奥威尔会怎么看特朗普

The Munich Security Conference used to be the place where western leaders talked about bad and dangerous things happening elsewhere in the world. This year the conversation was all about bad and dangerous things imperilling democracy at home. Donald Trump topped everyone’s threat list. The Europeans were alarmed by the US president’s opening weeks; the Americans promised to do their best to hold him in check.

过去，西方领导人在慕尼黑安全会议(Munich Security Conference)上一般谈论世界其他地区发生的糟糕、危险的事情。今年会议上谈论的全是危及西方民主的糟糕、危险的事情。唐纳德?特朗普(Donald Trump)排在所有人的威胁清单上的首位。欧洲人对特朗普上任头几周的表现感到不安；美国人承诺尽力控制住他。

Some things do not change. Sergei Lavrov, the veteran Russian foreign minister, turned up to deliver his ritual charge of Nato perfidy. The Kremlin, though, has lost some spring from its step since Russophile-leaning Michael Flynn was forced out as Mr Trump’s national security adviser. The terrible conflict in Syria had western heads shaking in knowing powerlessness. Many warned of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist ambitions.

有些事情没有改变。资深的俄罗斯外长谢尔盖?拉夫罗夫(Sergei Lavrov)出席了会议，例行公事地指责北约背信弃义。然而，有亲俄倾向的迈克尔?弗林(Michael Flynn)被迫辞去总统国家安全顾问一职以后，克林姆林宫就有些底气不足。叙利亚的可怕冲突让西方领导人不由得摇头，他们知道自己对此无能为力。许多人警告俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔?普京(Vladimir Putin)抱有复仇主义野心。

As for Mr Trump, stories abounded of a dysfunctional administration, eccentric working habits and power struggles between inner circle ideologues and the president’s more orthodox cabinet choices. Everyone despaired of the vanishing border between truth and lies.

关于特朗普，人们谈论的全是无法正常运转的政府、古怪的工作习惯以及核心圈子里的理论家与更为正统的内阁人选之间的权力争斗。所有人都对真相与谎言之间的界限日趋消亡感到绝望。

The Republican contingent, led by Senator John McCain, predicted bruising encounters ahead. Mike Pence, the vice-president, pulled off, just, the feat of sounding loyal to Mr Trump while discarding his foreign policy.

以参议员约翰?麦凯恩(John McCain)为首的共和党人预计未来会有激烈交锋。副总统迈克?彭斯(Mike Pence)刚干了件了不起的事，他在抛弃特朗普外交政策的同时，听上去还在对特朗普大表忠诚。

The really gloomy talk, though, was not so much about the fact of Mr Trump as about the fact that voters had put him in the WHite House. Like demagogues through time, he had seized the opportunity presented by a deeper malaise.

然而，真正令人沮丧的谈话，更多是关于选民把他选上台的事实，而不是关于特朗普其人其事。与历史上的煽动家一样，他抓住了一个更深层的问题带来的机会。

The political classes are some way off an agreed diagnosis of this sickness, let alone a prescription for its cure. Sure, the Republican establishment’s “containment strategy” could blunt the worst instincts of the president, but what then for his “movement”? These days, the dispossessed carry automatic weapons in preference to pitchforks.

政治阶层仍未就这个问题的诊断达成一致，更别提开出解决问题的处方了。当然，共和党建制派的“遏制战略”可能削弱特朗普最糟糕的本能，但是他的“运动”呢？如今，赤贫者带着自动武器而非干草叉。

In any event, the insurgency is not confined to the US. It played a part in Britain’s vote on the EU referendum. It is fuelling far-right nationalism across Europe. If events go badly wrong, it could put Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s xenophobic National Front, into the Elysée Palace. The French presidential contest will probably be the most consequential political event of 2017. Mr Trump’s disdain for the Atlantic community’s postwar architecture is worrying. Ms Le Pen would tear it down.

不管怎样，反叛不只发生在美国。它在英国退欧公投中也有一定影响。它正在助长欧洲各地的极右翼民族主义。如果形势严重恶化，它还可能让法国仇外的国民阵线(National Front)的领导人马琳?勒庞(Marine Le Pen)入主爱丽舍宫。法国总统大选可能会成为2017年最重要的政治事件。特朗普鄙视大西洋共同体的战后框架令人担忧。勒庞将会撕毁这一框架。

What has happened is that large segments of the population have withdrawn their consent for the democratic order. For 70 years the political argument in liberal democracies has been largely about “means”. Right and left could disagree, often angrily, about the distribution of power, the relationship between the state and the individual, and the pace of societal change, but they signed up to essentially the same pluralist framework.

