特朗普将辜负愤怒的支持者

Will Donald Trump benefit the enraged white working class that brought him into the White House? To answer this, one must examine his plans and the desires of congressional Republicans.

唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)会造福将他送入白宫的愤怒的白人劳动阶层吗？若要回答这个问题，必须考察一下他的计划和共和党国会议员的意愿。

One must also consider how these plans might affect the world economy.

还必须考虑这些计划可能如何影响世界经济。

The conclusion is straightforward: some people will indeed benefit but the white working class will not be among them.

结论很简单：有些人确实会受益，但白人劳动阶层不在其列。

Republicans have long stoked rage they do not assuage.

长期以来，共和党人一直在煽动愤怒，却没有做什么来平息他们煽动起来的怒火。

Mr Trump has taken this approach in new directions.

特朗普用新的方式延续了这一传统。

Huge, permanent and regressive tax cuts seem the one certainty.

大幅度、永久性和累退式的减税似乎是确定要发生的。

It is something on which Mr Trump and congressional Republicans agree.

特朗普和共和党国会议员在这方面达成了共识。

The revised Trump plan would reduce the top individual income tax rate to 33 per cent and the corporate tax rate to 15 per cent.

特朗普修改后的计划，将会把最高一档个人所得税率降至33%，将公司税率降至15%。

It would also eliminate the estate tax.

它也将废除遗产税。

The highest-income taxpayers — 0.1 per cent of the population, those with incomes over $3.7m in 2016 dollars — would receive an average cut of more than 14 per cent of after-tax income.

最高收入纳税人——占总人口的0.1%、2016年收入超过370万美元的那些人——所获的平均减税幅度将超过其税后收入的14%。

The poorest fifth’s taxes would fall by an average of 0.8 per cent of taxed income.

最贫穷的五分之一人口所获平均减税幅度，将为其税后收入的0.8%。

To those who hath, it shall be given.

凡有的，还要加给他。

Mr Trump (much less so the congressional Republicans) plans to increase infrastructure spending.

特朗普计划增加基础设施支出（共和党国会议员这样做的意愿低得多）。

This is desirable, though it would have made even more sense if Republicans had supported such a programme in the midst of the Great Recession.

这是可取的，不过，要是共和党人在大衰退(Great Recession)期间曾支持这样的计划，那会更合理。

But as noted by Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, the Trump plan relies mainly on private investment.

但正如美国前财长劳伦斯.萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)所说，特朗普的计划主要依靠私人投资。

Experience elsewhere suggests this often leads to exploitation of taxpayers and a failure to put into effect public investments that deliver high social benefits but have limited commercial returns.

其他地区的经验表明，这往往导致对纳税人的剥削，并让创造很高社会效益但商业回报有限的公共投资无法实现。

The net effect of these plans would be a large rise in fiscal deficits.

这些计划的最终后果将是财政赤字的大幅增加。

Calculations by the Tax Policy Center at the Brookings think-tank suggest that by 2020 the deficit would increase by 3 per cent of gross domestic product.

智库布鲁金斯学会(Brookings)税收政策中心(Tax Policy Center)的测算表明，到2020年，赤字增幅将相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的3%。

With current forecasts as the baseline and ignoring any additional spending, this would mean a deficit of around 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2020.

以目前预测为起点，并忽略任何额外支出，这意味着到2020年赤字将相当于GDP的5.5%左右。

Cumulatively, the increase in federal debt by 2026 might be 25 per cent of GDP.

累计下来，到2026年联邦债务的增加额或许将相当于GDP的25%。

Congressional Republicans such as Paul Ryan would surely demand matching cuts in spending.

保罗.瑞安(Paul Ryan)等共和党国会议员，肯定会要求以同等程度削减支出。

Annual federal outlays are close to 20 per cent of GDP.

年度联邦支出接近GDP的20%。

Spending on health, income support, social security, defence and net interest absorbed 88 per cent of this in 2015.

在2015年，医疗、收入补助、社会保障、国防和净利息支出占到总支出的88%。

Elimination of spending on all else (a catastrophic mistake) would merely halve the prospective deficit.

取消所有其他支出（一个灾难性的错误）仅仅将令预期赤字减半。

In sum, the plan’s logic leads towards either big increases in federal debt relative to GDP or sharp cuts in spending on programmes on which Mr Trump’s supporters depend.

总而言之，依照逻辑推断，特朗普的计划要么会导致联邦债务相对于GDP的比例大幅增长，要么会导致特朗普的支持者们所依赖的种种计划的开支遭到大幅削减。

The envisaged rise in US fiscal deficits would however be expansionary, even though the concentration of the cuts on the wealthiest would limit this effect.

然而，美国财政赤字预计中的上升将有助于经济扩张，尽管减税主要针对最富裕人群将削弱这一效果。

Still, a jump in US fiscal deficits would accelerate rises in US short-term interest rates.

然而，美国财政赤字猛增将加速美国短期利率的上升。

Mr Trump could hardly complain since he has attacked the Federal Reserve’s low rates.

