克里米亚与乌克兰:西方必须与俄罗斯谈判

In the west, the conversation is dominated by discussion of how to punish and isolate Russia for its role in the invasion and annexation of Crimea. That is a reaction not a strategy. A strategy begins with a clear understanding of the operational objective.

面对俄罗斯在入侵和吞并克里米亚中的所作所为，如何惩罚和孤立俄罗斯主导了眼下西方的舆论。这是一种反应，而不是一种策略。要拿出一种策略，首先必须清晰地认识行动的目标。

A western strategy should not set as its objective the rollback of the annexation of Crimea to force the peninsula back into Ukraine. Michael McFaul, the former US ambassador to Russia, has argued that the Crimean case should be treated the way Washington treated the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics: permanent non-recognition with the professed goal of eventual rollback. Such a position is unsound. The circumstances of the two episodes are quite different.

西方的策略不应着眼于迫使俄罗斯把克里米亚吐出来、还给乌克兰。前美国驻俄罗斯大使迈克尔•麦克福尔(Michael McFaul)主张，华盛顿方面应该像对待1940年俄罗斯并吞波罗的海国家那样，对待此次的克里米亚事件，即：永不承认克里米亚新的地位，并公开表示将致力于逆转这一变化。这一主张是站不住脚的。这两起事件的情况大相径庭。

Many western experts knew the Crimean portion of the early 1990s settlement had a tenuous character, given the status of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Some also recall the arbitrary background of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s attachment of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, while these territories were parts of the Soviet Union. This bit of caprice had its roots in several land-grabs that Khrushchev had sought for his Ukrainian domain back when he was its Soviet Communist party boss. Never part of Ukraine or independent, the Crimea had just been liberated from German military occupation when Khrushchev added it to his wishlist. One of Khrushchev’s biographers recounts him telling a Ukrainian colleague: “Ukraine is in ruins but everybody wants something from it. Now what if it received the Crimea in return?” Stalin turned him down. But 10 years later, shortly after Khrushchev took Stalin’s place, he had his way.

西方许多专家之前就知道，鉴于俄罗斯黑海舰队的地位，上世纪90年代初的协议中关于克里米亚的部分比较脆弱。一些专家还记得，苏联领导人尼基塔•赫鲁晓夫(Nikita Khrushchev)1954年非常轻率地将克里米亚并入了乌克兰，当时乌克兰和克里米亚都属于苏联。这种轻率并非孤例，担任苏共中央第一书记时，赫鲁晓夫曾轻率地将好几块土地并入了他的家乡乌克兰。克里米亚以前从未属于过乌克兰，也从来都不是一个独立国家。当年，克里米亚刚刚从德军占领下解放，赫鲁晓夫就将它加入了自己的“心愿清单”。赫鲁晓夫的一位传记作者回忆道，赫鲁晓夫曾对一名来自乌克兰的同僚说：“乌克兰眼下一片废墟，但每个人都在打它的主意。把克里米亚给它、作为回报怎么样？”斯大林(Stalin)拒绝了他的提议。但10年后，赫鲁晓夫接替斯大林之位后不久，就实施了自己当年的想法。

Given that there will now be some revision of the post-cold war diplomatic settlement, the objective of the western strategy should be to set firm limits on any further revisions in eastern Europe. In the short run, the strategy imposes sanctions on Russians for outlaw behaviour. The strategy would also entail non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea. Recognising this annexation could come later, if it is part of a larger diplomatic understanding in which Russia chooses to rejoin a system of common security.

鉴于冷战后的外交协议如今将面临修订，西方不应将确保东欧格局不发生任何变化作为自身策略的目标。短期而言，西方的策略是对俄罗斯实施制裁，以惩罚该国的非法行为。该策略也必须包括拒不承认克里米亚已成为俄罗斯的一部分。如果未来西方与俄罗斯达成更广泛的外交谅解协议，俄罗斯选择重新加入共同安全体系，那么作为回报，西方也可以承认克里米亚是俄罗斯的一部分。

Agreement? With Russia? With Putin? One could argue that Russia has already just torn up at least one such understanding. That includes the Budapest memorandum of 1994, in which it agreed to safeguard Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia also violated other agreements to avoid the use of force in changing international borders.

跟俄罗斯、普京谈协议？有人可能会说，俄罗斯刚刚撕毁了不止一份谅解协议，包括1994年的《布达佩斯安全保障备忘录》(Budapest memorandum)。根据该备忘录，俄罗斯同意保卫乌克兰的领土完整。俄罗斯还违反了其他有关避免使用武力改变国际边界的协议。

This sceptical argument will not wear well. The issue is not one of trust. The situation for Ukraine and its neighbours is ominous. A security structure must be built. A new diplomatic understanding about borders should be set in place. Alongside it there will need to be other efforts to shore up Ukraine and neighbouring states – politically, economically and militarily.

这种怀疑主义论调肯定是禁不起推敲的。眼下的问题不是信任。乌克兰及其邻国的情况很不妙。眼下必须建立一种安全框架。必须促使各方就边界问题达成一项新的外交谅解协议。此外，还必须拿出其他举措，在政治、经济和军事上支持乌克兰及其邻国。

Such a strategy requires some tough intelligence assessments about Ukraine. The loss of Crimea will change the precarious political balance in the country. The remaining pro-Russian factions will be recalculating their prospects and their choices. Ukraine’s friends should judge carefully what the durable, sustainable borders will be.

这样一种策略必须建立在对乌克兰进行严格情报评估的基础上。失去克里米亚将改变该国脆弱的政治平衡。剩余的亲俄派将重新考量他们的前景和选择。乌克兰的盟友应谨慎判断，可持久、可维持的国界线是怎样的。

Some suggest Kiev and its friends should offer Moscow proposals for the “neutralisation” or “Finlandisation” of Ukraine. Bad advice. An agreement legitimising such great power involvement in the character and behaviour of Ukraine’s government could be very dangerous.

有人提议，乌克兰政府及其盟友应该向莫斯科方面表示，乌克兰愿意“中立”或“与俄罗斯亲近”。这是个坏建议。用协议形式使大国对乌克兰政府性质和行为的影响合法化，可能非常危险。

As the current flush of excitement passes, Russian leaders will be living with a redoubled legacy of suspicion among their neighbours. To cite one consequence: the Budapest memorandum of 1994 was agreed to persuade Kiev to give up its former Soviet nuclear weapons. Tearing that up means Ukraine could claim to be entitled to re-evaluate those non-proliferation commitments. There are also large debt, property, and energy issues in play – among others.

随着眼下的兴奋褪去，俄罗斯领导人将面对邻国对其加倍的防备。就说一点影响：1994年的《布达佩斯安全防卫备忘录》是为说服乌克兰政府放弃前苏联的核武而达成的。撕毁该备忘录意味着，乌克兰可以宣称，它有权重新审视不扩散核武的承诺。此外，还会有大量债务、房地产和能源问题，等等。

Russia will eventually need a new, durable international settlement that reassures neighbours, if only a little. Ukraine will eventually need such a settlement, too. That is why western strategy today should be guided by a coalition plan that looks ahead to the future, deliberately setting the table now for the next stage of work.

俄罗斯最终将需要一份新的、可持久的国际协议，以安抚邻国——哪怕可能效果有限。乌克兰最终也需要这样一份协议。正因如此，眼下西方策略应该着眼于一份面向未来的合作方案，有意识地为下一阶段的工作做好准备。

The writer is a professor of history at the University of Virginia and former counsellor of the US Department of State

本文作者是弗吉尼亚大学(University of Virginia)历史学教授，美国国防部前顾问