德国是欧洲经济停滞的罪魁

THE U.S. economy finally seems to be climbing out of the deep hole it entered during the global financial crisis. Unfortunately, Europe, the other epicenter of crisis, can’t say the same. Unemployment in the euro area is stalled at almost twice the U.S. level, while inflation is far below both the official target and outright deflation has become a looming risk.

美国经济在全球金融危机期间掉进深渊，现在似乎终于要爬出来了。不幸的是，欧洲作为危机的另一个重灾区，却讲不出同样的话。欧元区的失业率停留在了几乎两倍于美国的水平，通胀水平远低于官方目标，完全陷入通缩的危险近在眼前。

Investors have taken notice: European interest rates have plunged, with German long-term bonds yielding just 0.7 percent. That’s the kind of yield we used to associate with Japanese deflation, and markets are indeed signaling that they expect Europe to experience its own lost decade.

投资者也注意到了：欧洲国家的利率大幅下降，德国长期国债收益率仅为0.7%。这种水平的收益率数字，类似于日本通货紧缩的情形，市场也的确传达出了欧洲将会经历“失去的十年”的信号。

Why is Europe in such dire straits? The conventional wisdom among European policy makers is that we’re looking at the price of irresponsibility: some governments have failed to behave with the prudence a shared currency requires, choosing instead to pander to misguided voters and cling to failed economic doctrines. And if you ask me (and a number of other economists who have looked hard at the issue), this analysis is essentially right, except for one thing: They’ve got the identity of the bad actors wrong.

为什么欧洲会陷入如此艰难的处境？欧洲政策制定者当中的惯常思维是，我们看到的是不负责任态度的代价：一些国家的政府采取的行动，并未体现出共同货币所需要的审慎，而是选择迎合受到误导的选民，坚持已经失败的经济理念。如果你问我（或者其他一些严肃对待这个问题的经济学家），这种分析基本上是正确的，只有一点例外：他们把做坏事的是谁给搞错了。

For the bad behavior at the core of Europe’s slow-motion disaster isn’t coming from Greece, or Italy, or France. It’s coming from Germany.

导致欧洲经济陷于停顿的最关键的恶劣行为，并非来自希腊、意大利或法国，而是来自德国。

I’m not denying that the Greek government behaved irresponsibly before the crisis, or that Italy has a big problem with stagnating productivity. But Greece is a small country whose fiscal mess is unique, while Italy’s long-run problems aren’t the source of Europe’s deflationary downdraft. If you try to identify countries whose policies were way out of line before the crisis, have hurt Europe since the crisis, and refuse to learn from experience, everything points to Germany as the worst actor.

我并不否认希腊政府在危机之前的行为很不负责任，也不否认意大利生产力停滞是一个大问题。但是希腊是一个具有独特财政问题的小国，而意大利的长期问题也并不是欧洲滑向通缩的根源。如果你想要找出哪些国家的政策在危机之前就已经出问题、在危机发生以来伤害欧洲经济、而且还拒绝吸取教训，那么所有的证据都说明，德国是行为最恶劣的国家。

Consider, in particular, the comparison between Germany and France.

请着重考虑一下德国和法国之间的差异。

France gets a lot of bad press, with much talk in particular about its supposed loss in competitiveness. Such talk greatly exaggerates the reality; you’d never know from most media reports that France runs only a small trade deficit. Still, to the extent that there is an issue here, where does it come from? Has French competitiveness been eroded by excessive growth in costs and prices?

关于法国的负面媒体报道不少，尤其是很多人的说法都宣称它丧失了竞争力。这样的说法极大地夸大了事实，从大多数媒体报道中，你永远也不会知道法国只有很小的贸易逆差。此外，即使法国的确存在这样的问题，问题的来源在哪里呢，法国的竞争力是被成本和物价的增长侵蚀了吗？

No, not at all. Since the euro came into existence in 1999, France’s G.D.P. deflator (the average price of French-produced goods and services) has risen 1.7 percent per year, while its unit labor costs have risen 1.9 percent annually. Both numbers are right in line with the European Central Bank’s target of slightly under 2 percent inflation, and similar to what has happened in the United States. Germany, on the other hand, is way out of line, with price and labor-cost growth of 1 and 0.5 percent, respectively.