特朗普很难抱怨什么，因为他一直抨击美联储的低利率。

Yet, as Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute notes, the world economy is fragile.

然而，正如美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的德斯蒙德.拉赫曼(Desmond Lachman)所说，世界经济是脆弱的。

A swift rise in US interest rates might destabilise it.

美国利率的迅速上升可能会破坏世界经济稳定。

Furthermore, the combination of fiscal loosening with monetary tightening would mean a stronger dollar and a rising current account deficit in the medium term.

此外，宽财政与紧货币相结合意味着，中期内美元会走强，经常账户赤字会上升。

The US would re-emerge as the global buyer of last resort, so helping the world’s structural mercantilists: China, Germany and Japan.

美国将重新成为全球最后购买人，从而有利于世界上的结构性重商主义国家：中国、德国和日本。

A strong dollar and rising external deficits would, as in the early 1980s, increase Protectionist pressures — Ronald Reagan’s administration was quite protectionist in its first term.

正如20世纪80年代初那样，强势的美元和不断攀升的外部赤字会增加实行贸易保护主义的压力——头一届罗纳德.里根(Ronald Reagan)政府的保护主义倾向就相当强烈。

The decision to launch the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise world trade was then the response.

当时的回应是，决定启动乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判、以推动世界贸易自由化。

This time, however, a strong dollar would reinforce the bias towards protectionism of the Trump administration.

然而，这一次，强势美元将强化特朗普政府对保护主义的偏好。

But protection against imports would raise the currency’s value further, shifting the adjustment on to unprotected sectors — above all, on to competitive exporters.

但不利于进口的保护主义措施将进一步推高美元汇率，将调整传递到不受保护的部门那里——尤其是有竞争力的出口商那里。

In all, a strong dollar must weaken the manufacturing Mr Trump seeks to help.

总而言之，强势美元肯定会削弱特朗普试图帮助的制造业。

A likely response would be to cajole the Fed into slowing monetary tightening.

一个可能的对策将是劝诱美联储放慢货币紧缩进程。

Janet Yellen’s term as Fed chair expires in 2018.

珍妮特.耶伦(Janet Yellen)的美联储主席任期将于2018年届满。

Her successor could be told that the 4 per cent growth mentioned by Mr Trump has to be attained.

她的继任者可能被告知，特朗普提出的4%的增长率必须实现。

The last time such growth was achieved over a five-year period was before the crash of 2000 — an ominous warning.

上一次持续五年实现这样的增长率，发生在2000年崩盘之前——这是一个不祥的警告。

If the Fed tried to achieve this goal, it might trigger inflation, financial instability or, more likely, both.

如果美联储试图实现这一目标，或许会引发通货膨胀、金融不稳定，或者更可能的是，同时引发这两种情况。

In all this there seem to be few, if any, gains for Mr Trump’s working-class supporters.

这一切，似乎都对特朗普的劳动阶层支持者们好处不大、甚至毫无好处。

The president-elect has also promised to eliminate Obamacare and most environmental and financial regulations.

这位当选总统还承诺废除奥巴马医改(Obamacare)和大多数环保和金融法规。

It is hard to believe any of this would succour the prospects of the working class.

很难相信这些措施的任何一个会改善劳动阶层的前景。

They are more likely to suffer from even worse health cover, a dirtier environment, more predatory behaviour by financial institutions and, at worst, even another financial crisis.

他们更有可能会面对更糟的健康保障、更脏的环境、行为更肆无忌惮的金融机构，在最坏情况下，甚至是另一场金融危机。

Protectionism, too, will fail to help most of his supporters .

保护主义也将无法帮助特朗普的大多数支持者。

Many depend on cheap imported goods.

他们中许多人依靠低价的进口商品过活。

Many would be badly hurt by the dire results of a tit-for-tat global trade war.

一场相互报复的全球贸易战将造成可怕后果，这些后果将对许多人造成严重伤害。

Meanwhile, rapidly rising productivity would still ensure a steady fall in the share of manufacturing in US employment, despite protection.

同时，尽管有保护措施，但生产率的迅速提高仍将导致制造业就业人数在美国就业总人口中的占比稳步下降。

Mr Trump promises a burst of infrastructure spending, regressive tax cuts, protectionism, cuts in federal spending and radical deregulation.

特朗普承诺了如下东西：基础设施支出大幅增加、累退式减税、保护主义、联邦支出削减、大幅去监管。

A big rise in infrastructure spending would indeed help construction workers.

基础设施支出的大幅增加确实将有利于建筑工人。

But little else in these plans would help the working class.

但是这些计划中的其他部分对劳动阶层没什么帮助。

Overall, his plans might indeed generate a brief economic surge.

总的来说，他的计划确实可能带来短暂的经济爆发。

But the longer-term consequences are likely to be grim, not least for his angry, but fooled, supporters.

但长期后果可能是严峻的，尤其是对于他那些愤怒、但被愚弄的支持者而言。

Next time, they might be even angrier.

下一次，他们可能还会变得更加愤怒。

Where that might lead is terrifying.

那可能会导致什么后果，让人不敢想象。