特朗普为何无法离间中俄
The 2014 Russian military intervention inUkraine resulted in Western sanctions and strategic pressure that drove Moscowtoward greater cooperation with China. Since then, the mercurial Sino-Russian“marriage of convenience” has evolved into a genuine strategic partnershipbased on overlapping interests, and mutual antipathy toward the United ough Russia and China are unlikely to declare a formal alliance, it is notin America’s strategic interests to confront a de facto Sino-Russian entente.
Donald Trump’s election generated hope insome conservative foreign policy circles that U.S. rapprochement with Russiacould create distance between Moscow and Beijing. Proponents ofrapprochement hearken back to Nixon and Kissinger’s “triangulardiplomacy,” which exploited the Sino-Soviet split to achieve an opening toChina, and positioned Washington for better relations with both Communistgiants than they had with each other. Cato Institute fellow Doug Bandow espousesthis viewpoint in a piece entitled “A Nixon Strategy toBreak the Russia-China Axis.” He argues that improving relations with Russia“would have the salutary side effect of discouraging creation of a commonRusso-Chinese front against the United States.” America’s leading offensiverealist, John Mearsheimer, likewise claims that if “Washingtonhad a more positive attitude toward Moscow,” this would engender betterrelations that would eventually lead Russia to join “the balancing coalitionagainst China.”
特朗普的选举团队中有不少持有保守外交政策的人士，他们主张恢复美俄友好关系，拉大中俄间距离。重新采用尼克松基辛格的“三角外交”策略，“三角外交”是利用中苏分裂来打造一个开放的中国，拉近华盛顿与共产主义巨人相互间关系，离间中苏。卡托研究所研究员道格班多支持这一观点，他在一篇题为《尼克松策略打破中俄轴心》的文章表示，“改善与俄罗斯的关系”将会出现正面溢出效应，即阻碍中俄联合对抗美国。”类似地美国鹰派代表人物，约翰米尔斯海默同样主张，如果对莫斯科的态度更加积极，美苏关系会变得更好，最后会导致俄罗斯加入“平衡联盟”来对付中国。Bandow and Mearsheimer’s arguments arebased on a realist explanatory model, wherein relations between America,Russia, and China are conceived as a “strategic triangle.” According to thisframework, it is logical for Trump to pursue Kissinger-style triangulardiplomacy to seek an opening to the weaker power, Russia, in order to balanceand attain leverage over the stronger power, China.
班多和米尔斯海默的观点是基于现实角度来进行解释的，其中美国，俄罗斯，和中国被看作是一个“战略三角”。根据这一构想，依照基辛格三角外交论，为制衡中国，特朗普需联合一个国力较弱的国家，因此最符合逻辑的非俄罗斯莫属。
In the current international context, thisapproach is problematic for several reasons. First, the deep ideologicalfissures that drove the Soviet Union and China apart during the late 1950s and1960s are nonexistent today. Furthermore, Sino-Russian geopolitical competitionhas lessened because Russia, unlike its Soviet predecessor, is a secondarypower in Asia. As a result, there is little indication that Trump, despite hisrapport with Vladimir Putin, can drive a wedge between Russia and ainly there is room to improve U.S.-Russia relations from their currentnadir, which could yield selective cooperation on mutual challenges such as theIslamic State (ISIS). However, there is little indication that achieving themodest improvements in U.S.-Russia relations that are politically andpractically feasible would drive Moscow and Beijing apart.