现在的情况是，大批民众不再赞同民主秩序。过去70年来，自由民主体制中的政治争论基本上与“方式”有关。右翼和左翼对权力分配、政府与个人之间的关系以及社会改革步伐存在分歧，往往还对此感到愤怒，但他们一致同意基本上一样的多元化框架。

The populists have upturned the debate: now it is about the “ends”. Mr Trump, spurred by his White House strategic adviser Stephen Bannon, imagines an entirely different order — one that is robustly nationalist and protectionist and guards the privileges of the native, white, Christian majority. The values of the old order — human dignity, pluralism, the role of law, protection for minorities — have no place in this identity politics. Nor do the institutions of democracy. Judges, media and the rest are “enemies of the people”.

民粹主义者颠覆了这场辩论：现在它与“目的”有关。在白宫战略顾问斯蒂芬?班农(Stephen Bannon)的鼓动下，特朗普设想了一种截然不同的秩序——一种坚决奉行民族主义和保护主义、捍卫本土白人基督徒这些“多数人”的利益的秩序。旧秩序的价值观——人类尊严、多元化、法律的作用和保护少数群体——在这种身份政治中没有任何位置。民主的各项制度同样如此。法官、媒体以及其他机构是“人民的敌人”。

An “America first” foreign policy is part of the same construct. Mr Bannon, the ideologue who informs Mr Trump’s impulses, anticipates a civilisational clash with Islam and a war with China. The flirtation with Mr Putin is about confessional and cultural solidarity against an imagined barbarian threat.

“美国优先”的外交政策是相同架构的一部分。激发特朗普冲动的理论家班农预感会与伊斯兰爆发文明冲突、与中国开战。与普京亲密互动为的是在信仰和文化上抱团，以防范想象中的野蛮人威胁。

Why now? Everyone has their own explanation as to why the Trumps and Le Pens have succeeded where others have failed to tap into the anger and anxieties of so many. Stagnating incomes, hubristic elites, post-crash austerity, the insecurities thrown up by technology and globalisation, the cultural shocks of migration — all played a part. I am not sure they explain the striking energy of the insurgents.

为何是现在？为何特朗普和勒庞之流能成功利用这么多人的愤怒和担忧情绪，而其他人却失败？对于其中原因，每个人都会有自己的解释。收入停滞、精英傲慢、危机后的紧缩政策、技术和全球化造成的不安全感，以及移民带来的文化冲击——这些都有一定的影响。我不确定它们能否解释反叛者那种引人注目的声势。

This is about more than flat living standards and rising migration. The other day a German friend recalled the 1930s, and reminded me of George Orwell’s review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Writing in 1940, Orwell reflected on the complacency of that era’s progressives. The ruling assumption had been that material welfare — the greatest happiness of the greatest number — would safeguard the prevailing order.

这不只与生活水平停滞和移民人数增加有关。前几天，一位德国朋友回忆起上世纪30年代，并向我提起了乔治?奥威尔(George Orwell)对希特勒(Hitler)所写的《我的奋斗》(Mein Kampf)一书的评论。奥威尔在这篇写于1940年的书评中反思了那个时代的进步分子的自满情绪。当时主流的想法是，物质福利（最大多数人的最大幸福）将保障主要秩序。

But, in Orwell’s words, “human beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades”. It helps, he might have added, if the promised struggle is rooted in identity, with “the other” — be they Jews or Muslims — the enemy.

但用奥威尔的话来说，“人类不仅仅想要舒适、安全、工作时间短、卫生、生育控制以及总体的共识……他们也想要战斗和自我牺牲，至少是时断时续的战斗和自我牺牲，更不用说战鼓、战旗和表现忠诚的列队了”。他或许还可以加上一句，如果承诺的战斗源于身份，“其他人”——不管是犹太人还是穆斯林——是敌人，那就更好了。

Nazism and Fascism, Orwell was saying, had caught a psychological current. Emotions elbowed aside economic calculation. Something similar is happening today if not, thankfully, on the same level of evil delusion.

奥威尔当时表示，纳粹主义和法西斯主义抓住了人们的心理潜流。情感挤掉了经济方面的考量。如今正在发生类似的事情，不过谢天谢地的是，邪恶妄想的程度不一样。

For Orwell’s generation the only answer was to fight for its values. Perhaps there is a message here too for all the liberals who have blithely assumed these past few decades that it was enough to declare the end of history.

对奥威尔那代人来说，唯一的答案是为他们的价值观而战。过去几十年来那些轻率地认定如今已足以宣告历史终结的自由主义者，或许也可以从中领会到什么。