全球经济需要直升机撒钱 Helicopter drops might not be far away

The world economy is slowing, both structurally and cyclically. How might policy respond? With desperate improvisations, no doubt. Negative interest rates have already moved from the unthinkable to reality. The next step is likely to include fiscal expansion. Indeed, this is what the OECD, long an enthusiast for fiscal austerity, recommends in its Interim Economic Outlook. But that is unlikely to be the end. With fiscal expansion might go direct monetary support, including the most radical policy of all: the “helicopter drops” of money recommended by the late Milton Friedman.

世界经济正在放缓——既是结构性的，也是周期性的。政策或将会如何应对？毫无疑问，只能依靠不顾一切临时拼凑出的各种措施。负利率早已从天方夜谭变为现实。下一步很可能要实施财政扩张。实际上，这正是经合组织(OECD)——财政紧缩政策的长期拥护者——在其《年中经济展望》(Interim Economic Outlook)中给出的建议。但这可能还不算完，在推出扩张性财政政策的同时，可能还会出台直接的资金支持，包括所有政策之中最激进的政策——已故经济学家米尔顿•弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)建议的“直升机撒钱”(helicopter drops)。

More recently, this is the policy foreseen by Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, a hedge fund. The world economy is not just slowing, he argues, but “monetary policy 1” — lower interest rates — and “monetary policy 2” — quantitative easing — are largely exhausted. Thus, he says, the world will need a “monetary policy 3” directly targeted at encouraging spending. That we might need such a policy is also the recommendation of Adair Turner, former chairman of the Financial Services Authority, in his bookBetween Debt and the Devil.

对冲基金桥水公司(Bridgewater)创始人雷•戴利奥(Ray Dalio)最近已预见到了这一政策。他辩称，世界经济已经不止是在放缓，但降息（一号货币政策）与量化宽松（二号货币政策）很大程度上都已弹尽粮绝。因此，他说，世界将需要以鼓励消费为直接目标的“三号货币政策”。英国金融服务管理局(FSA)前主席阿代尔•特纳(Adair Turner)在自己的著作《债务与魔鬼》(Between Debt and the Devil)中也给出了相同的政策建议。

Why might the world be driven to such expedients? The short answer is that the global economy is slowing durably. The OECD now forecasts growth of global output in 2016 “to be no higher than in 2015, itself the slowest pace in the past five years”. Behind this is a simple reality: the global savings glut — the tendency for desired savings to rise more than desired investment — is growing and so the “chronic demand deficiency syndrome” is worsening.

为什么世界或将不得不采取这样的权宜之计呢？简单来说，答案是：全球经济处于长期放缓之中。经合组织目前预计，2016年全球产出增速“不会高于2015年——2015年本身也是过去5年增速最慢的一年”。这背后的现实很简单：全球储蓄过剩（合意储蓄比合意投资增长更多的趋势）日益严重，因此，“长期需求不足综合征”正在恶化。

This stage of demand weakness must be seen in its historical context. The long-term real interest rate on safe securities has been declining for at least two decades. It has been near zero since the financial crisis of 2007-09. Before then, an unsustainable western credit boom offset the weakness of demand. Afterwards, fiscal deficits, zero interest rates and expansions of central bank balance sheets stabilised demand in the west, while a credit expansion funded massive investment in China. Loose western monetary policies and loose Chinese credit policies also drove the post-crisis commodity boom, though China’s exceptional growth was the most important single factor.

必须用历史的眼光看待这一阶段的需求疲软。在过去至少20年间，安全资产的长期实际利率一直在下降——自2007-09年金融危机以来一直接近于零。而在金融危机爆发前，西方国家不可持续的信贷膨胀抵消了需求的疲软。金融危机爆发后，财政赤字、零利率以及央行扩大资产负债表稳定了西方的需求，而在中国，信贷扩张为大规模投资提供了资金。西方宽松的货币政策和中国宽松的信贷政策还带动了后危机时期的大宗商品繁荣——尽管中国一枝独秀的增长是最重要的单一因素。

The end of these credit booms is an important cause of today’s weak demand. But demand is also weak relative to a slowing growth of supply. At the world level, growth of labour supply and labour productivity have fallen sharply since the middle of the last decade. Lower growth of potential output itself weakens demand, because it lowers investment, always a crucial driver of spending in a capitalist economy.

这轮信贷繁荣的结束是导致当前需求疲软的重要原因。但相对于放缓的供给增长，需求还是很疲软。从世界平均水平看，自上个10年的中期开始，劳动力供给增速及劳动生产率提升速度已经大幅下滑。潜在产出增长放缓本身就会削弱需求，因为它使投资减少，而投资在资本主义经济中一直是支出的关键驱动力。

It is this background — slowing growth of supply, rising imbalances between desired savings and investment, the end of unsustainable credit booms and, not least, a legacy of huge debt overhangs and weakened financial systems — that explains the current predicament. It explains, too, why economies that cannot generate adequate demand at home are compelled towards beggar-my-neighbour, export-led growth via weakening exchange rates. Japan and the eurozone are in that club. So, too, are the emerging economies with collapsed exchange rates. China is resisting, but for how long? A weaker renminbi seems almost inevitable, whatever the authorities say.

