特朗普剑指巴基斯坦的“两面性”

Like other US leaders before him, President Donald Trump has concluded that Pakistan is a Janus-faced ally. The country’s security services receive US assistance, while they provide sanctuary to the Taliban and other terrorist organisations at war with the US and its allies, including India.

与之前的美国领导人一样，唐纳德?特朗普(Donald Trump)总统已得出结论：巴基斯坦是一个有两副面孔的盟友。巴安全部门一面接收美国的援助，一面向塔利班(Taliban)等与美国及其盟友（包括印度）开战的恐怖组织提供庇护。

Mr Trump is right in one respect. America is not getting value for the money (some $33bn since the 9/11 terror attacks on the US, according to the US president) it provides to a country whose military and intelligence services, the ISI, have manipulated religious fanatics partly to keep a hand in the great game playing out next door in Afghanistan.

特朗普有一点说对了。美国未从向巴基斯坦提供的援助（根据这位总统的表述，自“9?11”恐怖袭击以来这笔钱已达到约330亿美元）中获得相应回报，而巴军事情报部门“三军情报局”(ISI)操纵着宗教狂热分子，部分目的是继续插手邻国阿富汗上演的大国博弈。

The decision taken last week to suspend $2bn in security assistance is therefore understandable. Moreover, this money has helped to empower parts of the state — the armed forces and ISI — that have enfeebled civilian institutions and civil society. If the suspension can be used as leverage to persuade them to take a firmer line against the Taliban and to support rather than weaken the government, it could prove a worthwhile gamble.

因此，特朗普上周决定暂停向巴基斯坦提供20亿美元安全援助是可以理解的。此外，美国的援助资金过去帮助巴基斯坦部分国家机构——武装部队和三军情报局——增强了实力，同时削弱了文职机构和公民社会的力量。如果暂停援助可以用作筹码来规劝巴军事和情报机构对塔利班采取更强硬的立场，同时支持、而非削弱政府，那此举将是一场值得的赌博。

It is far from certain, however, that this will be the outcome. The ISI was involved in the creation of the Taliban at the outset. Its operatives perceive the group as an asset, which gives them strategic depth. They will let go reluctantly, if at all.

然而，这样的结局还远未确定。三军情报局从一开始就参与了塔利班的创立。该局人员将塔利班看作一种可给他们带来战略纵深的资产。如果真要放弃塔利班，他们会很不情愿。

The substantial risks of blowback persuaded Mr Trump’s predecessors to be more cautious about sanctioning such a complex, unpredictable and potentially dangerous ally. The first is to US troops who rely for supplies on Pakistani co-operation. Mr Trump chose last year to double down on a failing military strategy in Afghanistan. Should Islamabad retaliate against the aid suspension by closing land and air routes, as they did once before in 2011, it would jeopardise the lives of American soldiers. Of the alternative supply routes, one is through Iran and therefore off limits to the US. The other requires co-operation from Russia, which is playing its own double games in the region. It is to be hoped that the Trump administration has a plan B that takes all this into account.

受到反弹的巨大风险使特朗普的前任们对于制裁这样一个复杂、不可预测且具有潜在危险性的盟友更加谨慎。首先是对美国军队的风险，他们依赖与巴基斯坦的合作来获得补给。特朗普去年选择对美国在阿富汗失败的军事战略加大下注。如果巴基斯坦像2011年那样通过关闭陆路和空中通道来报复美国暂停援助，这将危及美军士兵的生命。在替代性补给线中，有一条要通过伊朗，因此对美国而言不可行。另一条需要俄罗斯的合作，后者在该地区也有自己的双重博弈。希望特朗普政府有一个将所有这些因素考虑在内的B计划。

Another consequence of souring relations between Washington and Islamabad is that these strengthen fast-growing ties between Islamabad and Beijing. The Chinese are promising to invest $60bn into Pakistan as part of their one belt one road initiative to extend Beijing’s influence across Asia and beyond.

美巴关系恶化的另一个后果，是将加强巴基斯坦与中国之间快速发展的关系。中国承诺向巴基斯坦投资600亿美元，这是扩大北京方面在整个亚洲及更广大地区影响力的“一带一路”倡议的一部分。

US officials appear surprisingly at ease with this. After all, the Chinese are no more tolerant of radical Islam, and have no interest in seeing Pakistan overrun by it. If Beijing can navigate the duplicity of the Pakistani state more effectively, it would help to ease the burden on America.

出人意料的是，美国官员似乎对此并不在意。毕竟，中国人不再容忍激进的伊斯兰主义，看到巴基斯坦被激进的伊斯兰主义席卷对中国而言没有好处。如果北京方面能更有效地驾驭巴基斯坦的两面性，这将有助于减轻美国的负担。

Yet, were the current dispute between the US and Pakistan to evolve into long-term hostility, it would pose a very real threat. This is a country with more than 100 nuclear warheads. Its civilian government is chronically weak, and the state is threatened by its own homegrown, radical Islamists — another reason why the security forces have been reluctant to provoke a more direct conflict with them.

然而，如果当前美巴之间的争端演变成长期敌对，那将造成真正的威胁。巴基斯坦拥有100多枚核弹头，文职政府长期处于弱势，该国还受到本土激进伊斯兰主义者的威胁，这也是巴安全部队不愿更直接地与他们发生冲突的另一个原因。

The case for reducing aid to Pakistan has long been clear. Ideally, it will prompt Islamabad to earn back the US assistance it has lost. But Pakistan’s internal weaknesses, the terrorists it harbours and its nuclear arsenal make for an explosive mix. Sanctions do not make a policy in and of themselves. Washington also needs to figure out how to lower the odds of Pakistan becoming a failed state.

减少对巴基斯坦援助的理由一直都摆在那里。理想的情况是，此举将促使巴基斯坦做出努力重新赢得其失去的美援。但是巴基斯坦内部的种种薄弱点、其庇护的恐怖分子以及核武库构成了一个易爆的混合体。制裁本身并非一项政策。华盛顿方面还需想办法降低巴基斯坦成为一个失败国家的可能性。