistake in Libya was Mr Obama’s decision to allow the US to take a secondary role in an important Nato mission for the first time in its history.

美国有时会忘记，美国军队开支约占北约全部国防支出的75%。这或许不公平，但北约一直是一个以美国为首的联盟。发生在利比亚的真正错误，是奥巴马决定让美国在北约一项重要任务中发挥次要作用，这是历史上头一次。

US presidents have also learnt that it almost never works to embarrass a friend publicly. Mr Obama’s remarks about the Saudi royal family were inappropriate. He should have directed his darts not at America’s friends but at its true adversaries — Iran, Hizbollah, the Syrian government and Russia. You should argue with your allies behind closed doors rather than in the press.

美国的总统们还有一个教训是，公开让友邦难堪几乎从没起作用过。奥巴马有关沙特皇室家族的言论是不合适的。他本不应把美国的朋友当成靶子，而是应瞄准美国真正的对手：伊朗、真主党 (Hizbollah)、叙利亚政府和俄罗斯。你应该与盟友私下理论，而不是在媒体上斗嘴。

The US is not fated to fall from grace in the decades ahead but much will depend on the determination of its leaders. To paraphrase John F Kennedy, America can be as big as it wants. Mr Obama’s emphasis on what the US should not do rather than on what it should, suggests the limitations he has placed on policy.

美国并非注定要在未来几十年衰落，但这将在很大程度上取决于美国领导人的决心。套用约翰•肯尼迪(John F Kennedy)的话，美国有多大雄心，就可以有多伟大。奥巴马关注的是美国不应做什么，而不是美国应该做什么，这表明他对政策施加的局限。

He is right about one thing, however: this is a time to return to diplomacy. He still has time to present a larger, more expansive view of what America can and should achieve in the world. It would be reassuring, though, if the president acknowledged that combining diplomacy with military strength is not a relic from an antiquated “Washington playbook”. On the contrary, it is the surest way for a great power to find success and peace in a complicated and dangerous world.

不过，他有一点是正确的：现在是回归外交的时候了。他仍有时间就美国在这个世界上能够以及应该实现的成就，提出一种更有意义且更全面的观点。然而，如果奥巴马承认，把外交与军事实力结合起来并非从过时的“华盛顿手册”(Washington playbook)中找出来的老古董，这将让人放心。相反，把外交与军事实力结合起来，是一个大国在复杂且危险的世界里找到成功与和平的最保险途径。