在目前国际形势下，这种方法是有问题的，有几个原因。首先，中苏思想分裂是在50、60年代发生的，现在则不存在。此外中俄之间几乎没有地缘之争，因为俄罗斯不像前苏联，现在的俄罗斯成了亚洲第二大国。据目前来看，几乎没有迹象表明，特朗普与普京之间的关系（互动）会变成插入俄中间的楔子。但从目前已处于谷底的美俄间关系来看，双方有着改善的空间，譬如在ISIS问题上虽有挑战但又可以有合作。但无论如何，在当前的政治现实环境下，要想俄罗斯与北京决裂，实现美俄友好，几乎没有可能。The situation that Nixon confronted in Asiais not analogous to the one Trump deals with today. Unlike China and Russia atpresent, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were lockedin an intense ideological battle for leadership of the Communist world. As Lorenz M.Lüthi details inhis cogent book, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, theSoviet and Chinese Communist parties developed intractable ideologicaldifferences in the 1950s over which socialist development model to pursue. MaoZedong rejected the Khrushchev era model of Bureaucratic Stalinism in favor ofa Revolutionary Stalinist model with Chinese characteristics that produced thecatastrophic “Great Leap Forward.” Ideological rivalry contributed to an acute securitydilemma, particularly after China conducted a successful nuclear test in convulsions unleashed by radical Maoism during China’s Cultural Revolutionfurther exacerbated Sino-Soviet enmity and deeply unnerved the Kremlin, whichthrough 1970 deployed approximately 39 divisions along the Sino-Soviet existential threat of war with the Soviet Union drove Mao to seekrapprochement with America.
尼克松当时在亚洲面临的情况与现在的这桩买卖生意不太相似，无法套用在目前的中俄，（之前）中苏间问题实质是共产主义世界中的意识形态斗争。Lorenz M. Lüthi在他的著作中详细描述道，中苏分裂：在共产主义世界的冷战中，苏联和中国共产党在50年代形成了顽固的意识形态分歧，这是在追求社会主义发展模式所导致的。毛泽东拒绝了赫鲁晓夫时期的斯大林模式，拒绝了一个带有中国特色，产生灾难性“大跃进”且有利于斯大林官僚主义的模式。“意识形态之争导致了严重的安全困境，尤其是中国在1964成功进行了核试验。毛下的文化大革命所引起的动荡进一步加剧了中苏间敌意。深深焦虑的克林姆林宫，在1970年在中苏边界部署了约39个师。与苏联交恶，迫使毛与美国握手言和。Realists give short shrift to the roleideological factors play in fostering comity between Russia and China. Incontrast to the days of the Sino-Soviet split, ideology is now a unifyingfactor in relations. Both countries harbor intense authoritarian nationalistopposition to Western and globalist ideologies, but no longer share the common Marxist-Leninistpolitical orientation that produced the divisive ideological schisms of theCold War. Despite their distinctive brands of authoritarianism (personalistdictatorship versus one-party Leninist state), Putin and China’s rulingCommunist Party have similar views of the threat posed by Western “universalvalues” such as democracy and human rights. They see “foreign influences,”which they believe have penetrated their societies through globalization, theinternet/social media, and NGOs, as the primary threat to their domestic gripon power. For China and Russian governing elites, these influences are a Trojanhorse designed to spark destabilizing “color revolutions”that produce regimechange in “non-Western” (i.e. authoritarian) political systems.
现实主义者忽略了意识形态在后来中俄友好间所发挥的作用，与中苏交恶时期来比，现在的思想意识具有一致性。中俄两国都怀有强烈的专制意识、反对西方霸权，支持全球化，但双方都不在倾向遵循导致发生冷战、产生思想分裂的马列主义。尽管他们各自具有独特风格，但普京与中国的观念已向贴近西方的“普世价值”，比如在民主和人权方面。他们看到了“外来影响”,他们认为全球化，互联网媒体以及非政府组织正渗入他们的社会，成为影响国内的主要威胁。对于中俄精英，这些影响就像是木马，容易让“非西化”制度的国家发生“颜色革命”从而引发不稳定。Since the 2011 Arab Spring, Moscow andBeijing’s perception of this threat has only grown, as movements demandingdemocracy and reform have swept the globe and reached Russia and China’sdoorsteps through Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Maidan protests and Hong Kong’s 2014“Umbrella Revolution.” Western observers often discount Russian andChinese state media’s obsession with color revolution as authoritarianpropaganda. Nonetheless, as long as Russian and Chinese elites operateunder the assumption that the West is subverting their political systems anddomestic legitimacy, they will be reticent to put much distance between oneanother.