可以解释当前困境的正是这一背景——供给增长放缓、合意储蓄与合意投资日益失衡、无法持续的信贷膨胀走到了终点、以及（尤其是）庞大的遗留债务负担和虚弱的金融体系。这一背景还解释了为什么那些国内需求不足的经济体，不得不通过压低汇率寻求“以邻为壑”的出口拉动型增长。日本和欧元区如此。一些汇率暴跌的新兴经济体亦是如此。中国还在挺着，但能坚持多久呢？无论当局怎么说，人民币贬值几乎不可避免。

No simple solutions for the global economic imbalances of today exist, only palliatives. The current favourite flavour in monetary policy is negative interest rates. Mr Dalio argues that: “While negative interest rates will make cash a bit less attractive (but not much), it won’t drive . . . savers to buy the sort of assets that will finance spending.” I agree. I cannot imagine that businesses will rush to invest as a result. The same is true of conventional quantitative easing. The biggest effect of these policies is likely to be via exchange rates. In effect, other countries will be seeking export-led growth vis-à-vis over-borrowed US consumers. That is bound to blow up.

要消除目前的全球经济失衡没有简单的解决办法，只有权宜之计。目前最受青睐的货币政策是负利率。戴利奥辩称：“负利率将让持有现金变得（稍微）不那么吸引人，但它不会促使……储户去购买那种能够为支出提供资金的资产。”我同意这点。我无法想象企业会因此赶忙去投资。传统的量化宽松政策也是如此。这些政策的最大影响可能会通过汇率体现出来。实际上，与过度借贷的美国消费者相比，其他国家将寻求由出口拉动的增长。这种模式肯定会覆灭。

One alternative then is fiscal policy. The OECD argues, persuasively, that co-ordinated expansion of public investment, combined with appropriate structural reforms, could expand output and even lower the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product. This is particularly plausible nowadays, because the major governments are able to borrow at zero or even negative real interest rates, long term. The austerity obsession, even when borrowing costs are so low, is lunatic.

接下来，另一种解决办法是财政政策。经合组织令人信服的辩称，协调地扩大公共投资，再加上适当的结构性改革，可能会提高产出、甚至降低公共债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比。这种观点眼下看来尤其有道理，因为世界主要国家的政府能够长期以零实际利率甚至负实际利率借入资金。在借款成本处于如此低位之际还痴迷于财政紧缩政策，是极其愚蠢的。

If the fiscal authorities are unwilling to behave so sensibly — and the signs, alas, are that they are not — central banks are the only players. They could be given the power to send money, ideally in electronic form, to every adult citizen. Would this add to demand? Absolutely. Under existing monetary arrangements, it would also generate a permanent rise in the reserves of commercial banks at the central bank. The easy way to contain any long-term monetary effects would be to raise reserve requirements. These could then become a desirable feature of our unstable banking systems.

如果财政当局不愿明智地采取行动（唉，有迹象显示他们确实不愿意），那么央行就要唱独角戏了。可以赋予央行向每一位成年公民发钱（最好是以电子形式）的权力。这会扩大需求吗？肯定会。在现有的货币安排下，这还会导致商业银行存放在央行的存款准备金永久性增加。避免产生任何长期货币影响的简便办法，是提高银行存款准备金率。这随后可能会成为我们不稳定的银行业体系的一个理想特征。

The main point is this. The economic forces that have brought the world economy to zero real interest rates and, increasingly, negative central bank rates are, if anything, now strengthening. This is what the world economy is showing. This is what monetary policy is indicating. Increasingly, this is what asset prices are demonstrating.

主要观点如下。将全球经济带入零实际利率、乃至让越来越多央行实行负利率的经济因素，眼下不仅未见减弱，反而正在增强。这就是全球经济反映出的状况，也是货币政策反映出的状况。资产价格也越来越明显地反映出这种状况。

Policymakers must prepare for a new “new normal” in which policy becomes more uncomfortable, more unconventional, or both. Can the world escape from the chronic demand weakness? Absolutely, yes. Will it? That demands greater boldness. When one has exhausted the just about possible, what remains, however improbable, must be the answer.

政策制定者必须准备好迎接新一轮“新常态”，在这种新常态下，政策将变得更令人不安、更非传统，或者两者兼有。世界能否摆脱长期需求乏力？当然，答案是肯定的。会摆脱吗？这需要更多勇气。当所有可能的方案都已穷尽时，剩下的肯定就是答案，不管它有多么不可思议。