切断ISIS的经济命脉 Isis and the war for oil
It has always been hard to accept the argument that the series of wars in the Middle East since 2001 have been about oil. Afghanistan is not an oil state and most of the oil which will be produced from Iraq will end up in China and the Far East rather than in the United States or Europe. On the other hand what is happening now in Syria and Northern Iraq shows that oil and power are inseparably linked.
我们一直很难接受这样一种观点，即中东自2001年以来发生的一系列战争都与石油相关。阿富汗并非产油国，而伊拉克未来开采的大部分石油将运往中国以及远东地区，而非美国或欧洲。另一方面，叙利亚与伊拉克北部如今的形势表明，石油与实力之间有着密不可分的联系。
As the FT reported in October, in building its caliphate Isis has not followed al-Qaeda in relying on donations from rich supporters in Saudi Arabia or other parts of the Persian Gulf. Instead the ISIS leadership created its own economic structure in the territories it controlled based almost entirely on oil revenue. Another report published in December recorded in fascinating detail how oil from fields such as al-Tamak and al-Omar in the eastern Syrian province of Deir Exxor and from the Qayyara field close to Mosul in northern Iraq made its way mostly in trucks to other parts of both countries and beyond. In an almost medieval economy, some was even carried in pans on the backs of mules or donkeys. Even rebels fighting Isis within Syria turned out to be dependent for their basic fuel supplies on purchases of illicit oil which helped to fund their opponents.
英国《金融时报》去年10月报道称，在建立哈里发国的过程中，“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)并未效仿基地组织(al-Qaeda)在资金上依靠沙特阿拉伯或波斯湾其他地区富裕支持者捐赠的做法。相反，ISIS领导层在其控制的地盘建立了几乎完全依靠石油收入的经济体系。去年12月发表的另一篇报道介绍了一些引人入胜的细节：产于叙利亚东部省份代尔祖尔(Deir Ezzor)的al-Tamak、al-Omar等油田以及伊拉克北部摩苏尔附近的Qayyara油田的石油，是如何主要通过卡车运往两国其他地区及境外的。某些经济活动简直是中世纪的翻版：一部分石油甚至用驼于骡子或驴背上的铁锅运输。就连叙利亚境内与ISIS作战的叛军都要依靠购买非法油料来保障基本燃料供应，尽管这么做帮助了他们的对手获得资金。
At one point, Isis was earning as much as $40m a month from oil, using a professional operation which was tightly controlled from the centre. That money allowed Isis to create the semblance of an effective government and no doubt also funded the purchase of arms and weaponry.
借助从中心严密控制的专业经营，ISIS一度每月获得多达4000万美元的石油收入。这些资金让ISIS创建了一个貌似有效的政府，无疑还被用于购买武器装备。
That position has now been degraded by the bombing campaigns initiated by the French and the Russians which the British have recently joined. As well as attempting to decapitate the leadership structure of Isis, the air strikes have clearly targeted a number of key elements in the chain of activities from production and refining to the transport links which allowed Isis to make money from whatever it could produce.
如今，由法、俄两国发起（英国最近也加入）的轰炸战役已削弱了ISIS的这种地位。在对ISIS领导层实施斩首行动的同时，空中打击的目标显然还包括整条活动链上的多个要素（从生产和炼油，到运输线），这一链条使得ISIS无论生产什么都可以赚钱。
A recent article in Iraq Oil Report summarised the state of play towards the end of 2015:
《伊拉克石油报》(Iraq Oil Report)最近一篇文章总结了接近2015年底时的情况：
- Production is down as field infrastructure has been hit by bombing. Some oil continues to flow automatically and has to be stored temporarily in holes dug hurriedly in the ground.
—— 随着油田基础设施遭到轰炸，产量下滑。有些石油在继续自动喷涌，不得不在地上匆忙挖出大坑，将其暂时储存。
- Key refining links have been broken forcing the use of primitive techniques using open pits to make usable products.
—— 关键的炼油环节遭到破坏，不得不使用原始技术，利用露天作业生产能用的产品。
- The fall in the price has cut margins – already low because of discounting and is discouraging the black market trade because the risks involved now far outstrip the rewards especially for the tanker drivers.
—— 油价下跌压低了因为打折原本就低的利润率，同时打击了黑市交易，因为如今在黑市倒卖石油的风险远远大于回报，特别是对油罐车司机而言。
This, however, is far from the end of the story. Isis has not been defeated. The Iraqi army, no doubt with a good deal of help from outside, has retaken territory north of Baghdad. The situation on the ground is not quite trench warfare, but the unending conflict over narrow strips of land which pass from one side to another at enormous cost in terms of lives and physical damage is reminiscent of the battles of the first world war.