以2011年的“阿拉伯之春”来看，莫斯科与北京认为这种已席卷全球的“民主改革”威胁已既成现实。例如2013-14年间在俄罗斯家门口爆发的“广场抗议”以及2014年中国香港的“雨伞革命”。西方媒体通常不相信俄中这样的专制国家媒体热衷颜色革命。虽然如此。只要俄中认为西方国家是在（设计）颠覆政权体制与国内合法性，他们一定会拉大彼此间距离。Russia-China relations today aregeopolitically dissimilar to the relationship in the 1960s and ’70s. Duringthat time, Moscow and Beijing saw each other as major security threats. Bycontrast, Russia and China’s current strategic objectives are much more impededby the U.S. and its European and Asian allies than they are by one another. China’score strategic objectives are focused on East Asia, restoring control overTaiwan and favorably settling maritime territorial disputes in the East andSouth China Seas. Beijing’s primary obstacle is American naval power, and theweb of U.S. bilateral alliances (the “hub and spokes” system) with regionalpowers such as Japan and Australia. The main obstacle to Russia’s efforts tosecure spheres of interest on its Eastern European, and South Caucasianperipheries is the U.S.-led NATO alliance. The European Union Institute forSecurity Studies recently published a study of China-Russia relationscontaining an interview with a Chinese security expert that epitomizes thissharedthreat perception: “China feels pressure in the South China Sea, andRussia feels pressure from NATO in the Baltic Sea. Russia faces anti-ballisticmissiles systems in Romania and Poland, and China faces the same in South Koreaand Japan. While NATO expands to the East, the U.S. is strengthening itsmilitary presence in Asia.”
现在的俄中地缘关系与他们在6、70年代之间的关系不同。那时，莫斯科与北京相互视为主要威胁。但相比之下，俄国的战略目标比中国更能阻碍欧美与亚洲盟友间关系。中国核心战略目标主要集中在东亚，即重新恢复对台湾，中国东海，以及中国南海的控制权。北京面临的挑战主要是美国海军以及美国盟友，譬如日本、澳大利亚等地区大国。俄国是以美国为首的北约，既东欧，南高加索外围利益的主要威胁。欧洲联盟研究所最近公布了中俄安全关系的研究，其中包含了一位中国安全专家的观点，该专家表示，我们都面临同种威胁，“中国感到的压力是在南海，而俄罗斯感受到的则是来自波罗的海的北约压力。俄罗斯面临罗马尼亚和波兰的反导系统，同样，中国面临的是韩国和日本的反导。当北约东扩时，美国正加强其在亚洲的军事存在。”Driven by ideological and geopolitical fearof the West, Russia-China alignment has engendered close collaboration inmutually beneficial areas. Cooperation intensified following Western impositionof sanctions on Russia in 2014. The most high-profile example came in May 2014,when after nearly a decade of negotiations, Moscow finally cut a deal withBeijing to export Siberian gas to China. This followed the 2013 announcement ofa joint venture between Russian oil conglomerate Rosneft and China NationalPetroleum Corporation (CNPC) to develop Eastern Siberian oil and gas fields. Inthe short to medium term, it will take time to overcome economic and logisticalchallenges to develop stronger energy linkages. However, over the longer term,the deals should prove mutually beneficial. Russia secures Chinese investmentand locks in comparatively high prices; China diversifies its energy mix andgains access to new overland energy supplies, which Beijing considers lessvulnerable to geopolitical turmoil and blockade than energyimported from theMiddle East via maritime routes（bluebit）.