不，完全不是。自欧元在1999年诞生以来，法国的GDP平减指数（即法国商品和服务的平均价格的走势）每年提高了1.7%，而该国单位劳动力的成本则每年提高1.9%。两个数字都符合欧洲央行(European Central Bank)略低于2%的通胀目标，这与美国发生的情形相似。与法国相对比，德国的数据就非常不妥了，物价和劳动力成本的增长分别是1%和0.5%。

And it’s not just France whose costs are just about where they ought to be. Spain saw rising costs and prices during the housing bubble, but at this point all the excess has been eliminated through years of crushing unemployment and wage restraint. Italian cost growth has arguably been a bit too high, but it’s not nearly as far out of line as Germany is on the low side.

成本大体符合应有水平的不仅仅是法国。西班牙在房地产泡沫期间，成本和物价曾大幅提高，但由于严峻的失业率和工资限制持续多年，如今所有挥霍无度的迹象都已不复存在。可以说意大利的成本增长有点太高了，但它偏离正轨的程度，远没有德国成本过低的问题严重。

In other words, to the extent that there’s anything like a competitiveness problem in Europe, it’s overwhelmingly caused by Germany’s beggar-thy-neighbor policies, which are in effect exporting deflation to its neighbors.

换句话说，即使欧洲真的存在某种竞争力问题，其最主要的原因也是德国以邻为壑的政策。这些政策实际上将通货紧缩输出到了邻国。

But what about debt? Isn’t non-German Europe paying the price for past fiscal irresponsibility? Actually, that’s a story about Greece and nobody else. And it’s especially wrong in the case of France, which isn’t facing a fiscal crisis at all; France can currently borrow long-term at a record low interest rate of less than 1 percent, only slightly above the German rate.

那么债务呢？德国之外的其他欧洲国家难道不是在为过去不负责任的财政政策付出代价吗？实际上这种说法只适用于希腊，而非其他国家。对法国来说尤其不成立，该国根本没有面临财政危机；法国现在还能以创纪录的低利率（不到1%）借入长期国债，仅仅略高于德国的水平。

Yet European policy makers seem determined to blame the wrong countries and the wrong policies for their plight. True, the European Commission has floated a plan to stimulate the economy with public investment — but the public outlay is so tiny compared with the problem that the plan is almost a joke. And meanwhile, the commission is warning France, which has the lowest borrowing costs in its history, that it may face fines for not cutting its budget deficit enough.

然而欧洲的政策制定者，似乎下定决心要把自己的困境归咎于错误的对象和错误的政策。的确，欧盟委员会(European Commission)提出了一项用公共投资来刺激经济的方案，然而相对于问题的规模，公共开支如此之小，简直像个笑话。与此同时，尽管法国现在的举债成本达到了历史最低，但欧委会还是警告法国，如果削减财政赤字的力度不足，就会受到罚款。

What about resolving the problem of too little inflation in Germany? Very aggressive monetary policy might do the trick (although I wouldn’t count on it), but German monetary officials are warning against such policies because they might let debtors off the hook.

那么解决德国通胀水平过低的问题怎么样？采取激进的货币政策或许能达到这种目的（不过我不敢保证），但是德国负责货币政策的官员却对这种政策提出了警告，因为这样债务人就可以摆脱负担。

What we’re seeing, then, is the immensely destructive power of bad ideas. It’s not entirely Germany’s fault — Germany is a big player in Europe, but it’s only able to impose deflationary policies because so much of the European elite has bought into the same false narrative. And you have to wonder what will cause reality to break in.

这么说来，我们见到的就是坏主意产生的巨大破坏力量。并非完全要怪德国，尽管德国在欧洲是一个重要的角色，但是它之所以能够实行通缩性的政策，是因为有太多数欧洲精英，接受了相同的错误论述。这让人不禁开始思索，要怎样才能让他们认清现实。