乌克兰问题上普京鱼与熊掌不可兼得

When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Moscow stock market did not crash. That is because there was no Moscow stock market. By contrast, the news that Russian troops have taken effective control of Crimea was greeted, yesterday, by a 10 per cent collapse in shares on the Russian market.

1968年苏联入侵捷克斯洛伐克时，莫斯科股市没有崩盘，这是因为当时莫斯科根本没有股市。相比之下，周一俄罗斯军队实际控制克里米亚的消息传出后，俄罗斯股市暴跌了10%。

This contrast between 1968 and now underlines why talk of a new cold war is misleading. The economic and political context of Crimea in 2014 is entirely different from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Russia no longer has an empire extending all the way to Berlin. The pain of that territorial loss is part of the reason why President Vladimir Putin is fighting so hard to keep Ukraine in Moscow’s much-diminished sphere of influence.

1968年与现在的强烈反差，突显出为什么“新冷战”的说法具有误导性。2014年克里米亚问题的政治经济背景与1968年的捷克斯洛伐克问题完全不同。俄罗斯不再是一个疆域一直延伸至柏林的帝国。领土损失带来的痛苦，是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)现在拼命把乌克兰留在莫斯科严重缩水的势力范围之内的原因之一。

Just as important, the world is no longer divided into two mutually exclusive, and hostile, political and economic systems – a capitalist west and a communist east. After the collapse of the Soviet system, Russia joined the global, capitalist order. The financial, business and social systems of Russia and the west are now deeply intertwined. A new east-west struggle is certainly under way today but it is being fought on entirely different terrain from the cold war – and under different rules.

同样重要的是，世界不再分为两个互相排斥、敌对的政治经济体系——西方资本主义和东方共产主义。苏联体系崩溃后，俄罗斯加入了全球的资本主义秩序。如今，俄罗斯的金融、商业和社会体系与西方深深交织在一起。东西方今天当然正在进行新的争斗，但争斗的背景与冷战时期完全不同，规则也不一样。

The Kremlin may assume that the west’s business dealings with Russia work in its favour. President Putin, the former KGB agent, probably still believes the old Soviet maxim that western foreign policy is dictated by capitalists – who will not allow their financial interests in Russia to be endangered. The west’s supine reaction to the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 may have strengthened this impression. Ben Judah, author of a recent book on Russia, argues that the eagerness of western business people and former politicians to do business with Russia has made Mr Putin “very confident that European elites are more concerned about making money than standing up to him”.

克里姆林宫可能以为，西方与俄罗斯的商业往来对自己有利。曾任克格勃(KGB)特工的普京可能仍然相信苏联时期的格言：西方外交政策由资本家决定，后者不会允许他们在俄罗斯的金融利益受到损害。西方对2008年俄罗斯武装干涉格鲁吉亚的消极回应可能强化了这种印象。本•朱达(Ben Judah)最近写了一本关于俄罗斯的书。他辩称，西方商人和前政客们急切地与俄罗斯做生意，这让普京“确信，欧洲精英们更关心赚钱而非与他对抗”。

Yet Mr Putin, who is fond of judo, should know that a sudden shift of weight can turn a strength into a weakness. The interdependence of the Russian and western economies means that rogue actions by the Kremlin can inflict an immediate economic cost on Russia. The first part of that price became apparent with the crash on the Moscow stock market after the move on Crimea – with the shares of Gazprom and Sberbank – two big companies closely tied to the Kremlin – falling by about 10 per cent each.

然而，喜爱柔道的普京应该明白，重心的突然转移可能会化优势为劣势。俄罗斯经济与西方经济相互依存意味着，克里姆林宫的无理行动可能会让俄罗斯立即在经济上付出代价。这种代价的头一部分从俄罗斯对克里米亚采取行动后莫斯科股市的暴跌中可以明显看出来——俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)和俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行(Sberbank)这两家与克林姆林宫关系密切的大公司的股价下挫了约10%。

The imposition of formal economic sanctions or visa bans on members of the Russian elite would heighten the pain. Rich Russians now take for granted the right to pop over to London or Paris for the weekend. Billions of dollars of Russian money are stashed away in western banks or invested in European property.

实施正式经济制裁或者对俄罗斯部分精英人士禁发签证将加深俄罗斯的痛苦。富裕的俄罗斯人如今将周末去伦敦或巴黎度假视为理所当然的权利。俄罗斯有数十亿美元资金藏匿于西方的银行或者投资于欧洲的房地产。

The Russian central bank itself has estimated that two-thirds of the $56bn that flowed out of Russia in 2012 might have been the proceeds of crime. Funds that are the fruits of corruption are vulnerable to legal action. The City of London and the Swiss authorities, in particular, have not been noted for their eagerness to question the origins of Russian money. But those questions could now be asked a little more urgently.