受西方的意识形态的影响以及对地缘的忧虑，驱使俄中相互抱团取暖。2014年西方制裁俄罗斯后，中俄双方合作加速。最引人注意的例子是，2014年5月莫斯科与北京经历近十年谈判，莫斯科最终同北京达成协议。该协议由俄罗斯巨头ROSENT与中国天然气总公司在2013年签署并向外宣告，协议内容为在中短期内共同开发西伯利亚的天然气与石油。若要加强能源合作，这份协议需要时间来克服经济与行政支持上的挑战。然而，从长远来看，交易是互利共赢的。俄罗斯保护中国投资，并锁定相对较高的（投资）价格；中国能源变得多样化且获得新的陆上能源供应，比起中东海上石油路线，北京人为不会轻易受到地缘政治动荡和封锁的影响。The arms trade provides another example ofsymbiosis in Russia-China relations. The trade helps Russia ameliorate itsbiggest weakness — a feeble and energy export-dependent economy — while helpingChina sustain its ongoing military modernization efforts. Historically, a majorimpediment to this trade was Chinese reverse-engineering of Russian/Sovietarmaments, most notoriously Chinese development of the J-11B fighter, whichis “a direct copy of the Su-27, aone-seat fighter that was developed by the Soviets through the 1970s and 1980sas a match for the U.S. F-15 and F-16.” The problem of Chinesereverse-engineering was so severe that Moscow placed an informal ban on exportsof high technology military equipment to China in 2004. However, Putin’s recentapproval of advanced weaponry sales to China such as the Su-35 fighter and theS-400 Surface-to-Air Missile system indicates the moratorium has been bly, both parties agreed not to include technology transfer licenses inthese deals, which should reduce the feasibility (and resultant friction) ofChinese reverse engineering. The trade will remain mutually beneficial so longas Russia’s economy leans on arms exports (defense manufacturing employs 2.5-3million workers, around 20 percent of Russian manufacturing jobs), and China’smilitary industrial complex remain suboptimal at indigenously producing keytechnologies such as high performance jet engines and advanced conventionalattack submarines. Russia will also increasingly rely on China as a keycustomer, as India, long the biggest buyer of Soviet/Russian arms, diversifies itssuppliers and develops its domestic defense industry. China’s dependence onRussia for advanced military technology is further reinforced by lack of accessto European and American technology due to a Western arms embargo on China inplace since 1989.
俄中关系中武器贸易也成了另一项例证。这种贸易对国力虚弱依靠能源出口的俄罗斯有很大的助益，同时也有利于中国军事现代化的发展。从历史来看，贸易面临的主要问题是中国对俄罗斯或前苏联军备的工程仿制，比如臭名远扬的歼-11B战机，这就是对“SU-27战斗机的直接复制，SU-27是单座战机，是上世纪7、80年代前苏联为对抗美国F-15、16而研制的战机。”由于中国的逆向工程如此强悍，莫斯科曾在2004年颁布了（专门）针对中国高技术军事装备出口的非正式禁令。然而，普京最近向中国销售了不少先进武器，比如SU-35战机与S-400地空导弹，这说明禁令已经解除。但值得注意的是，双方都同意不包括技术转移，这将大大减小中国逆向工程的可行性（由此双方可能会产生摩擦）。双方贸易将保持互利，俄罗斯经济只需依靠武器出口（国防制造工人若有2.5-3万，俄罗斯制造业既有20%的就业机会），因为中国军事工业复合体对自行生产高性能喷气发动机和先进常规潜艇攻击的关键技术总是不满意。俄罗斯也将越来越把中国视作与印度相同的重要客户，至于印度，一直是苏/俄制武器的最大买家，储备多种武器并发展其国内的国防工业。由于欧美在1989年对中国实施先进武器禁运，中国对俄罗斯的先进武器技术愈发依赖。Western observers often highlight thetensions lurking below the surface of Sino-Russian relations, particularlyChinese economic expansion into Central Asia, and Russian arms sales to China’sregional rivals, primarily India and Vietnam. Nonetheless, these sources offriction are manageable, and, furthermore, the United States has limitedability to exploit them. For example, it would not be in U.S. interests forSino-Russian competition to intensify in Central Asia, as this would contributeto regional instability and hamstring regional cooperation against Islamistextremism. If the U.S. and Europe succeed in breaking Russian dominance of thearms trade with India and Vietnam, this would actually have the effect ofreducing a source of tension between Moscow and Beijing（bluebit）.