然而，这远非故事的结局。ISIS并未被击溃。在大量外援的帮助下，伊拉克军队在巴格达以北收复了一部分失地。战场局势虽然不是典型的堑壕战，但以人命和物质损失的巨大代价反复争夺狭窄区域的无休止拉锯战，难免让人联想起第一次世界大战的战斗。
As well as the human suffering, the environmental damage must be horrendous. What remains of Ramadi ( 80 per cent of the city is said to be in ruins ) is for the moment in Iraqi hands, but the major city of Mosul, despite promises of a renewed assault by Iraqi forces, is not. There and elsewhere across the region Isis still appears to be in control.
除了对人类造成的苦难外，对环境的破坏也必然是极大的。拉马迪的断壁残垣（据称该城80%成为废墟）如今回到了伊拉克军队手中，但摩苏尔这个大城市没那么幸运，尽管伊拉克军队承诺再次发动进攻。摩苏尔及整个地区的其他地方似乎仍处于ISIS的控制之下。
An undefeated Isis remains a serious threat – in the immediate region and beyond. So far there has been no impact on the world market from any action taken by Isis because the volumes involved have been so small. Even at its peak, oil production from territory controlled by Isis never exceeded 70,000 barrels per day. That position could change.
未被击溃的ISIS仍构成严重威胁——无论对当地还是对世界都是如此。迄今为止，由于涉及的数量太少，ISIS的任何行动都未对世界石油市场造成影响。即使在峰值时期，ISIS控制区的石油日产量也从未超过7万桶。这一产量水平可能发生变化。
In northern Iraq Isis now has a clear incentive to try to take further oil installations of which there are many around Mosul, particularly to the east and area of Kirkuk. The main fields should be well defended but others are more vulnerable. An Isis move towards Kirkuk would widen the physical conflict and that could bring the bombing campaign close to areas holding much more significant volumes of oil.
在伊拉克北部，ISIS如今有强烈动机设法进一步抢占摩苏尔周边的许多石油设施，特别是在摩苏尔以东以及基尔库克地区。主要油田应当得到了严密保卫，但其它设施可能比较脆弱。ISIS向基尔库克逼近将扩大武装冲突的范围，并将轰炸战役引向那些石油储量多得多的地区。
At the same time there is evidence that Isis appreciates the potential to use attacks on oil installations to weaken their opponents. Last week’s attack on facilities near al-Sidra in Libya is just one example of what can be done to cut revenue and to discourage new investment in a country where oil provides 95 per cent of exports and 75 per cent of the national budget.
与此同时，有证据表明，ISIS明白攻击石油设施以削弱对手的意义。ISIS近期对利比亚al-Sidra附近石油设施的袭击就是一例——在一个石油占出口95%、占国家预算75%的国家，这么做能够打击政府的财政收入，吓阻对该国的新投资。
Isis has every incentive to make sure that Libya declines into being a failed state.
ISIS完全有动机希望利比亚沦落为失败国家。
Even if the oil producing region in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia is assumed to be too well defended for Isis to penetrate, there are still substantial potential targets in Egypt, Algeria and the wider oil producing regions of Iraq itself. Isis has shown that while the principal focus is on the territory it holds the organisation still has the ability to venture into other areas in order to undermine existing regimes and to demonstrate its remaining power. If one of the aims of the caliphate is to drive foreigners out of the region another successful attack on oil facilities could well prove successful.
即使假设沙特东部省份的产油区保卫严密，足以防止ISIS渗透，在埃及、阿尔及利亚乃至伊拉克境内的大片产油区，仍有大量的潜在目标容易受到攻击。ISIS已经表现出，虽然其主要关注点在自己控制的地盘内，但该组织仍有能力渗入其他地区，以破坏现政权，展示自己尚存的实力。如果ISIS的目标之一是把外国人赶出中东地区，那么对石油设施发动又一次成功袭击就可能达到目的。
The bombing campaign has changed the game in Syria and northern Iraq. Isis can no longer depend on a steady flow of revenue through the creation of a quasi national oil enterprise. That business model – “Isis Inc” in the words of the first FT report – looks dead. But the war for oil and power across the region is far from over.
轰炸战役改变了叙利亚和伊拉克北部的游戏规则。ISIS无法再通过建立准国有石油公司获得稳定收入。这种商业模式——前述英国《金融时报》首篇报道称其为“ISIS公司”(ISIS Inc)——似乎已被绞杀。但中东地区争夺石油与实力的战争还远未结束。
