Not all Germans believe in God,” said Jacques Delors, former European Commission president, “but they all believe in the Bundesbank.” There is some truth to this, which is why it is not hard to understand the humiliation felt by the economically orthodox citizens of the bloc’s leading nation, as common policies come under attack from national capitals and even from Europe’s own institutions. Talk in German media is of deception, abuse and exploitation, with Berlin losing every battle and its citizens paying a hefty price to keep the eurozone intact. Pressure is mounting at home to push back, to score points in the national interest. Berlin’s ability to resist will be crucial to Europe’s fate. First, it is important to understand why so many Germans feel victimised. The revered Bundesbank has been repeatedly outvoted at the European Central Bank. Until the euro’s introduction in 1999, it in effect conducted monetary policy for the entire bloc. Today, in the popular view, it is ignored, its stability-oriented approach replaced by an ECB policy that tries to compensate for failures in other policy areas. For Germans, the victory of the anti-austerity Syriza party in Greece shows Europe’s approach to the debt-racked nation has failed. Despite generous official help, it looks ever more unlikely that the loans will be repaid in full. There is also anger at last week’s ECB decision to engage in quantitative easing. If monetary policy were conducted for Germany alone, such a stimulatory asset-purchase programme would be neither necessary nor desirable — indeed, low interest rates harm many German savers. Many Germans feel they no longer have reliable European partners. Paris and Rome are ignoring the hard-won fiscal compact. The UK is pursuing self-interest on integration. Syriza wants further second world war reparations. And France has declared that, as a big nation, it is not subject to Europe’s rules. To be fair, the German government — in particular Angela Merkel, chancellor, and Wolfgang Schäuble, finance minister — deserve credit for their handling of the crisis. They have taken responsibility for the bloc, making big financial commitments and supporting institutional reform. They have also steered their own nation and Europe as a whole in a pragmatic direction. Yet, with anti-European public opinion mounting at home, it is harder to stay on such a path. Berlin faces three challenges. First, it must convince voters that what is good for crisis-hit countries is good for them. Two-thirds of German exports go to the EU, and a similar proportion of foreign investment, so only as part of a dynamic Europe can they prosper long term. In the short run, this means structural re¬form of labour and product markets is needed. But so are expansionary policies such as the QE scheme, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s 315bn investment fund and a sufficiently flexible fiscal policy to stabilise demand in hard-hit nations. The second challenge is to convince Germans to be more patient and more humble. Complaints that neighbours avoid reforms are misguided; most have taken steps that surpass those of Germany’s Agenda 2010 a decade ago. Germany should remember from its own stint as the “sick man of Europe” that structural reforms take time to work. Germany’s third challenge is to take a stronger leadership role; its political and economic stability impose a particular responsibility to do so. Europe needs to pursue more institutional reforms to deepen integration and strengthen co-ordination on fiscal rules and structural policies, which will require Germany to build a closer partnership with other Europeans and to convince France to become a strong partner once more. Domestic politics make it tempting for Berlin, like its neighbours, to pursue a self-interested national policy. That would impose a great economic and political cost, on Europe as a whole but especially on Germany itself. The government needs to explain why a more integrated Europe is in the nation’s own best interests. Germans need to accept that they are not Europe’s victims but, rather, destined to be among its leaders. “不是所有德国人都信仰上帝，”前欧盟委员会(European Commission)主席雅克•德洛尔(Jacques Delors)说，“但他们都信仰德国央行(Bundesbank)。” 这句话道出了部分事实。在欧元区共同政策受到成员国政府乃至欧洲自身机构抨击之际，我们之所以不难理解这个欧元区经济领头羊国家秉持正统经济观的公民感觉受到羞辱，原因也在于此。由于柏林方面在每一场斗争中均成为输家、而德国公民为保持欧元区的完整又付出了高昂代价，德国媒体上充斥着关于欺骗、滥用和剥削的讨论。德国国内要求政府进行反击以维护国家利益的压力正在增大。柏林方面抵御这种压力的能力，将对欧洲的命运起到至关重要的影响。 首先，有必要弄明白为什么如此多的德国人感觉利益受损。备受尊敬的德国央行欧洲央行(ECB)的表决中多次沦为少数派。1999年欧元问世前，德国央行实际上主导着后来的所有欧元区国家的货币政策。如今，人们普遍认为它被忽略了，其以稳定为导向的方针被欧洲央行一项旨在弥补其他政策领域失误的政策所取代。 对德国人来说，希腊反紧缩的激进左翼联盟党(Syriza)的胜选证明，欧洲对这个债务缠身国家的应对之策已经失败。尽管得到了慷慨的官方援助，但希腊全额偿还贷款的可能性看起来越来越低。 德国人还对上周欧洲央行决定实施量化宽松感到愤怒。如果货币政策只为德国实施，那么这种刺激性的资产购买计划将是既无必要也不可取的——实际上，低利率损害了许多德国储户的利益。 许多德国人认为，他们再也没有可靠的欧洲伙伴了。法国和意大利不再理睬来之不易的财政契约。英国在一体化上只追求自身利益。希腊激进左翼联盟希望进一步向德国追讨二战赔款。法国已宣布，它作为一个大国不受制于欧洲的规则。 公平地说，德国政府——尤其是总理安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)和财长沃夫冈•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)——处理此次危机的做法值得称赞。他们担负起了对欧元区的责任，承诺提供大量资金并支持机构改革。他们还将本国及整个欧洲引向了务实的方向。然而，随着国内反欧洲舆论的兴起，维持这一路线变得更加困难。 德国政府面临三大挑战。首先，它必须说服选民相信，有利于那些受危机打击国家的措施对他们自己也是有利的。德国三分之二的出口进入欧盟市场，对外投资的比例也大致如此，因此，只有成为充满活力的欧洲的一部分，德国人才能享有长期繁荣。在短期内，这意味着需要对劳动力市场和产品市场进行结构性改革。但同时也需要实施量化宽松等扩张性政策，建立欧盟委员会主席让-克洛德•容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)提议的3150亿欧元投资基金，并采取能稳定受危机打击国家需求的、足够灵活的财政政策。 第二大挑战是说服德国人要更有耐心、更加谦虚。有些德国人抱怨邻国逃避改革，这些怨言是错误的；大多数国家已经采取行动，其力度超过了10年前德国的“2010议程”(Agenda 2010)。德国应该记得自己还是“欧洲病夫”的那段岁月，并回忆起结构性改革要发挥作用是需要时间的。 德国的第三大挑战是发挥更强大的领导作用；其政治和经济稳定性使得它对此负有特别的责任。欧洲需要进行更多的机构改革，以深化一体化并加强对财政规则和结构性政策的协调，这就需要德国与其他欧洲国家建立更紧密的合作关系，并说服法国再次成为其强大的合作伙伴。 国内政治使得德国像其邻国一样，忍不住想追求一种自利的国家政策。那将对整个欧洲、尤其是德国自身造成巨大的经济和政治代价。德国政府需要解释为何更加一体化的欧洲才最符合德国自身的利益。德国人需要接受一点：他们不是欧洲的受害者，恰恰相反，他们注定会成为欧洲的领导者之一。