俄罗斯央行自己估计，在2012年流出俄罗斯的560亿美元中，三分之二的资金可能是非法所得。源于腐败的资金很容易受到法律行动的追索。尤其要指出的是，伦敦金融城(City of London)和瑞士当局并不以热衷追问俄罗斯资金的来源而闻名。但现在，它们可以抓紧询问这些问题。

President Putin himself has long been rumoured to have billions salted away in the west. Presumably, not all of that money is the product of savings from his Kremlin salary. If western intelligence agencies have done their job, they will presumably know where this money is.

长期以来一直有传言称，俄罗斯总统普京本人在西方拥有数十亿的存款。可以想见，这些存款并非全部来自他在克里姆林宫任职的薪酬。如果西方情报机构尽到了责任，他们大概会查到普京的钱存在什么地方。

Visa bans on a widened circle of Russian leaders, implicated in the military intervention in Ukraine, are certainly feasible – which would stop them enjoying the properties and funds they have accumulated in Europe. America’s “Magnitsky list” – imposing visa bans on Russian officials implicated in the killing of the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky – has already established the precedent.

对更多参与军事干涉乌克兰的俄罗斯领导人禁发签证，无疑是一种可行的对策。这将让他们无法享受自己在欧洲积攒下的房产和金钱。美国的“马格尼茨基名单”（Magnitsky list，名单上列出的俄罗斯官员被禁发签证，因为他们牵涉律师谢尔盖•马格尼茨基(Sergei Magnitsky)被杀一事）已为此确立了先例。

Of course, the economic damage inflicted would flow both ways. The most obvious western vulnerability is Europe’s reliance on Russian energy. The image of western householders shivering because the Russian gas tap has been turned off will worry European leaders. Yet even here, Europe’s vulnerability – and Russia’s willingness to use the energy weapon – can be overstated.

当然，双方都将因此在经济上受损。西方最明显的软肋在于，欧洲依赖俄罗斯的能源。如果俄罗斯关上天然气开关，西方家庭将在严冬里瑟瑟发抖，这样的情景让欧洲领导人担心不已。但即便在这一点上，欧洲的脆弱性和俄罗斯使用能源武器的意愿也可能被高估了。

Russia needs to sell energy abroad. It gets some 70 per cent of its export revenues from oil and gas. The importance of such revenues to the Russian state ensured that energy sales to Europe were continued even during the height of the cold war.

俄罗斯需要出口能源。该国约70%的出口收入来源于石油和天然气。由于能源出口收入如此之重要，因此甚至在冷战形势最严峻之时，俄罗斯对欧洲的能源出口都没有中断过。

Meanwhile, European demand for Russian gas has fallen during the past decade as renewable energy comes on to the market. American shale gas could also provide an alternative source.

另一方面，过去十年里，随着可再生能源进入市场，欧洲对俄罗斯天然气的需求已有所减少。美国页岩气也可作为一种备选的天然气来源。

With luck, the Russian government will, even now, think better of the course on which it has embarked. There is clearly scope for a diplomatic solution involving the pullback of Russian troops matched by guarantees for the cultural and political rights of Russian speakers.

幸运的话，即便是现在，俄罗斯政府也会反思其已经踏上的道路并回心转意。显而易见，乌克兰局势尚有外交解决的空间——即俄罗斯撤回军队，而说俄语的乌克兰人获得文化与政治权利方面的保证。

For the moment, however, it seems more likely that Russia is determined to hang on to Crimea – and perhaps also to grab bits of eastern Ukraine.

但目前来看，俄罗斯似乎更有可能执意抓住克里米亚不放——或许还会抢占东乌克兰的部分地区。

President Barack Obama and the leaders of the EU have been swift to rule out a military response, and they are right to do so. But the west still has plenty of economic tools with which to make life difficult for Russia.

美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)和欧盟领导人迅速排除了军事回应的选项，他们这么做是正确的。但是，西方仍拥有很多经济手段，足以让俄罗斯的日子不好过。

For the past decade, Mr Putin and his entourage have often used the rhetoric of the cold war while enjoying the fruits of globalisation. Now they may need to be faced with a choice. They can have a new cold war. Or they can have access to the riches of the west. They cannot have both.

过去十年，普京及其幕僚一面享受着全球化的硕果，一面不时使用冷战论调。如今，他们可能必须要做出选择了——要么面对新冷战，要么享受西方的财富，不能二者兼得。