西方观察家经常突出中俄表面下潜藏的紧张关系，尤其是对中国的中亚经济扩张，以及俄罗斯向中国区域竞争对手如印度越南出售武器。无论怎样，这些衍生摩擦是可控的，但进一步来看，美国可以利用它们。例如，在中亚加强对抗俄国，不符合美国的利益，因为这有利于地区不稳定，在联合对抗伊斯兰极端主义时会产生障碍。如果美欧成功打破俄罗斯对印度、越南的武器贸易主导，这实际上将削弱了莫斯科和北京间的紧张关系。Since Washington will have difficultyexploiting divisions between China and Russia, it makes little sense to “freezeout” one party and pursue rapprochement with the other in the hopes ofachieving the sort of realignment that Nixon pulled off in the early is evidenced by previous President Barack Obama’s experience with Russiaand China. Although relations with both Moscow and Beijing became strainedunder Obama, the U.S.-China relationship, despite a growing rivalry in the Asia-Pacificregion, remained more functional. It could even be said that Washington andBeijing have developed a peculiar sort of “special relationship.” This is bestexemplified by continuing high-level engagement through the annual Strategicand Economic Dialogue (S&ED), an intensive, routinized series of bilateralsummits, where American and Chinese leaders engage on an array of internationalissues. Despite many disagreements, Beijing has a working relationship withWashington, and Moscow does not. As a result, China now occupies the positionthat Nixon’s America enjoyed during the 1970s: Beijing enjoys closer relationswith the two other powers in the strategic triangle than they have with oneanother.
由于华盛顿很难利用中俄间隙分裂彼此，因此利用“离间”以及70年代尼克松为追求和解实现重组的方法毫无意义。早前奥巴马在俄中间既已体验过。尽管在奥巴马时期内莫斯科与北京出现不和，美中在亚太地区竞争愈发激烈，但（美中）还保持着交流。甚至可以说，美中之间发展出一种“特殊关系”。美中年度战略与经济对话峰会，美中高层持续密集接触，共同探讨一系列国际话题，便是最好的例证。北京与华盛顿间尽管既有分歧但又有合作，而与莫斯科则不是。因此，中国目前所居位置就好比70年代尼克松的美国：在战略三角中，北京与其他两国的关系比起另两国间的关系，更为紧密。An effective strategy for Trump toforestall consolidation of a Sino-Russian bloc would be to opt for selectiveengagement with both Beijing and Moscow. Obviously, engagement would have to becoupled with continued hedging against intensifying security competition withRussia in Europe, and China in Asia. Nevertheless, the Trump administrationshould also recognize that the shared perception in Beijing and Moscow thatWashington aims to subvert and internally weaken its non-democratic rivals isdetrimental to relations with both Russia and China, and strengthensSino-Russian cooperation. Consequently, special efforts should be made toassure Moscow and Beijing that Washington has no interest in interfering intheir internal politics. This, rather than tilting toward Moscow, would go along way toward assuaging the anxiety that Russian and Chinese elites feelabout the United States. If Beijing and Moscow begin to see the United Statesas a normal state with its own interests and goals, rather than a fadinghegemon bent onideological dominance, it would help make triangular diplomacypossible once again.
特朗普的一种有效阻止中俄靠近的策略是，选择性地与北京、莫斯科接触。显然，在与日俱增的安全竞争中，对待欧洲的俄罗斯以及亚洲的中国，既要接触又必须保持反制。然而，特朗普政府也应该注意到北京、莫斯科的看法，华盛顿颠覆对方、瓦解对方内部的方法，会损害俄中关系，阻碍中俄合作。因此，华盛顿应特别注意，不要去干涉莫斯科、北京的内政。因此，即使对付莫斯科，也应该让用很长一段时间让他们放下警惕，也不要影响俄中精英对美国的感觉。如果北京和莫斯科人平常开始认为美国是为了他们自身的利益，而不是一个一心想夺回支配权的衰落霸主，这将有助于使三角外交成为再次可能。
