乌克兰仍可借助改革实现繁荣
The crisis in Ukraine has revived memories of the cold war and sparked fears of a new one. But as vulnerable as the country looks – with Crimea annexed and Russian troops on its borders – many are equally discouraged by its economic fragility, including slow growth and a fiscal deficit exceeding 5 per cent of gross domestic product.
乌克兰危机再度勾起了人们对冷战的回忆，并引发了人们对新冷战的担忧。然而，就像乌克兰看上去不堪一击（克里米亚被俄罗斯吞并，同时俄罗斯大军压境）一样，很多人对于该国的经济脆弱同样感到失望，包括增长缓慢以及财政赤字对国内生产总值(GDP)的比例高于5%。Yet Ukraine’s economic plight does not mean its economic future has to be bleak. Like Poland in 1989, it has great potential for improvement. And if it addresses its problems with the right reforms it can still release that potential as Poland did quarter of a century ago.
然而，乌克兰当前的经济困境并不意味着，其经济未来肯定一片黯淡。与1989年的波兰一样，乌克兰具有经济转好的巨大潜力。如果能够借助适当的改革解决好各个问题，乌克兰仍能像25年前的波兰那样把潜力释放出来。Since the collapse of communism, huge variations in long-term growth have appeared in the former Soviet block While Poland’s gross domestic product had doubled by 2013, that of Ukraine remains below its initial level. Institutional change, or the lack of it, is a key to this divergence. Poland and most other former Soviet countries swiftly restructured state machinery to enable the growth of dynamic, politically autonomous private companies in competitive domestic markets. By contrast in Ukraine, as in Russia, crony capitalism took hold. Politically connected businesspeople can use political patronage to take over the assets of less fortunate entrepreneurs while some politicians use their power to enrich themselves.
This limits competition, efficiency and structural change, works against small and medium enterprises, curbs investment and fosters a shadow economy. The ensuing poor economic performance and blatant unfairness lead to deep distrust of politicians, who respond by competing for popularity with fiscally disastrous policies such as fuel subsidies. These features of Ukraine’s regime grew worse under President Viktor Yanukovich, ejected last month after the protests in Kiev’s Maidan Square.
这限制了竞争、效率和结构性改革，不利于中小企业，同时阻碍了投资并培育了一个影子经济。继而出现的经济表现疲弱和明目张胆的不公平，导致人们对政客的极度不信任，政客们的回应是用能源补贴等有损财政健康的政策来争夺选民的支持。在总统维克多•亚努科维奇(Viktor Yanukovich)的领导下，乌克兰政府的这些特点变得更为糟糕，在基辅独立广场爆发抗议后，亚努科维奇在上月遭到驱逐。However, there is no cause for condescension towards Ukrainians. The conditions they inherited from the Societ era, including high inflation and poor state structures, were tougher than those in Poland. Western economies have their own problems arising from mistaken policies. For example, the availability of easy credit led to costly boom-and-bust episodes in the US, Britain, Greece, Spain and Ireland and to delays in structural reforms in Italy and France. So it is no surprise that both problems cropped up in Ukraine, the fastest-growing country in Europe between 2002 and 2008.
然而，我们没有理由在乌克兰人面前表现得高人一等。他们从前苏联时代所继承的状况（包括高通胀以及疲弱政府结构），要比波兰更为严峻。西方经济体本身有着因错误政策引发的问题。例如，宽松信贷政策导致美国、英国、希腊、西班牙和爱尔兰出现代价高昂的荣衰期，并导致意大利和法国推迟了结构性改革。因此，这两个问题突然出现在乌克兰就毫不奇怪了，2002年至2008年，乌克兰是欧洲增长最快的国家。More importantly, even though embarking on comprehensive and radical reforms immediately after the collapse of communism has proved more effective, reforms undertaken later have also worked. In the late 1990s Bulgaria rid itself of hyperinflation and recovered from financial collapse by introducing a currency board. It has since displayed impressive fiscal and monetary stability. Poland accelerated privatisation, reformed its pension system and strengthened local government in 1998-2000. A small but competent, cohesive group of reformers with a clear leadership can turn a country around given a political mandate and sufficient time.
更为重要的是，尽管事实证明，在共产主义倒台后立即启动全面且彻底的改革是更有效的，但以后实行的改革也起到了作用。上世纪90年代末，保加利亚引入了货币发行局制度，消除了恶性通胀并从金融危机中复苏。此后，该国展现出了不俗的财政和货币稳定局面。1998年至2000年，波兰加速了私有化进程，改革了养老金制度并增强了地方政府的实力。如果获得政治授权并假以一定时日，一个规模小但有能力和凝聚力的改革者团队，再加上清晰的领导权是能够让一个国家脱胎换骨的。The general goal of the necessary reforms is clear to many Ukrainians, regardless of which part of the country they live in: replace the existing unfair and inefficient system with the one that increases economic freedom for all; and respect the rule of law, thus generating more rapid and sustained economic growth.
对于很多乌克兰人而言，不管他们生活在该国的哪个地区，必要改革的总体目标是清晰的：用一套扩大为全民经济自由的制度来取代目前不公平且低效率的制度；尊重法治，从而实现更快、更长久的经济增长。It is not intellectually difficult to suggest what form a proper package of reforms should take. It has to be broad and introduced rapidly. It should include measures that make both economic and political sense, such as deregulation to smooth the establishment of enterprises, quick auditing and, following appropriate investigation, dissolving the most corrupt parts of the state. The gas sector, a focus of high-level corruption, needs to be restructured; and the stolen assets recovered from officials. Introducing these measures would reduce resistance to the elimination of massive fuel subsidies.
从学术上指出一份像样的改革计划应采取何种形式，不是一件难事。它必须覆盖范围广，而且应快速推出。它应该包括在经济上和政治上都行得通的举措，例如放松监管，为企业创立提供便利、快速审核以及在适度调查后，消除政府最腐败的部门。天然气行业（腐败最严重的焦点领域）需要接受重组；被窃取的资产应从官员手中收回。引入这些举措将减小取消巨额燃料补贴所面临的阻力。Many economists and politicians in Ukraine know what should be done. The key is the politics – and there are hopeful signs. A society that produced the Maidan movement shows an impressive capacity for self-organisation. Most Ukrainians know a huge gap has appeared in their standard of living relative to that of, say, Poland, and want it to be bridged. Many understand this requires radical reforms and that such reforms are also crucial for strengthening Ukraine’s position relative to Russia. Finally, most oligarchs do not relish the prospect of operating in a subservient position in a Ukraine dominated by Russia.
乌克兰的很多经济学家和政界人士都知道应该采取什么措施。关键是政治，目前的迹象让人充满希望。一个制造了独立广场运动的社会，表现出了了不起的自我组织的能力。多数乌克兰人明白，他们的生活水平与波兰等国存在巨大差距，他们希望弥补这一差距。很多人认为，这需要彻底的改革，而且这种改革对于提高乌克兰与俄罗斯的相对地位至关重要。最后，多数寡头并不期待在一个由俄罗斯主宰的乌克兰低声下气地经商。Which brings me to the final remark. Mr Yanukovich’s downfall has increased Ukraine’s chances of rule of law and democratic reform. This is the most likely reason Vladimir Putin is trying to destabilise the country. The Russian president’s annexation of Crimea has created geopolitical risks that call for a decisive response from a united west. Such a response is also needed to discourage further attempts to destabilise the country and thus obstruct its reforms.
接下来是我的结束语了。亚努科维奇的下台扩大了乌克兰实行法治和民主改革的几率。这是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)试图搅乱该国的最有可能的原因。普京吞并克里米亚之举引发了地缘政治风险，需要西方联合起来做出果断回应。要阻止俄罗斯进一步搅乱乌克兰从而阻碍其改革的企图，也需要这种回应。The writer is a former deputy prime minister of Poland and former president of the Polish central bank
本文作者是波兰前副总理、波兰央行前行长
